

Canadian Jewish Barometer / Baromètre juif canadien 2026

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**Canadian Jewish Barometer 2026:
Pressures on Canadian Jews and their Responses^I**

Abstract

This report is based mainly on a survey of 3,062 adult Canadian residents, including oversamples of Quebecers, Muslims, and Jews. The survey was in the field from January 15 to February 11, 2026. It focuses on how the attitudes of non-Jews toward Jews and Israel have changed since early 2024 and how that change has affected Canada's Jews. Its main findings are as follows: (1) Non-Jewish Canadians' attitudes toward Jews and especially toward Israel have become significantly more negative since 2024, (2) The percentage of individuals with negative perceptions of Jews and Israel varies in explicable ways across different groups and population categories, (3) In 2026 as in 2024, the correlation between attitudes toward Jews and attitudes toward Israel is moderate, so attitudes toward Israel are still important to understanding the spread of antisemitism, (4) Canadian Jews are most inclined to believe that attitudes toward Jews and Israel have grown more negative because of media coverage criticizing Israel's actions during the war in Gaza and the way Israel actually prosecuted the war, (5) Canadian Jews are considerably more fearful of their position in Canadian society than they were in 2024 and believe that the situation will grow worse in the near future, (6) A rift has grown between Jews who believe the government of Israel should not be criticized insofar as it lacks viable strategic alternatives and Jews who believe the government of Israel should be criticized for adopting strategies that prevent compromise with the Palestinians and violate traditional liberal-democratic principles on which the Jewish state was founded. Based on these findings, the report recommends strategies for mitigating negative sentiment toward Jews and Israel and reducing polarization in the Jewish community.

Résumé

Ce rapport repose principalement sur un sondage mené auprès de 3 062 résidents adultes canadiens, incluant un suréchantillonnage de personnes québécoises, musulmanes et juives. Le sondage s'est déroulé du 15 janvier au 11 février 2026. Il porte sur l'évolution de l'antisémitisme depuis début 2024 et sur ses répercussions sur la population juive canadienne. Ses principaux constats sont les suivants : 1) l'attitude des Canadiens non juifs envers les Juifs, et plus particulièrement envers Israël, est devenue nettement plus négative depuis 2024 ; 2) le pourcentage de personnes ayant une perception négative des Juifs et d'Israël varie de façon explicable selon les différents groupes et catégories de population ; 3) en 2026 comme en 2024, la corrélation entre l'attitude envers les Juifs et l'attitude envers Israël est modérée, de sorte que les attitudes envers Israël sont toujours importantes pour comprendre la propagation de l'antisémitisme. 4) les Juifs canadiens sont majoritairement enclins à croire que la dégradation de l'opinion publique à l'égard des Juifs et d'Israël est due à la couverture médiatique critiquant les actions d'Israël durant la guerre à Gaza et la

manière dont ce conflit a été mené ; 5) les Juifs canadiens sont beaucoup plus inquiets pour leur place dans la société canadienne qu'en 2024 et pensent que la situation va s'aggraver prochainement ; 6) Un fossé s'est creusé entre les Juifs qui estiment que le gouvernement israélien ne devrait pas être critiqué tant qu'il ne dispose pas d'alternatives stratégiques viables et ceux qui pensent qu'il devrait l'être pour avoir adopté des stratégies empêchant tout compromis avec les Palestiniens et violant les principes libéraux et démocratiques traditionnels sur lesquels l'État juif a été fondé. À partir de ces constats, le rapport recommande des stratégies visant à atténuer les sentiments négatifs envers les Juifs et Israël et à réduire la polarisation au sein de la communauté juive.

The End of Canadian Jewry's Golden Age

The golden age of Canadian Jewry stretched from the early 1960s to the early 2020s. During that period, Jewish Canadians experienced substantial upward mobility and increasing integration into the social, economic, and political mainstream. These developments occurred in the broader context of Canada's official adoption of multiculturalism in 1971 and expanding opportunities in higher education, business, and professional employment. Today, however, most Canadian Jews feel less secure than they did during the golden age because antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes are more widespread and often accompanied by antagonistic behaviour toward Jews.

According to B'nai Brith's annual audit of antisemitic incidents, the number of antisemitic acts started to rise quickly in the early 2000s, coincident with the second intifada and the founding of the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement.² Yet, until 2023, many scholars paid insufficient attention to the significance of this trend. In 2012 the late Irving Abella wrote that "anti-Semitism is no longer ... a major concern for Canadian Jews."³ In 2018, Morton Weinfeld agreed that "Jewish life in Canada is a success story."⁴ In 2021, historian David S. Koffman suggested that Canada is perhaps better for the Jews than any other diaspora country, past or present.⁵

One reason for this blind spot is that we lacked adequate attitudinal data. The first nationwide survey assessing the level and distribution of attitudes toward Jews and Israel, the relationship between the two sets of attitudes, and Jewish Canadians' responses to their new reality was conducted four months after the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023.⁶ By that time many members of the Canadian Jewish public had begun to think that the golden age was ending.


In the wake of the attack and the ensuing Israel-Hamas war, spontaneous and organized hostility toward Jews in their neighbourhoods, places of worship, schools, businesses, and workplaces spread. Activists marched into Jewish neighbourhoods, harassing Jews. Anti-Zionist encampments sprang up on twenty-five universi-

ty campuses. Activists expressed hostility toward the existence of Israel and toward Jewish students, faculty members, and administrative staff who disagreed with their ideas, rhetoric, and tactics.⁷ Public schools became sites of organized hostility against Jews, with guns fired at several school buildings.⁸ Arsonists set fires to synagogues. Physical assaults of Jews became more common.

In 2025, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) in the United States conducted a survey of more than one hundred countries to discover the percentage of people with an “elevated level of negative attitudes toward Jews” residing in each country.⁹ It turns out that 8 percent of Canadian adults—2.6 million people—reach that standard. Since there are about 321,000 Jewish adults in Canada, this means there are arguably eight adult antisemites for every adult Jew in the country.

The annual number of police-recorded hate crimes per hundred thousand members of a group is a reliable indicator of the impact of hate crime on a group. In 2024, there was one anti-Jewish hate crime for every 366 Jews in Canada (Figure 1).¹⁰ To place this number in perspective, there was one anti-Black hate crime for every 1,961 Blacks and one anti-Muslim hate crime for every 9,091 Muslims in that year. Because the impact of hate crime is more severe for Jews than for any other ethnic, racial, or religious group in Canada, Jews are the only group in the country that now requires surveillance cameras, protective fencing, bollards, and security guards at its places of worship, schools, and other community institutions.

Figure 1
Police-reported hate crimes per 100,000 members of the three groups experiencing most hate crimes, Canada, 2014–2024



What and How the Barometer Measures

What are this study’s research questions?

Four sets of questions drive our inquiry. First, how can we characterize non-Jewish Canadians’ attitudes toward Jews and Israel; how, if at all, have these attitudes

changed over the past two years; and how are these attitudes distributed across different religious, ethnic, racial, age, and political-ideological groups? Second, what specific attitudes and actions do Canadian Jews consider antisemitic; how often do they experience such attitudes and actions; and how worried are they about their future in this country? Third, what is the relationship between attitudes toward Jews and attitudes toward Israel; how has this relationship changed since 2024; and why do many non-Jews view this relationship differently than many Jews do? Fourth, what policies might reduce unfavourable sentiment toward Jews and Israel?

Our answers to these questions are far from definitive. However, we base them mainly on data from a large web panel survey of Canadian adults that was appropriately weighted to match key population characteristics. We also refer to the results of other recent surveys that touch on the subjects of this report and a broader research literature to establish context for some of our findings and arguments. Accordingly, we believe we are able to provide useful and reliable insights regarding the pressures facing Canadian Jews, their current state of mind, their near-term prospects, and ways they might deal with these pressures.

Sampling, weighting, and analysis

Our survey sampled four categories of Canadians. The general population sample consists of 3,062 adults who reside in Canada. In nineteen of twenty random samples of this size, the maximum margin of error would be ± 1.8 percent.¹¹ The sample of 3,062 individuals includes three oversamples. The Quebec oversample is composed of 1,208 adults who reside in Quebec. In nineteen of twenty random samples of this size, the maximum margin of error would be ± 2.8 percent. The Muslim oversample consists of 514 adults who identify as Muslim. In nineteen of twenty random samples of this size, the maximum margin of error would be ± 4.3 percent.¹² The Jewish oversample is composed of 626 adults who identify as Jewish by religion or identify with no religion but identify as Jews by ethnicity. In nineteen of twenty random samples of this size, the maximum margin of error would be ± 3.9 percent.

To maximize representativeness, we weighted the general population sample and the oversamples by age, gender, educational attainment, and annual household income using data from the most recent Canadian census. We also weighted the general population subsample and the Jewish oversample by province of residence, and the Jewish oversample by identification as Jewish according to (1) religion or (2) ethnicity and no religious identification. Finally, we weighted the Jewish oversample by religious denomination, with data on this variable taken from the *2018 Survey of Jews in Canada*, the only available source on this subject.¹³ When the oversamples are folded into the general population sample for purposes of analysis, they are reweighted to correspond to their representation in the general population. For more information on the representativeness of the general population sample and the oversamples, see Appendix A.

We wrote this report for an educated non-specialist audience. It should therefore be regarded as preliminary, with multivariate analyses to appear later in professional social science journals. Here we rely on descriptive statistics to tell our story.¹⁴

Canadian Attitudes toward Jews

How did attitudes toward Jews change between 2024 and 2026?

The “Barometer 2026” survey measures non-Jewish Canadians’ attitudes toward Jews in the same way as “Jews and Israel 2024: A Survey of Canadian Attitudes and Jewish Perceptions.”¹⁵ In the earlier survey, non-Jews were presented with a set of eight statements about Jews. Some statements were positively worded. For example: “Jewish people should be admired for their resilience in the face of adversity.” Others were negatively worded. For instance: “Jewish people don’t care what happens to anyone but their own kind.” We asked respondents to indicate whether they “strongly disagree,” “disagree,” “slightly disagree,” “slightly agree,” “agree,” or “strongly agree” with each statement. We repeated this procedure for the 2026 survey. Table 1 lists responses to the statements for both years. (See Appendix B for 2026 Quebec-only results.)

Sentiment toward Jews varies substantially. At the negative extreme, 24 percent of non-Jewish Canadians “slightly agree,” “agree,” or “strongly agree” that “Jewish people don’t care what happens to anyone but their own kind.” At the positive extreme, 68 percent of non-Jewish Canadians “slightly agree,” “agree,” or “strongly agree” that “Jewish people should be admired for their resilience in the face of adversity.” For responses to negatively worded statements, the average increased by 5 percentage points between 2024 and 2026. For responses to positively worded statements, the average fell by 10 percentage points between the two survey years. These changes are statistically significant at standard levels, indicating that negative attitudes toward Jews increased over the past two years.

To illustrate change between surveys years, we constructed a composite scale by reverse-coding positive items, averaging responses, and rounding to the closest integer. The resulting scale is cohesive, meaning that each statement is highly correlated with the other statements.¹⁶ The scale ranges from one to six, with six indicating the most negative attitudes towards Jews and one indicating the most positive attitudes. Figure 2 displays the percentage of respondents at each point in the scale for 2024 and 2026.¹⁷

The large decline in the percentage of respondents with the most positive attitudes toward Jews is striking. The percentage scoring one fell 8 percentage points between 2024 and 2026 while the percentage scoring two fell 15 percentage points. Meanwhile, the percentage scoring three rose 15 percentage points and the percent-

age scoring four rose 8 percentage points. These changes are statistically significant. (The percentage scoring five and six did not change significantly between 2024 and 2026.) Note also that the share of “don’t know” responses increased significantly between 2024 and 2026, as Table 1 shows.

