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The “Jewish Vote” in Canada’s 2025 Federal General Election^I

Abstract

Contrary to widespread opinion, Jewish voting patterns are not governed solely or sometimes even mainly by the commonly perceived ethno-religious interests of Jews, such as support for Israel and opposition to antisemitism. They are also governed by the same social forces that affect all Canadians. Focusing exclusively on the presumed Jewish interest underlying the Jewish vote prevents us from fully understanding why Jews vote the way they do. This paper seeks to demonstrate as much by examining trends in Jewish voting patterns over time and analyzing the factors that led some Jews to vote Liberal and others to vote Conservative in the 2025 federal general election. Along the way, it also examines the degree to which the Jewish vote helped to elect Jewish candidates. The paper is based mainly on the 2025 Canadian Jewish Voter Study, a web panel survey of five hundred Canadian Jewish adults that was in the field April 15–25, 2025, days before the April 28, 2025, federal general election.

Résumé

Contrairement à l'opinion largement répandue, les modes de vote des personnes juives ne sont pas régis uniquement ou même principalement par leurs intérêts ethno-religieux perçus, tels que le soutien à Israël et l'opposition à l'antisémitisme. Ils sont également régis par les mêmes forces sociales qui affectent tous les Canadiens. Se concentrer exclusivement sur l'intérêt juif présumé qui sous-tend le vote juif nous empêche de comprendre pleinement pourquoi les Juifs votent comme ils le font. Cet article cherche à le démontrer en examinant les tendances des modèles de vote juif au fil du temps et en analysant les facteurs qui ont conduit certaines personnes juives à voter libéral et d'autres à voter conservateur aux élections générales fédérales de 2025. En cours de route, il examine également dans quelle mesure le vote juif a aidé à élire des candidats juifs. Le document est basé principalement sur l'Étude sur l'électorat juif canadien de 2025, un sondage en ligne auprès de cinq cents adultes juifs canadiens, mené du 15 au 26 avril 2025, quelques jours avant l'élection générale fédérale du 28 avril 2025.

There is no such thing as a ... 'Jewish vote.'

—Ian Buruma²

The Main Issues Driving the Canadian Jewish Vote

A common view among political pundits is that Jewish support for the federal Liberal Party started eroding in the first decade of the twenty-first century.³ It was then that high-profile Jewish figures, some of whom had earlier played prominent roles in the Liberal Party, made front-page news by changing their colours from red to blue. Their conversion was a conspicuous reaction to the pro-Israel stance developed by the Conservatives as opposed to what the Liberals called a more balanced approach. For example, in 2006, the Conservatives strongly supported Israel's war against Hezbollah in Lebanon, while the Liberals called for an immediate ceasefire.

Polling data on Jewish voting patterns offer a more complex picture than that offered by this common view. A series of 235 Gallup polls fielded between 1953 and 1983 shows that nearly 63 percent of Canadian Jews supported the federal Liberals during that period, compared to 19 percent for the Conservatives and 17 percent for the CCF/NDP.⁴ However, already by the early 1970s, the Jewish vote outside Quebec started drifting toward the Conservatives at the expense of the Liberals, with Quebec following the national trend some years later.⁵ From this point of view, the first decade of the twenty-first century was not so much a turning point at the mass level as a conspicuous break at the elite level of a trend that had been building for three decades among ordinary Jews.

Because the movement away from the Liberals and toward the Conservatives began three decades before a difference crystallized between Liberal and Conservative positions on Israel, it implies that factors having nothing to do with Israel were responsible for the shift in the Jewish vote. More generally, the timing of the trend's onset suggests that Jewish voting patterns may not be governed solely by the perceived ethno-religious interests of Jews, such as support for Israel and opposition to antisemitism. It follows that focusing exclusively on the presumed singular Jewish interest underlying Jewish voting patterns prevents us from fully understanding why Jews vote the way they do.

In this paper I analyze some of the ethno-religious and non-ethno-religious factors that underlay the Jewish vote in the 2025 federal election. I do so in the course of seeking to answer three questions: (1) What accounts for change over time in Jewish voting intentions? (2) Which parties attract which Jews and why? (3) At the level of the federal electoral district, how much if at all does the Jewish vote help to elect Jewish candidates?