Table 1
“The following statements reflect notions that some people have regarding Jewish people. Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements,” non-Jewish Canadian adults, 2026 (2024 in parentheses), in percent


	“Slightly agree,” “agree” or “strongly agree”	“Slightly disagree,” “disagree” or “strongly disagree”	Don’t know/ no answer	Total
Jewish people have too much power in our country today.	21 (13)	50 (54)	29 (23)	100 (100)
Jewish people don’t care what happens to anyone but their own kind.	24 (16)	56 (68)	20 (17)	100 (100)
Jewish people talk too much about the Holocaust.	16 (13)	53 (68)	31 (19)	100 (100)
Jewish people are largely to blame for the negative consequences of globalization.	11 (4)	55 (76)	33 (20)	100 (100)
It is appropriate for opponents of Israel’s policies to boycott Jewish-owned businesses in Canada.	20 (16)	51 (67)	29 (17)	100 (100)
Jewish people should be admired for their resilience in the face of adversity.	68 (73)	12 (9)	20 (18)	100 (100)
Jewish people should be included in the policies that Canadian universities are implementing to increase equity, diversity, and inclusivity in all aspects of university life.	53 (58)	20 (18)	28 (24)	100 (100)
Jewish people should be admired for their achievements despite discrimination against them.	67 (74)	13 (8)	19 (18)	100 (100)
Average	57 (67)***			
Average	17 (12)***			

Note: Shaded cells indicate positive response to negatively worded statements and negative responses to positively worded statements. Unshaded cells indicate positive responses to positively worded statements and negative responses to negatively worded statements. Totals may not equal 100 due to rounding.
*** p < 0.001.

The picture that emerges from these data is one of substantial change in Canadian public opinion over a period of twenty-four months. Twenty of those months coincide with the 2023–2025 Israel–Hamas war. This circumstance leads us to hypothesize that the shift in public opinion is associated with mainstream Jewish organizations and many non-Jewish Canadians moving in opposite directions in their attitudes

toward the war. Mainstream Jewish organizations tended to express solidarity with Israel and eschew criticism of its actions in Gaza. Many non-Jewish Canadians disagreed with the way Israel prosecuted the war. As we note in the next section, 54 percent of non-Jewish Canadians considered the war “an example of genocide.” Media coverage often reinforced their opinion. As one observer notes, “the more that Canadian and American Jews suggest that their identities are nourished or challenged by the State of Israel, the more that non-Jewish Canadians might, unjustly, blame Jews for Israel’s misdeeds.”¹⁸ In this case, non-Jews fail to distinguish between Jewish attitudes toward the existence of the Jewish state (over which there is virtual unanimity) and Jewish support for particular Israeli state policies (over which there is considerable division of opinion).

Figure 2
Non-Jewish Canadians’ attitudes toward Jews, 2024 and 2026



Note: Scores of one to three are on the positive side of the scale. Scores of four to six are on the negative side.

How do attitudes toward Jews vary across social and demographic variables?

Group membership

Non-Jewish Canadians’ attitudes toward Jews vary across a host of social and demographic factors. To illustrate this point, we first examine how attitudes vary by membership in six non-Jewish groups: racialized Canadians, left-leaning Canadians, university students, Francophone Quebecers, Muslim Canadians, and all other Canadians. Because individuals self-identify in various ways, they may appear in more than one group.


Racialized Canadians include individuals who specified their main ethnic identity as Indigenous Canadian, Black Caribbean, Black African, Latin American, Arab or other Middle Eastern other than Israeli, and other Asian. To measure ideological position, we presented respondents with the following question: “People sometimes place political opinions on a left-right spectrum. How would you characterize your political opinions on this spectrum? Please use a scale from 1, meaning ‘extremely left,’ to 7,

meaning ‘extremely right,’ with the mid-point, 4, meaning ‘in the political centre.’” We categorized respondents selecting 1, 2, or 3 as left leaning.

Figure 3 shows the average attitude toward Jews for individuals in all six groups. It is important to recognize that variation underlies every average. That is, all groups are heterogeneous. They include some individuals who score low and some who score high on our scale. Averages only reflect a group tendency.

That said, a score over 3.5 indicates that more than one-half the group has negative attitudes toward Jews. The average varies from 2.3 for left-leaning individuals to 4.0 for self-identified Muslims. A between-group difference of at least 0.2 on the six-point scale of attitudes toward Jews indicates a statistically significant difference at conventional thresholds, so there is no statistically significant difference between racialized Canadians and university students or between left-leaning individuals and all other Canadians.

Figure 3
Non-Jewish Canadians’ attitudes toward Jews, by group, 2026



*Excludes Muslims, leftists, Francophone Quebecers, racialized Canadians, and university students.

** Includes individuals whose first ethnic identity is Indigenous Canadian, Black Caribbean, Black African, Latin American, Arab or other Middle Eastern other than Israeli, and other Asian.

Muslims, Francophone Quebecers, university students, and racialized Canadians score significantly higher than the “all other Canadians” group. Left-wing Canadians score lowest on the scale, although the difference between them and the “all other Canadians” group is not significant.

We discuss left-wing Canadians and Muslims later. Here we cite research literature that points to factors responsible for the relatively high negative sentiment toward Jews on the part of Francophone Quebecers, racialized Canadians, and university students.

Francophone Quebecers

For nearly three-quarters of a century, anxiety about demographic decline, linguistic and cultural assimilation, and underrepresentation in white-collar private sector employment have fuelled nationalism among Francophone Quebecers.

Surveys show that negative sentiment toward immigrants and minorities is no stronger in Quebec than in the rest of the country—as long as newcomers and members of minority groups embrace the French language and integrate well into Quebec's secular culture.¹⁹ Quebec's language and *laïcité* policies, the latter of which strictly separate state from religion, are designed to help overcome resistance to this embrace. These policies ban the display of religious symbols in state institutions, compel immigrant children to study in French schools, demand that French dominates commercial signs and packaging, and so on.²⁰ Consequently, negative attitudes toward religious groups that tend to resist secularism and cultural assimilation—especially Muslims, but also Sikhs and Jews—are common among Francophone Quebecers, although by no means universal.

Racialized minorities

Irrespective of whether one measures economic inequality by differences in poverty rates, occupational attainment, or earnings, the research literature reveals intergenerational convergence with White Canadians for some racialized groups and persistent intergenerational inequality for others. For example, by the third generation, the poverty rate difference recedes substantially for Indian, Chinese, and Japanese immigrants but persists for Black, Latin American, Arab, and West Asian immigrants despite considerable advances in their educational attainment.²¹ Persistent economic deprivation is also evident among Indigenous Canadians. Such inequalities, due principally to labour force discrimination, are often associated with widespread resentment against economically privileged groups. Resentment is especially strong among members of the second and later generations of underprivileged racialized groups because they have been educated in a school system that emphasizes equality of cultures as a societal norm.²² Historically, Jews have been a target of such resentment because of their notable economic success. They remain so today.²³

University students

In recent decades, anti-racism movements originating in the US have strongly influenced Canadian universities, which have adopted equity, diversity, and inclusion (EDI) policies.²⁴ Among other things, these policies involve (1) increasing the diversity of students attending university; (2) rewriting curricula so they increasingly reflect the intellectual contributions of underprivileged minorities; and (3) modifying hiring criteria so new jobs increase the representation of these groups. EDI policies and anti-racist sentiment are more deeply entrenched in some fields than in others, with education, sociology, and the humanities leading the charge.²⁵ In general, however, it seems that EDI policies may encourage students to develop a two-class image of the ideal society in which a subordinate class obtains privileges now enjoyed by a dominant class, resulting not just in equality of opportunity but equality of outcome. Whatever the merits and weaknesses of this vision, it fosters antagonism between students labelled underprivileged and those labelled privileged. Again, Jews are often

negatively evaluated because they are commonly seen as privileged—not just in the larger society but in the university, where they constitute a disproportionately large number of students and faculty members in some disciplines, such as medicine.²⁶

Positive versus negative attitude groups

We now divide respondents into those who express positive and negative attitudes toward Jews, showing how the two groups differ along multiple social and demographic dimensions. The percentage differences between groups indicate the extent to which the dimensions differentiate the two groups. The greater the number of asterisks at the end of each line, the less likely the finding is to have occurred by chance. Lines in Table 2 lacking an asterisk indicate no statistically significant difference between the groups.

People with negative attitudes toward Jews are most significantly likely to identify as Muslims, attend religious services at least several times a year, place themselves on the right of the ideological spectrum, reside in Quebec, identify as men, be part of the 18–34 age cohort, and to have answered the questionnaire in French. Members of the group with positive attitudes toward Jews are most significantly likely to be on the left of the political spectrum, to believe that there is “some” or “a lot” of antisemitism today, and to be part of the 65–plus age cohort.

Table 2
Canadians with positive and negative attitudes toward Jews by various social characteristics, 2026, in percent

	Positive group	Negative group
Percent Muslim	1	12***
Percent who attend religious services apart from weddings, funerals, etc., at least several times a year.	26	42***
Percent Quebec resident	18	35***
Percent completed questionnaire in French	16	33***
Percent on the left of the ideological spectrum	35	16***
Percent on the right of the ideological spectrum	31	50***
Percent “some” or “a lot” of antisemitism today	78	60***
Percent male	48	68***
Modal age cohort (% in parentheses)	65+ yrs. (29)	18–34 yrs.** (37)
Percent union member	19	28**
Percent who would vote Liberal	46	35**
Percent who would vote Bloc Québécois	4	10**
Percent Christian	52	46
Percent who would vote Conservative	26	26
Percent who would vote NDP	7	5

** = $p < 0.01$; *** = $p < 0.001$

Less significantly, members of the positive group are more likely to vote Liberal, while members of the negative group are more likely to be union members and vote Bloc Québécois. The groups do not differ significantly in terms of the percentage of self-identified Christians in the group, the percentage who vote Conservative, or the percentage who vote for the left-leaning New Democratic Party.

Age and ideology

Quantitative social science research has paid considerable attention to the effect of age and ideology on attitudes toward Jews. For that reason, we illustrate these effects in Figure 4 and Figure 5.

Research conducted in the US supports the “horseshoe theory” of antisemitism. The theory holds that the most antisemitic US residents occupy the hard left and the hard right of the political spectrum, while the least antisemitic US residents occupy the political centre.²⁷ As a result, when graphed, the relationship between position on the ideological spectrum and attitudes toward Jews forms a U-shape.

“Barometer 2026” data do not support the horseshoe theory. Figure 4 plots respondents’ self-identified position on the left-right spectrum against attitudes toward Jews on our six-point scale. For clarity, we display trends in the data rather than an “x” for each respondent.²⁸

Attitudes become more negative as one moves from left to right on the ideological spectrum, rising from 2.3 on the six-point scale for those on the hard left to 3.2 for those on the hard right. The correlation between ideological position and attitudes toward Jews is weak but statistically significant. Note that these results are based on the self-perception of non-Jewish Canadians. As we show later, most Canadian Jews do not perceive left-leaning Canadians as having relatively positive attitudes toward Jews.

Figure 4
Non-Jewish Canadians’ attitudes toward Jews, by position on the left-right spectrum, 2026





Figure 5
Non-Jewish Canadians' attitudes toward Jews, by age cohort, 2026



Unlike the association between ideological position and attitudes toward Jews, the association between age and attitudes towards Jews in Canada is similar to that in the US and other countries. Figure 5 again displays the trend in the data rather than an “x” for each respondent. In Canada, attitudes toward Jews become more positive as one moves from younger to older age cohorts, falling from 2.8 on our 6-point scale for eighteen- to thirty-four-year-olds to 2.4 for respondents sixty-five years of age and older. Again, the association is weak but statistically significant. Over time, relevant conditions may change in a way that makes this association disappear, but if relevant conditions do not change, then as young Canadians age, and older Canadians pass away, the future may be less hospitable toward Canadian Jews.

How is antisemitism reflected in Canada’s education system?

To varying degrees, the expression of negative attitudes toward Jews is evident in all Canadian institutions. We conclude this section by focusing on the education system because it touches the lives of nearly all Canadians and has recently been the subject of more antisemitism research than have other institutions in Canadian society. We first summarize findings from a recent survey on antisemitism in K-12 (kindergarten to grade 12) schools and then review recent research on the university scene.

Antisemitism in K-12 schools

Ontario is home to about 55 percent of Canada’s approximately sixty-four thousand school-age Jewish children. A 2025 survey of parents of Jewish schoolchildren in that province found widespread antisemitism in K-12 schools.²⁹

Recognizing that a single incident perceived as antisemitic may exhibit a variety of characteristics—blanket condemnation of Jews because of their alleged negative attributes, Holocaust denial, denial of the right of Israel to exist as a Jewish state, and so on—the survey asked parents, “In your opinion, what was it about the incident that made it antisemitic? Please select as many of the following options as apply.”

Respondents were presented with a list of six options that were then divided into: expressions of negative attitudes toward Jews *per se* and expressions of negative attitudes toward Israel.

More than 40 percent of incidents involved the expression of negative attitudes toward Jews—statements like “Hitler should have finished the job.” The remaining 60 percent expressed negative attitudes related to Israel—statements like “you’re a Zionist baby-killer.” Significantly, many incidents combined negative statements about Jews *and* Israel, making it clear that the supposed line between anti-Jewish and anti-Israel sentiment is often blurred if not absent in the minds of many schoolchildren.

Nearly one in six incidents were initiated or approved by a teacher or involved a school-sanctioned activity. Moreover, about 60 percent of reported incidents were not investigated by school authorities, classified as not antisemitic, or resulted in a recommendation that the victim attend school virtually or be removed from the school permanently.

Antisemitism in universities

Since October 7, 2023, pro-Palestinian/anti-Zionist university students have staged countless demonstrations, media appearances, class and convocation disruptions, and appeals to various university constituencies. However, the series of university events that seem to have most attracted the public’s attention took place in the spring and summer of 2024, when pro-Palestinian students set up temporary residence on the grounds of twenty-five university campuses across the country.

A tiny percentage of university students populated the encampments. In many cases they numbered only a dozen or two. The largest encampment, at the University of Toronto, included no more than two hundred students, 0.2 percent of the student body. Even these numbers exaggerate because some encampment participants were not university students. Some encampments, especially McGill University’s, received funding and other assistance from outside sources.³⁰

A survey of more than fifteen hundred Canadians in May 2024 found that 16 percent of the country’s adults supported the encampments, 40 percent opposed them, and 44 percent lacked an opinion one way or the other. The strongest supporters were between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four, lived in urban areas, located themselves on the left of the political spectrum, tended to be non-White, were least likely to say they were “proud to be a Canadian,” and were most likely to have negative attitudes towards Jews.³¹

A forthcoming report on a 2026 survey of Canadian university students report deepens our understanding of anti-Zionist protesters in the country’s universities. It

substantiates the existence of a wide rift between non-Jewish university students and Canadian Jews in perceptions of what constitutes antisemitism (on the latter, see Table 8, below).³²

Canadian Attitudes toward Israel

How did attitudes toward Israel change between 2024 and 2026?

Two main findings regarding non-Jewish Canadian attitudes toward Israel emerge from the “Barometer 2026” survey. First, as was the case in the “Jews and Israel 2024” survey, non-Jewish Canadians are much more negative in their attitudes toward Israel than in their attitudes toward Jews. Second, strong and moderate supporters of Israel are fewer in percentage terms than in 2024, while the percentages of weak supporters, detractors, and individuals who are uncertain of their attitudes toward Israel are substantially larger. Table 3 and Figure 6 lead us to these conclusions.

Table 3 lists responses to ten statements that tap attitudes toward Israel and form a cohesive attitudinal scale.³³ Five of the statements are positively worded. For instance: “Israel is the only democratic country in the Middle East.” Five are negatively worded. For example: “Israel is an apartheid state.” These statements appear in both the “Jews and Israel 2024” survey and the “Barometer 2026” survey. For each statement, we asked respondents to indicate whether they “strongly disagree,” “disagree,” “slightly disagree,” “slightly agree,” “agree,” or “strongly agree.” (See Appendix B for Quebec-only results.)

Responses vary widely in the degree to which they express anti-Israel sentiment. However, on average for the five negatively worded statements, a 2 percentage point drop took place between 2024 and 2026. This result is within the margin of error and therefore not statistically significant. On the other hand, on average for the five positively worded statements, we observe a 14 percentage point decline over the two survey years. This is a substantively and statistically significant change.

Figure 6 shows how this change is reflected in the six-point scale of attitudes toward Israel that we created following the same procedures applied earlier in constructing the scale of attitudes toward Jews. It displays the percentage of respondents at each point on the scale for 2024 and 2026. Like the scale of attitudes toward Jews, scores less than 3.5 are on the positive side of the scale, scores greater than 3.5 are on the negative side. A group score over 3.5 indicates that more than one-half the group has negative attitudes toward Jews.

Figure 6 displays a combined 16 percentage point decline in the two most positive positions on the scale (one and two) between 2024 and 2026. Over the same period, it registers an increase of 7 percentage points in the weakest positive position (three),

a combined 12 percentage point increase in the weak negative and moderately negative positions (four and five), and no change in the extreme negative position (six). Clearly, over the two years under examination, the non-Jewish Canadian public has grown substantially more critical of Israel.

Table 3
“The following statements reflect notions that some people have regarding Israel. Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements,” non-Jewish Canadian adults, 2026 (2024 in parentheses), in percent


	“Slightly agree,” “agree” or “strongly agree”	“Slightly disagree,” “disagree” or “strongly disagree”	Don’t know/ no answer	Total
The war Israel is conducting in Gaza is an example of genocide.	54 (49)	15 (37)	30 (14)	100 (100)
Israel is an apartheid state.	27 (34)	17 (33)	56 (32)	100 (100)
The Israelis are more responsible than the Palestinians are for the past three years of violence in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza	35 (32)	22 (37)	43 (31)	100 (100)
Zionism is a form of racism.	35 (38)	14 (28)	51 (35)	100 (100)
I support the Palestinian-led BDS (boycott, divestment, and sanctions) movement.	24 (21)	28 (44)	48 (35)	100 (100)
Israel is the only democratic country in the Middle East.	25 (38)	24 (30)	51 (32)	100 (100)
There is no justification for Palestinian suicide bombers targeting Israeli civilians.	65 (77)	8 (11)	27 (11)	100 (100)
In general, Israeli leaders are sincere in their pursuit of peace with the Palestinians.	19 (26)	46 (54)	35 (20)	100 (100)
The Jewish people are entitled to a state of their own in Israel.	51 (63)	12 (16)	37 (20)	100 (100)
The Canadian government should not impose sanctions on Israel.	30 (43)	30 (36)	41 (21)	100 (100)
Average	29 (43)***			
Average	30 (32)			

Note: Shaded cells indicate positive response to negatively worded statements and negative responses to positively worded statements. Unshaded cells indicate positive responses to positively worded statements and negative responses to negatively worded statements. Totals may not equal 100 due to rounding.
*** p < 0.001.

The foregoing data concern respondents who expressed opinions on Israel. Returning to Table 3, we note that the percentage of sampled individuals who answered “don’t know” or did not respond to a statement, already high in 2024, increased markedly in 2026. On average across the ten statements about Israel, about 23 per-

cent of respondents in 2024 and 40 percent in 2026 replied “don’t know,” while another 2 percent in both years did not respond at all. Sociologists usually interpret “don’t know” responses literally, and we see no reason to interpret them differently in the present case. While some non-Jewish Canadians developed increasingly negative attitudes toward Israel between 2024 and 2026, others apparently grew more uncertain about their attitudes.

Figure 6
Non-Jewish Canadians’ attitudes toward Israel, 2024 and 2026



Note: Scores of one to three are on the positive side of the scale. Scores of four, five, and six are on the negative side.


Finally, while 82 percent of individuals hold positive attitudes toward Jews in 2026 (Figure 2), just 48 percent hold positive attitudes toward Israel (see Figure 6). When we asked directly, “What is your overall opinion of the State of Israel?” 27 percent of respondents selected “very favourable” or “mostly favourable,” 40 percent selected “mostly unfavourable” or “very unfavourable,” and 33 percent selected “don’t know” or didn’t answer the question. And when we asked, “In the dispute between Israelis and Palestinians, which side do you sympathize with more, Israelis or Palestinians?” nearly 24 percent of non-Jewish Canadians said they sympathize more with Palestinians and almost 12 percent said they sympathize more with Israel. Notably, however, more than 64 percent of respondents were about equally divided between the “both equally,” “neither one,” and “don’t know/no answer” response options.

How do attitudes toward Israel vary across social and demographic variables?

Group membership

Like attitudes toward Jews, attitudes toward Israel vary widely across different non-Jewish groups. Figure 7 displays average scores on our six-point scale of attitudes toward Israel for racialized Canadians, left-leaning Canadians, university students, Francophone Quebecers, Muslim Canadians, and all other Canadians. Since people identify with multiple groups, some individuals appear in more than one group.

Figure 7
Non-Jewish Canadians’ attitudes toward Israel, by group, 2026



All groups score significantly higher, that is, significantly more negative, than they do on the scale of attitudes toward Jews. The average attitude toward Israel varies from 4.6 for self-identified Muslims to 3.2 for all Canadians not found in any of the other groups. A between-group difference of at least 0.2 on the six-point scale indicates a statistically significant difference. A score over 3.5 indicates that more than one-half the group has negative attitudes toward Israel. Thus, most individuals in all groups apart from “all other Canadians” have negative attitudes toward Israel.

With one exception, the order of groups in terms of their attitudes toward Israel is the same as the order of groups in terms of their attitudes toward Jews. The exception: non-Jews who place themselves on the left of the political spectrum. Among the six groups under consideration, non-Jewish left-leaning individuals have the least negative attitudes toward Jews and the second most negative attitudes toward Israel. We reflect on this finding, which some readers may regard as anomalous, later in this report.

Positive and negative attitude groups

Dividing respondents into those who express positive or negative attitudes toward Israel, we now demonstrate that the two groups differ on a range of characteristics (Table 4). In Table 4, the greater the number of asterisks at the end of each line, the greater the statistical significance of the difference between the positive and negative group. Lines lacking an asterisk indicate no statistical difference between groups.

Table 4
Canadians with positive and negative attitudes toward Israel by various social characteristics, 2026, in percent

	Positive group	Negative group
Percent Christian	62	40***
Percent Muslim	1	8***
Percent who would vote Conservative	38	15***
Percent who would vote NDP	4	10***
Percent on the left of the ideological spectrum	12	45***
Percent on the right of the ideological spectrum	46	21***
Percent male	62	52**
Percent who would vote Liberal	39	48**
Modal age cohort (% in parentheses)	65+ yrs. (34)	18-34 yrs. (35)**
Percent Quebec resident	19	26*
Percent completed questionnaire in French	18	25*
Percent who attend religious services apart from weddings, funerals, etc., at least several times a year.	33	27
Percent union member	19	23
Percent who would vote Bloc Québécois	5	8
Percent "some" or "a lot" of antisemitism today	76	72

* = $p < 0.05$; ** = $p < 0.01$; *** = $p < 0.001$.

The groups are most significantly different in terms of religious composition, political party preference, and self-identified position on the ideological spectrum. Members of the positive group are more likely to identify as Christians, vote Conservative, and place themselves on the right of the ideological spectrum. Members of the negative groups are more likely to identify as Muslims, vote NDP, and place themselves on the left of the political spectrum.