The 2025 Canadian Jewish Voter Study

Much of this paper is based on the *2025 Jewish Voter Survey*, a web panel poll of five hundred Canadian Jews that was in the field from April 15–26, 2025—the period immediately preceding the April 28, 2025, federal general election.

The sample was drawn mainly from the Leger Opinion Panel, which includes about four hundred thousand Canadian adults who have agreed to participate in surveys for payment.⁶ To maximize representativeness I weighted the sample so it conforms to the distribution of Jews in the 2021 census in terms of age, gender, province of residence, educational attainment, median annual household income before taxes in the year preceding the survey, and identification as Jewish either by religion or by ethnicity and identification with no religion. I also weighted the sample so it would conform to the distribution of Jews by religious denomination in the *2018 Survey of Jews in Canada*. See the Appendix for the distribution of the sample by weight variables. The sample and the country’s Jewish population may differ with respect to variables other than those just listed. However, I believe that the weighting procedure I followed renders the sample roughly representative of the country’s Jewish population.

Why did the Jewish Vote Change over Time?

Justin Trudeau became prime minister of Canada in the 2015 general election, when the Liberal Party won a majority of seats in the House of Commons. However, within a few years, the blush was off the rose. In the 2019 general election, the Liberal government was reduced to minority status. By 2021, substantial segments of the Canadian electorate were dissatisfied with the government’s COVID–19 policies, rising inflation, a shortage of affordable housing, ethics scandals, and Trudeau’s “wokeism.” A snap election that year resulted in another minority Liberal government. By the spring of 2023, what had begun as a gradual decline in support for the Liberal Party among decided voters turned into avalanche.⁷ Almost consistently until the first months of 2025, support for the Conservative Party grew, reaching a more than 20 point lead in polling.

Finally conceding to reality, Trudeau resigned as prime minister in January 2025. Two months later, Mark Carney, former governor of the Bank of Canada and the Bank of England, and former vice–chair of Brookfield Asset Management, assumed the mantle. Polls immediately registered a change of direction. US President Donald Trump had been threatening Canada with high tariffs—a perilous development given that about one–quarter of Canada’s GDP and three–quarters of the country’s exports depend on sales to the US market. Given his impressive business and administrative résumé, Carney was perceived by a large and growing number of Canadians as just the person to stand up to Trump, successfully negotiate acceptable terms for cross–border trade, and engineer a robust new industrial policy for the country. In

the 2025 general election, the Liberal Party won its fourth term in a row with a minority government, missing majority status by just three seats.

Most Canadian Jews, like most other Canadians, were alarmed by the threat Trump posed. In April 2025, just before the general election, the *2025 Jewish Voter Study* asked respondents, “For you, what are the most important issues in the upcoming Canadian federal election? Rank the following issues from most to least important.” Table 1 shows their ranking of the top five issues. Donald Trump’s approach to Canada–US relations was the number-two issue, second only to the rising cost of living. Polls showed that these were also the top two issues for all Canadians.⁸

Table 1
“For you, what are the most important issues in the upcoming Canadian federal election? Rank the following issues from most to least important” top five choices, ranked

Issues	Ranked first choices	
	Jews Aug–Sep 2024 (n = 588)	Jews Apr 2025 (n = 500)
The rising cost of living	1	1
Antisemitism	2	4
Healthcare	3	3
Housing affordability and accessibility	4	5
Climate change and the environment	5	X
Donald Trump’s approach to Canada–US relations	X	2

Note: X = not asked (column 1) or not included because top 5 choices already reached (column 2). I elected to show ranks rather than percentages because there were 11 response options in 2024 and 8 response options in 2025, and the number of response options affects percentages much more than it affects ranks.