Less significantly, members of the positive group are most likely to identify as male and to be in the sixty-five-plus age cohort. Members of the negative group are most likely to be in the eighteen- to thirty-four age cohort.


Still less significantly, members of the negative group are more likely to be Quebec residents and to have completed the questionnaire in French. The two groups do not differ significantly in terms of the likelihood of their attending religious services frequently, belonging to a union, voting for the Bloc Québécois, or perceiving "some" or "a lot" of antisemitism today.

Age and ideology

Earlier we saw that non-Jewish Canadians' attitudes toward Jews become significantly more negative as one moves from the left to the right of the ideological spec-


trum. We now add that the opposite is true with respect to attitudes toward Israel. Attitudes toward Israel become significantly more *positive* as one moves from left to right, and the correlation between the two variables is moderate and significant (Figure 8). Put differently, non-Jewish Canadians on the ideological left have more positive attitudes toward Jews and more negative attitudes toward Israel than do those on the ideological right. We explore this apparent paradox below. For the moment, we note merely that Figure 4 and Figure 8 suggest that attitudes toward Jews and attitudes toward Israel are distinct in the minds of most non-Jewish Canadians, although not, as we shall see, in the minds of most Canadian Jews.

Figure 8
Non-Jewish Canadians’ attitudes toward Israel, by position on the left-right spectrum, 2026



No such complexities are involved when we inspect the relationship between age cohort and non-Jewish Canadians’ attitudes toward Israel (Figure 9). Younger Canadians have more negative attitudes toward Israel and Jews than do older Canadians. The correlation between these two variables is weak but significant. Changing geopolitics and other factors may alter this relationship over time, but all else the same, there are no grounds for optimism in this finding.

Figure 9
Non-Jewish Canadians’ attitudes toward Israel, by age cohort, 2026



The Relationship between Attitudes towards Jews and Israel

A recurring question in public and scholarly debates concerns the relationship between attitudes toward Jews and attitudes toward Israel. While some commentators treat these attitudes as equivalent, others emphasize their distinctiveness. Survey data provide a means of assessing the empirical relationship between the two.

In the “Jews and Israel 2024” survey, the correlation between attitudes toward Jews and attitudes toward Israel was 0.339, at the low end of moderate. The correlation between these variables in the “Barometer 2026” survey is 0.366. The results for the two surveys are both statistically significant, suggesting that attitudes toward Israel remain important to understanding the spread of antisemitism. At the same time, the fact that the correlation is moderate in both years suggests that many Canadians continue to distinguish between their attitudes toward Jews and their attitudes toward Israel. The data do not support the claim that the two attitudes are interchangeable.

However, the strength of the relationship between attitudes toward Jews and toward Israel varies across social groups. Table 5 compares correlations for selected groups of non-Jewish Canadians polled in the “Barometer 2026” survey. The correlations range from strong for Muslims to moderate for Francophone Quebecers to low for left-leaning and “all other Canadians,” the latter category excluding Francophone Quebecers, left-leaning individuals, Muslims, racialized Canadians, and university students. We hypothesize that the stronger the correlation, the less likely individuals are to distinguish Jews from Zionists.

Table 5
Correlations (r) between attitudes toward Jews and attitudes toward Israel, non-Jewish Canadians, selected groups, 2026

Muslim Canadians	0.503***
Francophone Quebecers	0.352***
All other Canadians†	0.297***
Left-leaning Canadians	0.285***

† Excludes Francophone Quebecers, left-leaning individuals, Muslims, racialized Canadians, and university students.


*** $p < 0.001$

The correlations indicate the degree to which the two sets of attitudes are associated but they do not tell us how the attitudes are distributed. What percentage of individuals in each group have positive attitudes toward both Jews and Israel, negative attitudes toward both Jews and Israel, positive attitudes toward Jews and negative attitudes toward Israel, and negative attitudes toward Jews and positive attitudes toward Israel?

Figure 10 answers this question for three groups in 2026: Muslim Canadians, non-Jewish Canadians who place themselves on the left of the ideological spectrum, and “all other Canadians,” as defined earlier. Among respondents identifying as Muslim, 56 percent express negative attitudes toward both Jews and Israel. Among respondents who identify as left-leaning, the most common pattern, including 61 percent of cases, is positive attitudes toward Jews combined with negative attitudes toward Israel. Among the residual “all other Canadians” group, the largest share (54 percent) expresses positive attitudes toward both Jews and Israel.

Figure 10

Attitudes of non-Jewish Canadians toward Jews and Israel, Canada, 2026, by selected group, in percent



*Excludes Muslims, leftists, Francophone Quebecers, racialized Canadians, and university students.

How can one explain the fact that more than one-half of Muslim Canadians have negative attitudes toward both Jews and Israel? Some analysts suggest that Islam is responsible for this pattern. If that were the case, one might expect Muslims who are more religious to have more unfavourable sentiment toward Jews and Israel than do Muslims who are less religious or non-religious. To test this argument, we examined correlations between religiosity (measured by frequency of attending religious services, ranging from “never” to “daily”) and our scales of attitudes toward Jews and Israel. We found that both correlations are close to zero. In Canada, religious Muslims are no more likely than are irreligious Muslims to have negative attitudes toward Jews or Israel. This finding casts doubt on the religiosity hypothesis.

In Muslim-majority countries, about three-quarters of residents have highly negative attitudes toward Jews.³⁴ Could immigration status in Canada influence attitudes toward Jews and Israel? By this logic, Muslims whose parents were born in Canada may have the least negative attitudes toward Jews because they are relatively assimilated into Canadian culture, while Muslims who are temporary residents may have the most negative attitudes because they are closest to the socializing influence of their country of origin. Again, however, analysis reveals a correlation close to zero when we examine the relationship between immigration status, on the one hand, and our scales of attitudes toward Jews and Israel, on the other.

Another possibility is that attitudes toward Israel play a role in shaping attitudes toward Jews. After all, many Muslim Canadians seem to believe (correctly) that most Jews support Israel. Muslim Canadians also tend to be strongly anti-Israel and pro-Palestinian. Thus, when asked, "In the dispute between Israelis and Palestinians, which side do you sympathize with more, Israelis or Palestinians?" 64 percent of Muslims selected "Palestinians," 1 percent selected "Israelis," with the remaining 35 percent selecting "both equally," "neither," "don't know," or not answering the question.

While our interpretation is plausible it is not certain. There exists a small empirical literature that seeks to unravel the causal complexities of the relationship between attitudes toward Jews and attitudes toward Israel. Some analysts argue that negative attitudes toward Israel cause negative attitudes toward Jews. Others hold that negative attitudes toward Jews cause negative attitudes toward Israel. Still others maintain that the causal relationship is reciprocal. Findings are not definitive, and addressing this issue would in any case take us well beyond the scope of this report.³⁵

One of the more notable patterns in the data pertains to respondents who identify as left-leaning. They tend to exhibit relatively positive attitudes toward Jews alongside comparatively negative attitudes toward Israel. An entire literature claims that many left-leaning individuals are antisemitic insofar as they reject the idea that there should be a Jewish state.³⁶ But how can left-leaning individuals be antisemitic if, as we have seen, they have more positive attitudes toward Jews than do the other groups that we have analyzed?

One way to unscramble this paradox is to recognize that, as the "Barometer 2026" survey finds, 86 percent of Canada's Jews think that supporting Israel is an essential or important part of what it means to be a Jew. From this point of view, Jews enjoy national rights—a position, incidentally, endorsed by 85 percent of United Nations member states insofar as they recognize the State of Israel diplomatically.³⁷ In contrast, many left-leaning individuals think of Jews as a religious or ethnic group lacking national rights. The result: Many left-leaning Canadians have positive attitudes toward their preferred image of Jews, not toward the great majority of Jews as they actually are. Many Jews thus consider left-leaning individuals antisemitic despite the demonstrable fondness of the latter for what we might call the imaginary Jew.

Jewish Perceptions and Responses

We now turn our attention to the ways Jewish Canadians experience antisemitism; the effect of Holocaust education on attitudes toward Jews in Quebec and the rest of Canada; and the effect of antisemitism and anti-Israelism on Jewish communal solidarity.

How do Canada's Jews Experience Antisemitism?

We asked Jewish respondents to “indicate whether each of the following things has happened to you in the past twelve months.” A list of eighteen possible experiences followed. Table 6 arrays the responses, with those experienced most frequently at the top and those experienced least frequently at the bottom. Results for items preceded by an asterisk pertain to individuals with at least one child under the age of eighteen living at home.

Table 6

“Please indicate whether each of the following things has happened to you in the past twelve months,” in percent

	Yes	No	Don't know/ no answer	Total
I have seen anti-Jewish graffiti or vandalism in my local community.	69	29	2	100
* I started worrying about the safety of my children in school because of rising antisemitism.	69	26	5	100
I have heard someone say that Jews care too much about money or words to that effect.	65	33	3	100
I have heard someone say that the Holocaust did not happen or that its severity has been exaggerated.	60	37	4	100
I have had someone who is not Jewish express support for me because I am Jewish or because of my Jewish background.	59	37	4	100
* I started worrying about sending my child(ren) to university because of rising antisemitism.	58	32	10	100
* I have moved my child(ren) to a Jewish day school, thought seriously about moving them to a Jewish day school, or would like to move them to a Jewish day school if one were available in my city and I could afford it.	43	54	3	100
I started worrying that a Holocaust could eventually happen in Canada because of rising antisemitism.	39	55	7	100
* I started worrying about whether my child(ren) could get a job because of rising antisemitism.	38	56	5	100
I have heard someone say that Canadian Jews care more about Israel than about Canada.	37	55	8	100
I was made to feel unwelcome because I am Jewish or because of my Jewish background.	36	52	2	100
I stopped wearing visible signs that I am a Jew in public (<i>kippa/yarmulke</i> , Star of David necklace, etc.).	34	56	11	100
I developed more negative feelings about Muslims because of rising antisemitism.	30	64	6	100
I have thought seriously about moving to another country or I have made plans to move to another country because of antisemitism in Canada.	26	69	5	100
I have been harassed online because I am Jewish or because of my Jewish background.	25	71	3	100
I changed which federal political party I support because of antisemitism in Canada.	23	70	8	100
I was called offensive names because I am Jewish or because of my Jewish background.	22	76	2	100
I was physically threatened or attacked because I am Jewish or because of my Jewish background.	8	89	3	100

* For individuals with at least one child under the age of eighteen living at home.

Note: Totals may not equal 100 due to rounding.

Physical threats or attacks were least frequently experienced during the twelve months preceding the survey, yet almost one in ten Canadian Jews say they had been physically threatened or attacked. The rates for the remaining seventeen incidents range from 22 percent to 69 percent.

Leading the list was “seeing anti-Jewish graffiti or vandalism in my local community” and, for individuals with at least one child under the age of eighteen living at home, starting to worry about “the safety of my children in school because of rising antisemitism.” Sixty-nine percent of respondents say they had these experiences. Hearing slurs about Jews caring “too much about money” or about how “the Holocaust did not happen or that its severity has been exaggerated” follow at 65 percent and 60 percent, respectively.

Such experiences are partly balanced by the 59 percent of respondents who claim that “someone who is not Jewish express[ed] support for me because I am Jewish or because of my Jewish background.” Nonetheless, 58 percent of Jewish Canadians with at least one child under the age of eighteen living at home say they “started worrying about sending my child(ren) to university because of rising antisemitism.” Forty-three percent say they “moved my child(ren) to a Jewish day school, thought seriously about moving them to a Jewish day school, or would like to move them to a Jewish day school if one were available in my city and I could afford it.”

These percentages are high by any reasonable standard, but some of the lower percentages are noteworthy too. Thus, 39 percent of Canadian Jews “started worrying that a Holocaust could eventually happen in Canada because of rising antisemitism.” Thirty-eight percent of those with at least one child under the age of eighteen living at home “started worrying about whether my child(ren) could get a job because of rising antisemitism.” Twenty-six percent “thought seriously about moving to another country or ... have made plans to move to another country because of antisemitism in Canada.” The last figure is higher than the comparable percentage of Jews who are thinking about emigrating from Israel or have made plans to do so.³⁸ There is of course a big difference between “thinking about” and “making plans,” on the one hand, and taking action, on the other. Just 251 people born in Canada immigrated to Israel in 2024, the most recent figure available as of this writing. In the same year, thousands of Israelis moved to Canada.³⁹

Distress is growing among Canadian Jews. In the “Jews and Israel 2024” survey, 50 percent of Jews expected antisemitism to grow worse over the next few years. In 2026, the comparable figure is 58 percent. Two years ago, 63 percent of Jewish respondents said they feel less safe in Canada than they did five years earlier. That figure rose to 88 percent in 2026.

How do Jews in the education system respond to antisemitism?

Earlier we reviewed results of a 2025 survey on antisemitism in Ontario's K-12 schools. We now summarize what that survey revealed about how Jewish school-children and their parents responded to antisemitic incidents.

About one in six parents who participated in the survey decided to move their child to another school or were considering doing so—usually to a Jewish private school. The number of parents contemplating such a move would have undoubtedly been larger if more of Ontario's Jews had access to Jewish schools in their communities and could afford to send their children to them.⁴⁰

Nearly two-thirds of parents who participated in the survey reported antisemitic incidents to school authorities. The remainder did not report incidents either because their children asked them not to (for fear of the report becoming public, in which case they could become the target of more harassment and bullying); or because, based on past experience, they didn't believe the school would do anything meaningful about the incident.

The most frequent reactions of school-age victims of antisemitism include anger (31 percent of cases), worry about losing friends or being socially isolated from non-Jewish friends (27 percent), and fear of being bullied or returning to school (27 percent).

Psychologists studying the impact of campus antisemitism on Jewish university students report increased stress levels, depressive symptoms, and "avoidance coping," that is, turning away from the source of stress rather than confronting it.⁴¹ Avoidance coping is by no means universal—many Jewish students fight campus antisemitism—but when avoidance coping takes root it is a maladaptive response, allowing depression to persist and even deepen.

Avoidance coping and openly opposing antisemitism are also evident among many Jewish faculty members, who report they have been spat on, threatened, and subjected to vandalism and a barrage of microaggressions since October 7, 2023.⁴² Some Jewish faculty members have tried to hide their Jewish identity, others to accentuate it as an act of pride and resistance. They report being disqualified from committees dealing with anti-racism and antisemitism training because of their alleged bias; lacking options for identifying themselves as a Jew in university data-gathering exercises on employee surveys and equity initiatives; and in general being made to feel isolated, invisible, and frightened. One Jewish faculty member, a convert, commented that, before converting, she never saw antisemitism, but "as soon as I became a Jew, this happened to me.... I couldn't believe it."⁴³

What is responsible for antisemitism according to Canadian Jews?

We presented Jewish respondents with a series of factors that may be responsible for the current rise in antisemitism and asked them to rank each factor from one (“contributes most to antisemitism”) to six (“contributes least to antisemitism”). Table 7 presents the results of this exercise. In brief, Jewish Canadians are most likely to say that the chief contributors to the rise of antisemitism in Canada include biased coverage in social and mass media and the recent actions of the Israeli military in Gaza. Around three in ten Canadian Jews rank each of these factors first in importance.

Table 7
“In your opinion, which of the following factors contributes most to the rise of antisemitism in Canada? Rank the factors from one (contributes most to rising antisemitism) to five (contributes least to rising antisemitism). Select all factors you agree with.”

	Percent ranking factor first	Percent not ranking factor first	Total
Biased coverage in social media	30	70	100
Biased coverage in the mass media	28	72	100
The recent actions of the Israeli military in Gaza	28	72	100
Support for anti-Israel activities by the governments of Qatar and Iran	13	87	100
The Israeli government’s ineffective public relations campaign	7	93	100
Israel’s treatment of Palestinians in general	5	95	100

How effective is Holocaust education as a response to antisemitism?

Eighty-one years after the end of World War II, the Holocaust remains a leading preoccupation of Jews everywhere. Among diaspora countries, Holocaust remembrance is especially salient in Canada because a disproportionately large number of survivors settled here—proportionately about twice as many survivors as in the US. They told their stories to their children, many of whom now advocate for Holocaust remembrance, not just as an exercise in homage but as a cautionary tale. The effort to have Holocaust education adopted in the school system is one of the most widespread responses of Canadian Jews to antisemitism.

“Barometer 2026” results illustrate the importance of the Holocaust for Canadian Jews. We asked Jewish respondents, “What does being Jewish mean to you?” and provided eleven response options that participants could classify as “essential,” “important but not essential,” or “unimportant” (Table 8). The options include “remembering the Holocaust,” “caring about Israel,” “celebrating Jewish holidays with family,” and so on. Eighty-three percent of respondents selected “remembering the Holocaust” as an essential part of being Jewish—a much higher percentage than for any other option. We also asked which of a dozen statements respondents would “definitely,” “probably,” “probably not” or “definitely not” consider antisemitic. Eighty-one percent of respondents said the statement, “the Holocaust is a myth or

... has been exaggerated” is definitely antisemitic, again a much higher percentage than any other statement.

Table 8
How Canadian Jews define being Jewish and what they regard as antisemitic

What does being Jewish mean to you? Please indicate whether each of the following is an essential, important but not essential, or unimportant part of what Jewish means to you.		Would you consider people antisemitic if they say... (Response options: yes, definitely; yes, probably; no, probably not; no, definitely not; don't know/no answer)	
Options	Percent "essential"	Options	Percent "yes, definitely"
Remembering the Holocaust	83	...the Holocaust is a myth or that it has been exaggerated	81
Leading an ethical and moral life	74	...Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes	69
Celebrating Jewish holidays with family	59	...Jews have too much power in Canada's economy	68
Working for justice and equality in society	55	... Jews have too much power in Canada's politics	68
Being intellectually curious	53	...Jews have too much power in Canada's media	67
Being part of a Jewish community	48	...there is no need for a separate Jewish state	52
Caring about Israel	46	...Israel is "an apartheid state"	45
Having a good sense of humour	39	...Israel is "committing genocide" in its treatment of Palestinians	45
Participating in or attending Jewish cultural activities, such as concerts and events	19	...they support the boycott of Israeli goods/products	40
Observing Jewish law (halakha)	17	...they support Canada's ban on future arms sales to Israel	30
Attending synagogue	14	...they support Canada's recognition of a Palestinian state	20
		...things that are critical of certain Israeli policies	11

To memorialize the Holocaust and educate people about it, Canada's Jews have established or helped to establish Holocaust museums in Montreal and Toronto; a Holocaust Education Centre in Vancouver; Holocaust-related exhibits in the Canadian Museum of Immigration at Pier 21 in Halifax and the Canadian Museum for Human Rights in Winnipeg; and Holocaust memorials or monuments in Toronto, Ottawa, and Edmonton. Many Canadian cities hold commemorative events or temporary exhibits for International Holocaust Remembrance Day on January 27 each year.

Furthermore, the Jewish community has successfully promoted compulsory Holocaust education as part of public school curricula in most provinces and territories.

As of this writing, all provinces and territories apart from Quebec, Newfoundland and Labrador, Prince Edward Island, and Nunavut had instituted compulsory Holocaust education in their schools, with Quebec accounting for 83 percent of the population of non-compliant jurisdictions.⁴⁴

In Quebec, non-compulsory Holocaust education seems to be concentrated in two English-language school boards, the English Montreal School Board and the Lester B. Pearson School Board, the latter serving the western part of greater Montreal. However, even in Montreal's English-language schools, there has been resistance to Holocaust education. Meanwhile, the percentage of Quebec's public school students attending French schools has risen since the beginning of the century, reaching more than 91 percent in 2023–2024. French schools offer little Holocaust education.⁴⁵

To find out more about Holocaust education among non-Jews, we asked respondents, "Thinking about the years you were in school, roughly how many total hours were devoted to learning about the Holocaust?" Response options included "0 hours," "about 1 hour," "about 2–5 hours," "about 6–10 hours," and "more than 10 hours."


Figure 11 shows how hours of Holocaust education are associated with attitudes toward Jews. For non-Jews in Quebec (in blue) and non-Jews in the rest of Canada (in red), it plots hours of Holocaust education against the scale of attitudes toward Jews developed earlier.⁴⁶

The trend line for non-Jews in Quebec is higher than the trend line for non-Jews in the rest of Canada, a result of attitudes toward Jews being more negative in Quebec than in the rest of the country. However, both lines descend as one moves from left to right, indicating that respondents with more hours of Holocaust education tend to have more positive attitudes toward Jews, while respondents with fewer hours of Holocaust education tend to have more negative attitudes toward Jews.⁴⁷ More hours of Holocaust education apparently creates more empathy toward Jews and hence more positive attitudes toward them. Overall, however, though statistically significant, the effect of hours of Holocaust education on attitudes toward Jews is weak, as indicated by the correlation coefficients in Figure 11 and the relatively flat trend lines.

We also asked, "To the best of your knowledge, how many Jews were killed in the Holocaust?" Forty-nine percent of non-Jewish Quebecers said that between six thousand and sixty-six thousand Jews died in the Holocaust or replied "don't know" or "no answer." In the rest of Canada, the comparable figure was significantly lower at 37 percent. The more accurate knowledge of Canadians residing outside Quebec may be a function of the fact that they spend an average of two-to-five hours learning about the Holocaust in their school years, compared to an average of about one hour for Quebecers.

Figure 11

“Thinking about the years you were in school, roughly how many total hours were devoted to learning about the Holocaust?” by scale of attitudes toward Jews, non-Jews in Quebec, and non-Jews in the rest of Canada



Finally, we inquired, “In light of recent world events, do you think it is more or less urgent to teach about the Holocaust in schools?” Respondents could select one of three responses: “It is more urgent,” “It is neither more nor less urgent,” or “It is less urgent.” Twenty-nine percent of Quebecers compared to 43 percent of Canadians residing outside Quebec said it was more urgent to teach about the Holocaust in light of recent world events, which again may be attributable to more time spent learning about the Holocaust outside Quebec.

Holocaust education in Quebec is unusual in this country insofar as it is not compulsory. What is more, the curriculum related to the Holocaust is unstandardized and therefore likely subject to idiosyncrasies that make it more effective in some schools than in others. For instance, staff in some schools resist the introduction of Holocaust education on the presumed grounds that its ulterior purpose is to justify the existence of a Jewish state in Israel.⁴⁸ We believe that making Holocaust education compulsory in Quebec and standardizing the curriculum at a high level of effectiveness would increase empathy for Jewish concerns and thus lower the level of negative attitudes toward Jews in the province.

Even with that reform, however, we have no reason to believe that the effect of compulsory and standardized Holocaust education on attitudes toward Jews will be any stronger than it is in the rest of Canada. As we argue in the concluding section of this report, other reforms are also needed to moderate negative attitudes toward Jews in Quebec and the rest of the country.

How unified is the community?

We often hear that wars and other forms of conflict cause people to “rally round the flag” or “circle the wagons.” We see evidence of this tendency in reports that Canadian synagogue membership, Jewish day school enrolment, Sunday school enrolment, and other forms of Jewish association have been on the rise since the most murder-

ous attack on Jews since World War II took place on October 7, 2023.⁴⁹ According to the “Barometer 2026” survey, 54 percent of Jewish Canadians “agree somewhat” or “strongly agree” that their “emotional attachment to Israel is stronger now than it was before the October 7, 2023, attack on Israel and the war in Gaza.”