A second issue threatened the Jewish community in particular: a stream of antisemitic incidents on Canada’s streets and in its businesses, cultural institutions, universities, and K–12 schools.⁹


It seems that the stream did not flow steadily. There were apparently two major outbursts of antisemitic activity in the nineteen months preceding the 2025 general election. The first was in the period October–December 2023, immediately following the October 7 Hamas pogrom and the subsequent invasion of Gaza by the Israel Defence Forces. Thus, a survey of antisemitism in Ontario’s K–12 schools covering the sixteen months between October 2023 and January 2025 found that 45 percent of antisemitic incidents occurred in the 78 days between October 7, 2023, and the start of the December 2023 school holiday.¹⁰ The second outburst was during the spring and summer of 2024, when raucous and highly controversial pro–Palestin-

ian encampments occupied parts of twenty-five Canadian university campuses from Halifax to Nanaimo.¹¹ Both outbursts were accompanied by a level of harassment, intimidation, threats, verbal and physical assaults, vandalism, arson, and even gun violence that had never been seen in the country. Most of the barrage denied the right of Israel to exist as a Jewish state—a core element of the identity of most Canadian Jews. A surprisingly large part of it—more than 40 percent of antisemitic incidents reported by parents of Jewish children in Ontario's K-12 schools between October 2023 and January 2025—employed Nazi-inspired slogans, symbols, and salutes.¹²

There seems to have been a relative lull in antisemitic activity in the winter and spring of 2025. I believe this circumstance partly explains why antisemitism was ranked as the fourth most important issue facing Jews in that month's general election, down from its second-place ranking in August-September 2024, at the tail end of the encampment movement (Table 1). The other circumstance responsible for the decline in the ranking of antisemitism as an election issue by Canadian Jews was that Trump's aggressive posture vis-à-vis Canada had emerged as one of the top two election issues for all Canadians, including Jews, displacing antisemitism as the second-ranked election issue. Jewish party preferences were thus influenced by a threat facing all Canadians and a separate threat facing Jews in particular.

A line graph displaying the results of five polls stretching from February-September 2018 to April-May 2025 traces the effects of the dual forces influencing the Jewish vote (Figure 1). Each poll except the last one asked Canadian Jews to indicate which party they would vote for if an election were held tomorrow. The last poll, taken immediately after the April 28, 2025, election, asked respondents which party they voted for in the election. The graph shows that support for the Liberals dropped to an historic low (26 percent) in August-September 2024, after the outbreak of the Gaza war and during the encampment movement. Meanwhile, support for the Conservatives rose to an historic high (57 percent). In the weeks before the election, however, with Trudeau's resignation, the emergence of the Trump threat, Carney's leadership, and the lull in antisemitic incidents, support for the Conservatives fell seven percentage points and support for the Liberals rose twelve percentage points. And by election day, Jewish support for the Conservatives dropped another six percentage points while Jewish support for the Liberals rose another seven percentage points.¹³

Figure 1
Jewish support for the two main Canadian political parties, decided voters, 2018-25, in percent



Sources: Robert Brym, Keith Neuman, and Rhonda Lenton, *2018 Survey of Jews in Canada*, SPSS data file (Toronto: Environics Institute, 2018); JSpace Canada, *The Canadian Jewish Vote: 2025 Federal Election*, https://www.jspacecanada.ca/jewish_vote_2025; New Israel Fund of Canada and JSpace Canada, *September 2023 Survey on Israel's Policies Regarding the Palestinians*, SPSS data file; New Israel Fund of Canada, JSpace Canada, and Canadian Friends of Peace Now, *Arguments for the Sake of Heaven: A Jewish Community Divided*, https://assets.nationbuilder.com/jspace/pages/1579/attachments/original/1733873070/JSNIFCCFPN_CdnJews_FULLFINAL_3.pdf?1733873070; Robert Brym, *2025 Canadian Jewish Voter Study*, SPSS data file.

What are the Characteristics of Jews who Tend to Support the Liberal and Conservative Parties?

Canadian and ethno-religious factors drive the Jewish vote for all political parties, but they play out differently in support for each party. To illustrate this point, I present a binary logistic regression analysis showing how, in the second half of April 2025, a variety of factors affected the odds of supporting the Liberal Party as opposed to other parties and the Conservative Party as opposed to other parties.