Simultaneously, however, conflict can cause divisions within a group. This phenomenon has also become evident in Canada’s Jewish community over the past few years as the most right-wing party in Israel’s history took power and started invoking legislation that is foreign to traditional liberal-democratic norms; Jewish settler violence against Palestinians in the West Bank and vigilantism against Palestinian citizens of Israel greatly intensified; and a war causing scores of thousands of civilian Palestinian deaths dragged on.⁵⁰ The “Barometer 2026” survey found that 16 percent of Jewish Canadians “agree somewhat” or “strongly agree” that their “emotional attachment to Israel is weaker now than it was before the October 7, 2023, attack on Israel and the war in Gaza.”

Let us consider in more detail three manifestations of division among Canadian Jews related to Israel.

Emotional attachment to Israel

The 2018 *Survey of Jews in Canada* found that 79 percent of Canadian Jews were “very” or “somewhat” emotionally attached to Israel. The figure fell to 70 percent in the “Jews and Israel 2024” survey, conducted four months after the start of the 2023–2025 Israel–Hamas War. That is where the figure remains today according to the “Barometer 2026” survey. Almost 29 percent of Canadian Jews now say they are “not very” or “not at all” emotionally attached to Israel, with nearly 2 percent saying they “don’t know” or not answering the question.⁵¹

Reluctance to call oneself a Zionist

In 2026, notwithstanding the decline in Canadian Jews’ emotional attachment to Israel, 92 percent of Canadian Jews continue to believe that Israel has the right to exist as a Jewish state, statistically no different from the 94 percent who gave the same answer in the “Jews and Israel 2024” survey. Believing that Israel has the right to exist as a Jewish state meets the minimalist definition of Zionism found in English dictionaries and general encyclopaedias. Still, Canadian Jews are deeply divided over whether to call themselves Zionists because the meaning of the term has become confused with policies of a current Israeli government that many Canadian Jews dislike. A January 2025 survey asked, “Do you call yourself a Zionist?” Forty-nine percent of Canadian Jews were reluctant to label themselves in that way.⁵² About one year later, the “Barometer 2026” survey repeated the question. Nearly the same percentage of Jewish respondents (48 percent) now decline to consider themselves Zionists.⁵³ Among the latter, 24 percent respond with a flat “no,” 13 percent say “I’m

ambivalent,” 5 percent say “I consider myself an anti-Zionist,” and 6 percent say “don’t know” or do not answer the question. A follow-up question asked those who demurred, “Why do you not consider yourself a Zionist? Rank all reasons that apply to you, where 1 is most important to you, 2 is next, and so on.” The response option receiving the highest percentage of first choices (44 percent): “I do not consider myself a Zionist because I disagree with some important and enduring policies of the Israeli government.”

The West Bank and Gaza

The eventual disposition of the West Bank and Gaza, captured by Israel in its 1967 war with five surrounding Arab armies, is a contentious issue in international and Israeli politics, and therefore in the politics of Jewish diaspora communities worldwide. The “Barometer 2026” survey asked Canadian Jews a series of questions about the occupied territories, revealing another aspect of the fissure in the community. We discovered that significantly more Canadian Jews (34 percent) think the construction of Jewish settlements in the West Bank “harms Israel security” than think it “increases Israel’s security” (25 percent). As far as Gaza is concerned, a minority (20 percent) believe that “Israel should take full control of Gaza and build Jewish settlements there” while 61 percent disagree “somewhat” or “strongly.” Thirty-five percent of Jewish Canadians “agree somewhat” or “strongly agree” that “the way Israel has conducted the war in Gaza clashes with my Jewish values.”

In sum, the largest part of Canadian Jewry is growing more solidary while a smaller but still substantial segment is growing apart over issues related to Israel. Roughly five of ten Canadian Jews are in the former group, three of ten in the latter group. These opposing tendencies raise in the sharpest possible way strategic questions about how Canada’s Jewish community might best respond to its fracturing, a subject of the concluding section.

Strategic Implications

There is ultimately much truth in the words, “in every generation, they rise up to destroy us.” Our response determines whether our enemies will succeed.

—Yankev Leshchinsky (1937)⁵⁴

The fight against antisemitism...is a well-meaning but mostly wasted effort.

—Bret Stephens (2026)⁵⁵

Is the fight against antisemitism worth the effort?

Bret Stephens is a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist who has been editor of *The Jerusalem Post* and a columnist for *The New York Times* and *The Wall Street Journal*. In February 2026 he gave the annual “State of World Jewry” address at the 92nd Street

Y in Manhattan. He asserted that the struggle against antisemitism is fruitless. Why? Because, “for as long as there have been Jews, there have been Jew haters, and for as long as there will be Jews, there will be Jew haters.” From Stephens’s viewpoint, lobbying politicians, offering reasoned and evidence-based arguments against antisemitic claims, engaging in dialogue with non-Jews to promote mutual understanding, educating non-Jews about the Holocaust, and other methods of fighting antisemitism have little or no effect. This we can supposedly see from the “fact” that antisemitism is a constant in world history. “What Jews need now isn’t allyship or sympathy,” Stephens concludes. Instead, Jews need to invest in strengthening Jewish institutions and identity.

We have no quarrel with investing to strengthen Jewish institutions and identity—far from it. However, we regard Stephens’s argument as a non sequitur based on a mistaken historical premise. It is a non sequitur because the mere presence of antisemites in the world has no logical bearing on the question of whether fighting antisemitism can decrease the number and impact of Jew haters. Moreover, it is mistaken to think that antisemitism is a constant when the historical record loudly declares it a variable. Jews were respected and influential in the early period of Muslim rule in Spain and Portugal—and tormented and expelled during the region’s subsequent Christian *re-conquista*. They enjoyed economic security and considerable political independence in feudal Poland—and ferocious persecution in Poland in the 1930s and 1940s.

Yankev Leshchinsky, whom we also quote, was the foremost social scientist writing mainly in Yiddish before World War II. His recipe for fighting antisemitism: reject declarations that the struggle against antisemitism is a mostly wasted effort; investigate the conditions accounting for variation in the treatment of Jews; and take actions that help to prevent inhospitable periods and promote golden ages.⁵⁶ Given research methods developed since Leshchinsky’s time, we can now add that people interested in countering antisemitism also need to measure the effects of their efforts in order to refine their strategies.

Unfortunately, we know little about these effects because few researchers have measured them. For instance, many Jews think Holocaust education is beneficial in the fight against antisemitism. That is what we found (conditionally), but the plain fact is that research on the effect of Holocaust education is scant. A comprehensive 2026 literature review found only six such assessments worldwide. Just one was peer-reviewed, and it is twenty years old.⁵⁷

The paucity of program evaluation research means that, for the time being, we must base discussions of strategy on common sense and whatever relevant evidence is available. Accordingly, our plan in this section is to list the most strategy-relevant findings of the “Barometer 2026” survey and make recommendations consonant with

those findings. If any of our recommendations spark a wider conversation and are eventually adopted, research on their effects needs to be conducted.

First, however, we emphasize that we intend our recommendations to supplement existing efforts to counter antisemitism, not replace them. We have established that attitudes toward Jews and Israel are variables. In Canada in 2026, more than eight of ten non-Jewish adults have positive attitudes toward Jews and fewer than two of ten have negative attitudes. Just under one-half of non-Jewish adults have positive attitudes toward Israel and just over one-half have negative attitudes.⁵⁸ Moreover, variation is evident within the positive and negative categories. Surely, an effective strategy to combat antisemitism must keep this variation in mind; what might prove useful in dealing with people who hold extremely anti-Jewish and anti-Israel attitudes might easily prove counterproductive in dealing with those who hold weakly positive or weakly negative attitudes.

Mainstream Jewish organizations do some good work, but they tend to focus on Canadians with hostile attitudes toward Jews and Israel. For example, the Centre for Jewish and Israel Affairs (CIJA) recently organized a webinar in which legal experts demonstrated the gap between Canada’s anti-hate legislation and the frequent failure of police forces to implement it effectively.⁵⁹ CIJA is now engaged in an educational campaign with police forces around the country to help close this gap. Overall, members of the Jewish community appreciate such actions, which focus on the most extreme Jew and Israel haters. The “Barometer 2026” survey found that seven of ten Canadian Jews think the work of CIJA “strongly” or “somewhat” supports Jewish interests (Table 9).

Table 9
“In your opinion, do each of the following institutions strongly support Jewish interests, somewhat support Jewish interests, neither support nor undermine Jewish interests, somewhat undermine Jewish interests, or strongly undermine Jewish interests?” in percent

	Strongly or somewhat support	Neither support nor undermine	Strongly or somewhat undermine	Don't know/ no answer	Total
Jewish Federations in various cities	77	3	5	15	100
Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs (CIJA)	70	4	6	21	100
New Israel Fund of Canada (NIFC)	36	6	7	51	100
JSpace Canada	27	7	7	59	100
Universities	9	13	65	22	100
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC)/ Radio Canada	8	22	49	22	100
Unions	7	19	44	31	100

Note: Totals may not equal 100 due to rounding.

On the other hand, mainstream Jewish organizations such as CIJA and the Jewish Federations do relatively little to engage in dialogue with Canadians who hold weakly negative attitudes toward Jews and Israel. Such people are an order of magnitude more numerous than those who are most negatively predisposed toward Jews and Israel. Canadian Jews would certainly be worse off without the efforts of mainstream community organizations. However, we also need new strategies for combatting antisemitism among non-extremists. One type of strategy cannot work for all.

What remedial strategies do this study's findings suggest?

We believe that five of our findings are especially strategy-relevant and suggest practical remedies. We base some of the recommendations that follow on our belief that polarization allows negative attitudes to flourish. It follows that devising mechanisms to limit polarization can minimize conflict.

Establish a new Canadian Jewish governing body

Earlier we provided data showing that “the largest part of Canadian Jewry is growing more solidary while a smaller but still substantial segment is growing apart over issues related to Israel.” We judge that one way of dealing with the growing divide in the Jewish community is to revive the Canadian Jewish Congress (CJC) or something like it.

The CJC was established in 1919. It supported but did not focus on Jewish settlement in Palestine. Its practical efforts were directed at promoting Jewish interests in the diaspora, such as resettling Jews from Ukraine, where pogromists killed about one hundred thousand Jews in 1918–1919, and creating Jewish institutions in Canada, such as schools and an organization for immigrant aid. The CJC faltered within a few years due to lack of leadership and funding but was revived in 1933. It encompassed nearly all Jewish organizations in the country, a sort of parliament of Canadian Jewry that operated on broadly democratic principles.⁶⁰

In 2004, some influential community members, dissatisfied with the work of the CJC, established CIJA, which undertook advocacy on behalf of Canada's Jewish community and in support of Israeli government policy. In early 2010 CIJA initiated discussion and debate about restructuring the governance of Canadian Jewry. A year later, it took the reins. A more Conservative and ardently pro-Israel agenda replaced that of the CJC, now unfunded and soon defunct.⁶¹

Canada's Jewish community, always fractious, has grown more so in recent years, as we have shown.⁶² If current trends persist, a considerable part of the Jewish community may experience growing alienation from the Jewish mainstream. A chasm may open between Jews who refuse to criticize Israel's government irrespective of its policies and those who believe they must criticize Israel's government for enacting

policies that prevent compromise with the Palestinians and violate the liberal–democratic principles on which Zionists founded the Jewish state. In the extreme case, more Jews will be lost to the organized Jewish community.⁶³

To avoid such an outcome, we think it is necessary to raise a big tent once again, re-constituting something like the CJC as a democratic organization that incorporates all—or nearly all—Jewish organizations in the country.⁶⁴

Increase dialogue with non-Jews

Our data show that the social gap between Jews and non-Jews is growing, especially the gap between Jews and certain political, religious, and racial minorities. In this light, we disagree strongly with Bret Stephens's assertion that we do not need to engage in dialogue.

David S. Koffman observes that Canada's Black, Indigenous, Arab, Muslim, and other communities have been growing in relative size, solidarity, and influence for decades. At the same time, the Jewish community's horizontal ties to Indigenous and visible-minority organizations, labour unions, churches, mosques, and gurdwaras have weakened while their vertical ties to parliamentarians, police chiefs, university presidents, and members of other elite groups have strengthened. "And so," Koffman argues, "we arrive at today's condition: Canadian Jews are politically enfranchised but socially estranged; powerful in official circles, but uncertain of our neighbors."⁶⁵

Koffman neglects to mention that, notwithstanding the shifting focus of mainstream Jewish organizations toward vertical influence, Jewish efforts to engage in dialogue have been spontaneously emerging from below. Some examples:

- Created by York University students in 2019, Professor Randal Schnoor reestablished Bridging the Gap in 2023. It has brought dozens of mainly Toronto-area Jewish and Muslim university students together to respectfully listen to their different viewpoints on the Israel–Palestine conflict, better understand each other, discover points of commonality, and talk about how they can work together to create a more civil atmosphere on university campuses.⁶⁶
- On a broader scale, Digital Public Square (<https://digitalpublicsquare.org/>) is a not-for-profit organization dedicated to creating inclusive digital spaces. Its CEO is Shlomit Broder, an Israeli–Canadian. Beginning at the University of Toronto's Munk Centre in 2013, Digital Public Square has forged online collaborations and created online research tools, quizzes, and games aimed in part at bringing communities in conflict together to facilitate mutual understanding. Millions of people around the world have engaged with Digital Public Square projects, some focused on the Israel–Palestine conflict and involving Canadian participants.⁶⁷

- Canadian Friends of Peace Now (established 1982), the New Israel Fund of Canada (established 1986), and JSpace Canada (established 2010) are progressive Zionist organizations with thousands of members and contributors who variously support justice, equality, and human rights in Israel and a two-state solution to the Israel–Palestine conflict. These organizations have grown substantially in recent years.⁶⁸ Among other activities, they have sponsored conferences, webinars, and public lectures promoting dialogue between Jews and Muslims.⁶⁹

We could describe other such efforts, ranging from joint Jewish–Muslim podcasts to a new professional/entrepreneurial workspace for Jews and allies, but our point should be clear by now.⁷⁰ While mainstream Jewish organizations perform an important function operating mainly vertically to influence elites, they have neglected operating horizontally to moderate opposition and gain support. We believe that to prevent communal divisions from turning into unbridgeable solitudes, mainstream organizations need to learn from grassroots Jewish organizations and invest substantially more in forging horizontal ties. True, Canadian Jews believe progressive Zionist organizations are of less benefit to the Jewish community than are mainstream Jewish organizations. However, that may be because progressive Zionist organizations are much less well funded, in most cases newer, and therefore only about one-third as well known as the big mainstream organizations (see the “don’t know/no answer” column in Table 9).⁷¹

Broaden Holocaust education

Jews view Holocaust education as a tool to counter hate, but its effects in this regard are weak, as demonstrated earlier.⁷² In our opinion, the frequently repeated claim that the Holocaust should be considered unique and in separation from every other mass killing in the history of humanity, limits the efficacy of Holocaust education intellectually and pedagogically.⁷³

Every mass killing is unique in some ways, but comparative studies of mass killings usefully identify their common features and the factors that account for their level of destructiveness.⁷⁴ More to the point for present purposes, we surmise that, as a pedagogical tool for countering hate, the comparative analysis of mass killings is likely to have a wider and deeper emotional impact than does the study of the Holocaust alone. That is because mass killings have been experienced not just by Jews, but also by Armenians, Bosniaks, Cambodians, Chinese, Congolese, Ethiopians, Guatemalans, Indigenous Canadians, Indonesians, Palestinians, Rohingya, Rwandans, Sri Lankans, Sudanese, Syrians, Ukrainians, Yazidis, and others. All these groups are represented in Canadian schools. We hypothesize that members of these groups are more likely to empathize with the mass killing of Jews and the consequent need for a Jewish state if they can see their own history partly mirrored in the Jewish experience. And Jews will more deeply empathize with the

mass killings of others if they can see the Jewish experience partly mirrored in the history of these groups.

A substantial body of psychology and neuroscience research is consistent with our argument. The research demonstrates that empathy—understanding and sharing the feelings of others—moderates antagonism.⁷⁵ It follows that seeing oneself in others and others in oneself should therefore be the goal of teaching about mass killings. The paradox of empathy is that one must give it in order to receive it. That is why it is as important for Jews to learn about the Nakba and its consequences as it is for Muslims in general and Palestinians in particular to learn about the Holocaust and its consequences. Although the scale and severity of these tragedies were vastly different, they are both defining features of the national identity of the respective groups. They remain so today.

Align labour law with human rights jurisprudence

Many members of the Canadian left regard Jews as a religious or ethnic group that lacks national rights. The overwhelming majority of Canadian Jews disagree. As noted earlier, 86 percent of Canada's Jews think that supporting Israel is an essential or important part of what it means to be a Jew. Left-leaning Canadians, some trade unionists among them, thus tend fully to support only the small number of Canadian Jews who reject Jewish national rights.

When it comes to deciding what constitutes discrimination, human rights jurisprudence is on the side of racial, ethnic, religious, and other minorities. Lawyers Shalom Schachter and Maya Zor thus cite case law demonstrating that “a foundational principle in Canadian human rights jurisprudence is that members of minority groups are uniquely situated to identify and articulate the forms of discrimination that affect them.... Crucially, intent is not an element of the analysis ... [D]iscrimination may arise even in the absence of malicious or deliberate conduct.”⁷⁶ It follows that denying the national rights of Jews is a form of discrimination even if unintended. As the Ontario human rights code states, every person belonging to a “vocational association” has a right to equal treatment without discrimination based on ancestry, place of origin, ethnic origin, citizenship, or creed, among other criteria.⁷⁷

Human rights tribunals outside of unions could effectively deal with discrimination based on the denial of national rights if they acted promptly to hear discrimination complaints. However, they typically take years to schedule a hearing, let alone reach a decision. Such delays amount to justice denied. Meanwhile, Canadian labour law has been interpreted narrowly to limit the ability of individuals to seek redress within the union framework. Schachter and Zor call for certain Human Rights Code updates such as a regulation that would sharply reduce delays in hearing cases. They also urge specific labour law amendments that would render union leadership more

accountable for discriminatory actions toward members, such as establishing labour board forums operating under the terms of the Human Rights Code. We believe their recommendations, if implemented, would go a long way toward limiting the expression of antisemitism in unions.

Address antisemitism in schools and universities

A document recently published by Canada's largest school board states that "schools should be safe and welcoming places where all students and staff feel respected, included, and valued in their learning and work environments."⁷⁸ The web site of the country's largest university endorses "the idea that every member of our community should thrive in an environment of belonging. A welcoming and global community that supports equity, diversity and inclusion (EDI) for all is an essential part of our university."⁷⁹ These ideas are reflected in statements made by boards of education and universities throughout Canada. Yet, as we have seen, Jewish students, staff, and faculty in Canada's schools and universities routinely report being excluded and maligned.

While well-intended, and raising important issues including the prevalence of anti-Indigenous, anti-Muslim, and anti-Black racism, EDI policies frame Jews as a privileged White (or "White-adjacent") group. This circumstance invalidates the historical and current experience of antisemitism, causing some Jews to contest their invalidation, others to fall silent, disguise their Jewishness, or leave their program or institution for a more hospitable environment.

If schools and universities are to fulfill their stated role as welcoming and inclusive institutions, EDI policies must include Jews. Specifically, Jews must be afforded the same rights as other groups to determine how they are categorized and whether and how discrimination affects them. This means that Jews must be recognized not as a religious group but as a group that combines religious, ethnic, and national components of identity, the mix of components varying from one Jew to the next. Discrimination based on any of these components of identity must be dealt with as human rights legislation says they should—as actions requiring a remedial or punitive response.

We are on firm ground making this recommendation. The "Barometer 2026" survey found that 2.7 times more Canadian adults support the inclusion of Jews in EDI policies than oppose it (Table 1). They would likely be pleased to learn that some universities have started to broaden their EDI policies. For example, the University of Alberta encompasses "alienated and excluded people of all disciplines and within all social locations" in their revised EDI framework.⁸⁰

Our second recommendation concerning universities emerges from the tension between protecting freedom of expression and maintaining a safe, non-discriminatory environment. These responsibilities are fundamental to the life of the university. In

practice, however, universities have struggled to differentiate between legitimate political expression and antisemitic rhetoric. They have been unable to create an environment where it is possible to challenge students, staff, and faculty and not feel intimidated about expressing their opinions. Students have reported classroom experiences where instructors have incorporated their own political beliefs in lectures irrespective of their relevance to course content. Jewish and non-Jewish students have been pressed to endorse particular views about Israel and the Israel-Palestine conflict that should be open to scholarly debate. Clear policy on protecting freedom of expression and maintaining a safe, non-discriminatory environment, combined with consistent enforcement, including transparent investigations regarding complaints, are essential for building trust on the part of all community members. We do not intend this suggestion to deter robust analysis of controversial topics. However, the university response must go beyond strongly worded statements and striking task forces to investigate the issue.

Our third recommendation pertains to the autonomy of university student associations. Prior to the 1960s, universities closely governed most student councils. In the 1960s and 1970s, student movements transformed student councils into associations run by students and funded by student fees. Courts and policy frameworks subsequently affirmed student associations as independent entities with their own governance and finances.

Student associations offer students a variety of services and supports. They provide a vehicle through which students are supposed to be able to work together to bridge divides and address twenty-first century problems for which they will ultimately be responsible. Challenges arise when many students no longer believe their associations represent them and/or when there is a conflict between the university and the associations. For instance, McGill University threatened to cut ties with the Students' Society of McGill University in 2025 over a student referendum to divest from Israel-related investments, requiring mediation for a renegotiated agreement.⁸¹ A year later, the university gave the Law Students' Association similar notice for proposing amendments to its constitution, the impact of which it views as antisemitic and counter to the Law Society's guiding principles, McGill's Charter of Students' Rights and Policies, and its Policy on Harassment and Discrimination.⁸² In Ontario, complaints from students regarding the use of student fees led to the passage of Bill 33, which shifts control over such fees from student associations (and universities) to the provincial government.⁸³ Bill 33 also provides government oversight of school board finances, performance, and other "matters of public interest." The University of Alberta's new framework eliminates EDI principles from hiring decisions.⁸⁴

Government intervention in the operation of schools and universities, and university severance from student associations, should not be go-to solutions. Maintaining good relations with student associations, supporting educational workshops for stu-

dent leaders to create forums for mutual understanding and problem-solving, and providing clear regulations concerning student associations are all necessary features of the education system. But so is decisive action when incidents of antisemitism or other forms of discrimination occur.

In thinking about the educational role that universities must play in producing the next generation of leaders responsible for addressing complex global problems, we also need to increase opportunities for students to think critically and engage in respectful discourse. Such initiatives are especially important at a time when degree programs in the humanities and the arts are under duress due to declining enrolment. Success here will mean expanding opportunities through general education or elective courses, extracurricular activities such as organized debates, experiential education such as cooperative internships working for government and in grassroots organizations, undertaking relevant capstone projects, and other activities that help to prepare students for respectful participation in a multicultural society. An example of such initiatives is the Supporting Open and Respectful Dialogue Program at York University, which offers support for initiatives such as Bridging the Gap, discussed earlier.

In sum, strategies for mitigating antisemitism and anti-Zionism, including those we have suggested, need to be debated, tried, and tested. We take comfort and inspiration from the adage that, though “it is not your duty to finish the work, neither are you at liberty to neglect it.”⁸⁵

Appendix A: Sampling

Web panel surveys like the one on which we base this report are popular for two reasons. First, they are much less expensive than randomized phone surveys or address-based surveys. Second, response rates for randomized surveys have fallen to single digits.⁸⁶ Such low response rates raise questions about whether probability samples are idiosyncratic in suspected or unknown ways that may affect responses. This concern is especially salient in the current atmosphere; one may reasonably expect many Jews to be reluctant to acknowledge their religious or ethnic identity let alone provide details about their social characteristics and attitudes.