The main story underlying Table 2 is that, for Canadian Jews in April 2025, the odds of supporting the Liberals as opposed to other parties increased significantly and strongly if an individual thought Trump was the top election issue. The odds of supporting the Liberals increased significantly but less strongly if the individual was relatively young, felt unsure about the future because of global issues, identified with less traditional Jewish denominations, and expressed relatively weak emotional attachment to Israel.

On the other hand, the odds of supporting the Conservatives as opposed to other parties increased significantly and strongly if an individual thought antisemitism was the top election issue. The odds of supporting the Conservatives increased significantly but less strongly if the individual thought the rising cost of living was the top election issue, identified with more traditional Jewish denominations, expressed

Table 2
Binary logistic regression predicting Jewish support for the Liberal and Conservative parties, April 2025

	Model 1						Model 2					
	Liberal			Conservative			Liberal			Conservative		
	B	s.e.	Exp(B)	B	s.e.	Exp(B)	B	s.e.	Exp(B)	B	s.e.	Exp(B)
Top election issues												
Cost of living (not #1=0; #1=1)	-0.142	0.292	0.868	0.932***	0.279	2.540	-0.158	0.337	0.853	0.927*	0.363	2.526
Trump (not #1=0; #1=1)	1.584***	0.301	4.876	-1.075***	0.306	0.341	1.695***	0.346	5.446	-1.245***	0.390	0.288
Healthcare (not #1=0; #1=1)	0.109	0.345	1.115	-0.267	0.330	0.766	0.113	0.391	1.119	-0.664	0.413	0.515
Antisemitism (not #1=0; #1=1)	-1.052*	0.487	0.349	1.876***	0.472	6.526	-1.794	0.798	1.166	2.307**	0.764	10.047
Sociodemographic variables												
Older age							-0.174*	0.085	0.840	0.086	0.095	1.090
Gender (0=male; 1=female)							0.065	0.250	1.068	0.189	0.281	1.209
Higher income							-0.159	0.095	0.853	0.387***	0.105	1.473
Higher education							-0.041	0.075	0.959	-0.065	0.081	0.937
Greater precariousness							0.157**	0.060	1.170	-0.154*	0.066	0.857
Ethno-religious variables												
Denomination (Orthodox high)							-0.407**	0.131	0.666	0.427**	0.137	1.533
Greater attachment to Israel							-0.274*	0.136	0.760	0.944***	0.176	2.569
Constant	-0.764***				-0.129			1.210			-4.122***	
-2 log likelihood	510.176				517.894			415.062			355.406	
Nagelkerke pseudo-R ²	0.178				0.215			0.313			0.507	

Note: This table reports binary logit coefficients (B), standard errors (s.e.), and odds ratios (Exp(B)). Cases with missing data were deleted listwise.

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

relatively strong emotional attachment to Israel, enjoyed relatively high annual household income, and felt relatively unthreatened about the effects of global issues on one's wellbeing. (The fact that Jewish Conservative voters tend to be members of households experiencing relatively high economic security is consistent with my earlier observation that the Jewish vote started drifting toward the Conservatives in the 1970s, once the community experienced substantial upward mobility.¹⁴) Regarding Trump as the top election issue significantly lowered the odds that a Canadian Jew would support the Conservatives.

Readers uninterested in the statistical details of the regression models may wish to skip the next two subsections.

Variable Coding

The dependent variable measuring support for the Liberals codes "Liberal" 1 and "other parties" 0. The dependent variable measuring support for the Conservatives codes "Conservative" 1 and "other parties" 0.¹⁵

I created four dummy variables for the first regression model. If respondents selected the cost of living as the top election issue, they received a score of 1 on the "cost of living" variable. If they did not rank this issue first, they received a score of 0. This procedure was repeated for those who ranked Trump, healthcare, and antisemitism as the top election issues.

In the second model, the socio-demographic variables include respondent's age (coded 18–34 = 1, 35–44 = 2, 45–54 = 3, 55–64 = 4, 65+ = 5), gender (0 = male, 1 = female), annual household income before taxes in 2024 (less than \$40,000 = 1, \$40,000 to \$69,999 = 2, \$70,000 to \$99,999 = 3, \$100,000 to \$149,000 = 4, \$150,000+ = 5), educational attainment (grade 8 or less = 1, some high school = 2, high school diploma or equivalent = 3, registered apprenticeship or other trades certificate or diploma = 4, college, CEGEP or other non-university certificate or diploma = 5, university certificate or diploma below bachelor's level = 6, bachelor's degree = 7, master's degree = 8, doctoral or professional degree = 9), and precariousness. The last variable is based on responses to the question, "To what extent do you feel that ongoing global events often leave you feeling unsure about the future? Please use a scale between 0 and 10, where 0 means 'not at all unsure about the future' and 10 means 'extremely unsure about the future.'" ¹⁶ The first of the two variables concerning respondents' ethno-religious identity is "denomination," with "Just Jewish" coded 1, "Reform/Other" coded 2, "Conservative" coded 3, and "Orthodox" (including Modern Orthodox) coded 4. Finally, respondents were asked, "How emotionally attached are you to Israel?" Response options include "not at all attached," "not very attached," "somewhat attached," and "very attached," coded 1 through 4, respectively.¹⁷

Regression models

Table 2 displays results for two regression models. Model 1 shows the odds of supporting the Liberals as opposed to other parties or the Conservatives as opposed to other parties if respondents selected each of the top four election issues, identified earlier. Model 2 shows the odds of supporting the Liberals or the Conservatives when five socio-demographic variables and two variables concerning respondents' ethno-religious identity are added to the regression equation.

In model 1, two variables affect the odds of supporting the Liberals as opposed to other parties at standard levels of statistical significance: ranking Donald Trump's approach to Canada-US relations as the top election issue and ranking antisemitism as the top election issue. $\text{Exp}(B)$, the odds ratio, tells us how strongly each of these factors influences the odds of supporting the Liberals as opposed to other parties; the greater the magnitude of the odds ratio, the stronger the effect. An odds ratio greater than 1 means that the factor of interest increases the odds of supporting the Liberals as opposed to another party. For example, the odds ratio of 4.876 means that, for respondents who regard Donald Trump's approach to Canada-US relations as the main election issue, the odds of supporting the Liberals are 4.876 times higher than the odds of supporting another party. An odds ratio less than 1 means that the factor of interest decreases the odds of voting Liberal as opposed to another party. Thus, the odds ratio of 0.349 means that, for respondents who regard antisemitism as the main election issue, the odds of supporting the Liberals are 0.349 times lower than the odds of supporting another party.

In model 1, the issues driving Jewish support for the Conservatives as opposed to another party are nearly the inverse of the issues driving Jewish support for the Liberals as opposed to another party. For respondents who regard antisemitism as the main election issue, the odds of supporting the Conservatives are 6.536 times higher than the odds of supporting another party. For respondents who regard Donald Trump's approach to Canada-US relations as the main election issue, the odds of supporting the Conservatives are 0.341 times lower than the odds of supporting another party. In addition, for respondents who regard the rising cost of living as the top election issue, the odds of supporting the Conservatives are 2.540 times higher than the odds of supporting another party.

Model 2 adds socio-demographic and ethno-religious variables to the regression equation. First consider the factors statistically significantly affecting the odds of Liberal support compared to non-Liberal support. For respondents who regard Donald Trump's approach to Canada-US relations as the main election issue, the odds of supporting the Liberals are 5.446 higher than the odds of supporting another party. This factor remains the most influential driver of Liberal support. Far be-

hind in influence but still statistically significant is feeling that ongoing global events often leave a respondent feeling unsure about the future. The odds of supporting the Liberals as opposed to another party are 1.170 times higher for each one-point increase in a respondent's position on the 11-point precariousness scale. Liberal support is also significantly associated with youth. The odds of supporting the Liberals as opposed to another party are 0.840 lower for each one-point increase in the five-point age scale. And Liberal support is significantly weaker among those who identify with more traditional Jewish denominations and those who have a stronger emotional attachment to Israel. Specifically, the odds of supporting the Liberals as opposed to another party are 0.760 lower for each one-point increase on the four-point scale measuring emotional attachment to Israel and 0.666 lower for each one-point increase on the four-point denominational traditionalism scale. Regarding antisemitism as the top election issue no longer has a statistically significant effect on Liberal support, as it did in model 1.