Researchers have also raised questions about the usefulness of non-probability samples such as those drawn from web panels. No one doubts that non-probability samples can help generate hypotheses for more rigorous testing. Many social scientists regard covariation among variables in non-probability samples as more resistant to sample bias than are estimates of population parameters. However, statistical purists insist that non-probability samples do not even permit statistical inference concerning relationships among variables because they are accompanied by unknown biases and thus depart from assumptions underlying probability sampling.

It is important to note in this connection that the representativeness of samples drawn from the Léger Opinion Panel and weighted by known population characteristics has been externally validated by comparing pre-election polls with election-day voting results. According to Kyle McGee, Léger’s Vice-President, Statistics and Analytics, the agency’s web panel surveys generally yield results close to those derived from their probability samples. Léger’s final 2021 federal election web panel survey was within tenths of a percentage point of actual election results.⁸⁷ Weighting web panel samples by key population parameters helps to achieve this result.

Since we need a criterion that allows us to distinguish meaningful from chance findings, we base our generalizations about the population and subpopulations on statistical inference from our samples. While orthodox statisticians rightly regard this practice as problematic, we regard it as at least notional given the external validation tests performed by Léger and the increased representativeness of our sample achieved by weighting.

Below we present the weighted frequency distributions of all weight variables for the general population sample and the three oversamples.

Table 10
General population: weighted frequency distribution for weight variables, in percent

Age	
18-34	24
35-44	18
45-54	16
55-64	17
65+	26
Total	100
Gender	
Male	48
Female	51
Transgender/non-binary	1
Total	100
Educational attainment	
< High school diploma	3
High school diploma	15
Registered apprenticeship, trade certificate or diploma	6
College, CEGEP, other non-university certificate or diploma	21
University certificate or diploma	7
Bachelor's degree	29
Post-graduate or professional degree	20
Total	100

Annual household income	
< \$40,000	17
\$40,000-\$69,999	23
\$70,000-\$99,999	22
\$100,000-\$149,000	20
\$150,000+	17
Total	100
Region of residence	
Atlantic	4
Quebec	40
Ontario	37
Manitoba/Saskatchewan	4
Alberta	7
British Columbia	8
Northern territories	<1
Total	100

Table 10 (cont'd)
Quebecers: weighted frequency distribution for weight variables, in percent

Age	
18-34	24
35-44	16
45-54	15
55-64	18
65+	28
Total	100
Gender	
Male	48
Female	51
Transgender/non-binary	<1.0
Total	100
Educational attainment	
< High school diploma	4
High school diploma	14
Registered apprenticeship, trade certificate or diploma	9
College, CEGEP, other non-university certificate or diploma	25
University certificate or diploma	8
Bachelor's degree	25
Post-graduate or professional degree	16
Total	100

Annual household income	
< \$40,000	16
\$40,000-\$69,999	23
\$70,000-\$99,999	23
\$100,000-\$149,000	19
\$150,000+	18
Total	100

Table 10 (cont'd)
Jews: weighted frequency distribution for weight variables, in percent

Age	
18-34	24
35-44	16
45-54	14
55-64	15
65+	30
Total	100
Gender	
Male	48
Female	51
Transgender/non-binary	<1
Total	100
Educational attainment	
< High school diploma	1
High school diploma	7
Registered apprenticeship, trade certificate or diploma	1
College, CEGEP, other non-university certificate or diploma	12
University certificate or diploma	4
Bachelor's degree	37
Post-graduate or professional degree	38
Total	100
Annual household income	
< \$40,000	14
\$40,000-\$69,999	16
\$70,000-\$99,999	15
\$100,000-\$149,000	19
\$150,000+	36
Total	100

Religiosity	
Identifies as Jewish by religion	84
Identifies with no religion but Jewish by ethnicity	16
Total	100
Denomination	
Ultra-Orthodox, Orthodox, Modern Orthodox	16
Conservative	27
Reform	17
Reconstructionist/ Renewal/Humanitarian/Humanist/Other	14
Just Jewish	26
Total	100

Table 10 (cont'd)
Muslims: weighted frequency distribution for weight variables, in percent

Age	
18-34	39
35-44	24
45-54	18
55-64	11
65+	9
Total	100
Gender	
Male	49
Female	51
Transgender/non-binary	0
Total	100
Educational attainment	
< High school diploma	5
High school diploma	27
Registered apprenticeship, trade certificate or diploma	2
College, CEGEP, other non-university certificate or diploma	33
University certificate or diploma	4
Bachelor's degree	18
Post-graduate or professional degree	11
Total	100
Annual household income	
< \$40,000	61
\$40,000-\$69,999	23
\$70,000-\$99,999	9
\$100,000-\$149,000	5
\$150,000+	2
Total	100

Appendix B: Supplementary Quebec Tables

Table 11
“The following statements reflect notions that some people have regarding Jewish people. Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements,” non-Jewish Quebecers, 2026, in percent

	“Slightly agree,” “agree” or “strongly agree”	“Slightly disagree,” “disagree” or “strongly disagree”	Don’t know/ no answer	Total
Jewish people have too much power in our country today.	30	42	28	100
Jewish people don’t care what happens to anyone but their own kind.	35	43	22	100
Jewish people talk too much about the Holocaust.	20	43	37	100
Jewish people are largely to blame for the negative consequences of globalization.	15	48	38	100
It is appropriate for opponents of Israel’s policies to boycott Jewish-owned businesses in Canada.	22	45	32	100
Jewish people should be admired for their resilience in the face of adversity.	52	24	24	100
Jewish people should be included in the policies that Canadian universities are implementing to increase equity, diversity, and inclusivity in all aspects of university life.	39	30	31	100
Jewish people should be admired for their achievements despite discrimination against them.	51	25	24	100
Average	45			
Average	25			

Note: Shaded cells indicate positive response to negatively worded statements and negative responses to positively worded statements. Unshaded cells indicate positive responses to positively worded statements and negative responses to negatively worded statements. Totals may not equal 100 due to rounding.

Table 12
“The following statements reflect notions that some people have regarding Israel. Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements,” non-Jewish Quebecers 2026, in percent

	“Slightly agree,” “agree” or “strongly agree”	“Slightly disagree,” “disagree” or “strongly disagree”	Don't know/ no answer	Total
The war Israel is conducting in Gaza is an example of genocide.	62	11	27	100
Israel is an apartheid state.	34	14	52	100
The Israelis are more responsible than the Palestinians are for the past three years of violence in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza.	42	18	39	100
Zionism is a form of racism.	41	10	48	100
I support the Palestinian-led BDS (boycott, divestment, and sanctions) movement.	26	30	44	100
Israel is the only democratic country in the Middle East.	20	32	48	100
There is no justification for Palestinian suicide bombers targeting Israeli civilians.	65	11	24	100
In general, Israeli leaders are sincere in their pursuit of peace with the Palestinians.	14	52	34	100
The Jewish people are entitled to a state of their own in Israel.	52	16	32	100
The Canadian government should not impose sanctions on Israel.	22	41	36	100
Average	26			
Average	36			

Note: Shaded cells indicate positive response to negatively worded statements and negative responses to positively worded statements. Unshaded cells indicate positive responses to positively worded statements and negative responses to negatively worded statements. Totals may not equal 100 due to rounding.

Robert Brym, FRSC, is emeritus professor of sociology at the University of Toronto. He has published more than two hundred scholarly works and received multiple awards for his publications and teaching, including the Northrop Frye Award (University of Toronto), the *British Journal of Sociology* Prize (London School of Economics and Political Science), the Outstanding Contribution Award of the Canadian Sociological Association, and the Louis Rosenberg Canadian Jewish Studies Distinguished Service Award. Brym's main research projects have focused on the politics of intellectuals, Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union and its successor states, the second intifada, and Jews in Canada. For downloads of Brym's published work, visit <https://utorontoacademia.edu/RobertBrym>.

Rhonda Lenton served as president and vice-chancellor of York University from 2017 to 2025, during which she embodied York's vision of providing students from diverse sociodemographic backgrounds with access to high-quality education at a research-intensive institution dedicated to the public good. She guided the university's leadership in twenty-first century learning, research and innovation, sustainability, global health, and social justice. By advancing her vision across Canada's higher education sector, she elevated York's profile nationally and globally. Lenton was named one of the top 100 most powerful women in Canada by the Women's Executive Network in 2015. In 2016 she received the Angela Hildyard Recognition Award for innovative leadership and outstanding contributions to her institution and to higher education in general. Her areas of research and publication include gender studies, research methods and statistical analysis, Jews in Canada, and higher education.

1

Funding for the "Canadian Jewish Barometer 2026" was provided by the Azrieli Foundation, the Israel and Golda Koschitzky Centre for Jewish Studies, York University, the Anne Tanenbaum Centre for Jewish Studies, the University of Toronto, and Rhonda Lenton (York University). We also thank executive members of the Foundation for Genocide Education for encouraging us to draw a Quebec oversample, allowing us to examine consequences of the lack of compulsory Holocaust education for Quebec residents; Rachel Margolis, who helped to improve the questionnaire on which this study is based; and David S. Koffman and Joshua Tapper, who mobilized demanding and reliably prompt anonymous peer reviewers and sped this work to press. We had a free hand to interpret the survey results with the least bias we could muster. We therefore bear full responsibility for the contents of this report.

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[PID=105399&PRID=0&PTYPE=105277&S=0&SHOWALL=0&SUB=0&TEMPORAL=2013&THEME=95&VID=0](https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=9810035301); Statistics Canada, "Religion by gender and age: Canada, provinces and territories" (2023), <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=9810035301>.

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The margin of error decreases as findings rise above or fall below 50 percent.

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For readers unfamiliar with the statistics we use, we note that correlation coefficients vary from -1.0 to 1.0. The closer a correlation coefficient is to 1.0, the greater the degree to which the value of one variable increases with the value of the other variable. The closer a correlation coefficient is to -1.0, the greater the degree to which the value of one variable decreases with the value of the other. Generally, in the social sciences, a positive or negative correlation less than 0.300 is considered weak, a positive or negative correlation greater than 0.299 but less than 0.500 is considered moderate, and a positive or negative correlation of 0.500 or greater is considered strong. In Appendix A we justify using statistical significance tests to assess whether a relationship or difference is meaningful or due to chance. Simplifying, we can say that the notation " $p < 0.05$ " means there is a 95 percent chance a finding is not due to chance, while " $p < 0.01$ " increases the likelihood to 99 percent and " $p < 0.001$ " raises it further to 99.9 percent.

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For both the 2024 and 2026 data we calculated scores by determining the percentage of respondents for each point as follows: 1 = 1 < 1.5; 2 = 1.5 < 2.5; 3 = 2.5 < 3.5; 4 = 3.5 < 4.5; 5 = 4.5 < 5.5; 6 = 5.5+. In Brym's "Jews and Israel 2024," scores were calculated by dividing the scale into 6 equal parts, yielding different scores for 2024 than those reported here. The method used here is more faithful to the underlying data but has the shortcoming of truncating the range of one and six scores. However, both methods yield similar substantive results.

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In principle, the correlation between having the fewest hours of Holocaust education and the most negative attitudes towards Jews is equally consistent with the view that students who already dislike Jews are unlikely to choose social studies or history courses that touch on the Holocaust. However, this inference strikes us as implausible. Most K-12 courses are compulsory and, in any case, few students know the detailed content of courses they are about to take.

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Full disclosure: Robert Brym is on the advisory board of the New Israel Fund of Canada.

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