Finally, consider the factors underlying the odds of supporting the Conservatives in model 2. The odds of supporting the Conservatives as opposed to another party are 10.047 times higher if one views antisemitism as the top election issue. This variable is by far the strongest driver of Conservative support. The odds of supporting the Conservatives are 2.526 times higher if one views the rising cost of living as the top election issue, 1.473 times higher for each step up the five-point scale of annual household income, and 0.857 times higher for each step down the 11-point scale of feeling unsure about the future due to ongoing global events. The odds of supporting the Conservatives as opposed to another party are 2.569 times higher for each step up the 4-point scale of emotional attachment to Israel and 1.533 times higher for each step up the 4-point scale of denominational traditionalism.

The last two rows of Table 2 display indicators of how well the data fit the regression equations. By statistical standards, fit is good for the model 1 Liberal and Conservative equations. Fit is very good for the model 2 Liberal and Conservative models. Especially in model 2, model fit is better for Conservative than Liberal support.

Does the Jewish Vote Help to Elect Jewish Candidates?

To this point I have examined (1) variation over time in Canadian Jewish voting preferences and (2) variation in the characteristics of Canadian Jews who support different political parties at a single time point. Neither set of evidence supports the notion that Canadian Jews tend to vote as a bloc motivated by a single conception of what constitutes the Jewish interest. To the contrary, different categories of Canadian Jews view the Jewish interest differently. And beyond these differences, Jewish voters are strongly influenced by factors that motivate the electoral choices of all Canadians. I now briefly demonstrate that evidence concerning the relationship between suc-

successful Jewish candidates in the April 2025 election and the parties they represent is consistent with my other findings.

The 2025 election results suggest that, in constituencies with relatively large Jewish populations, the Jewish vote helps to elect Jewish candidates.¹⁸ Thus, as Table 3 shows, five Jewish candidates were elected in eight federal electoral districts in metropolitan Toronto, Montreal, and Winnipeg. There was thus a 62.5 percent chance that a Jewish candidate would win a seat in these eight ridings, where Jews comprise between 6.9 percent and 29.5 percent of the population ($5/8 = 62.5$ percent).

In each of the remaining 237 electoral districts, Jews comprise less than 6.9 percent of the population—in 191 cases, less than 1 percent. Five Jewish candidates were elected in these 237 constituencies. There was thus a 2.1 percent chance of a Jew running and winning a seat in a constituency with a Jewish population less than 6.9 percent of the total ($5/237 = 2.1$ percent). Said differently, Jewish candidates were nearly 30 times more likely to run and win in districts with at least 6.9 percent Jews than in districts with fewer than 6.9 percent Jews ($62.5/2.1 = 29.8$ percent).

In 2025, Jews comprised about 1 percent of the Canadian population but 2.3 percent of candidates for each of the Liberal and Conservative parties, 2.1 percent of candidates for the NDP, 0.9 percent of candidates for the Green Party of Canada, and 0 percent of candidates for both the Bloc Québécois and the People's Party of Canada, for a total of 1.6 percent of all candidates.¹⁹ The Liberals won 38 percent of the Jewish vote but 60 percent of seats in which Jewish candidates were elected; the ten successful Jewish candidates included six Liberals, three Conservatives, and one NDP. The heterogeneity of the election results for successful Jewish candidates provides evidence consistent with the argument that Canadian Jews hardly vote as anything approaching a bloc.

Conclusion

My impression is that, in 2025, news reports about the Jewish vote tended to echo news reports from two decades earlier.²⁰ In the mid-2000s and in the mid-2020s, the mass media and many political pundits emphasized that a single factor—the Conservative party's stalwart support for Israel and Jews versus the more equivocal position of the Liberals—was pushing the Jewish vote rightward.

Table 3**Elected Jewish¹ candidates (bolded) and non-Jewish candidates by political party and percentage of Jews in their constituency in Canada's federal general election, 2025**

Federal Electoral District	Metro area	Percent Jews	Elected, 2025 ²	Party
Thornhill	Toronto, Ontario	29.5	Melissa Lantsman	Conservative
Mount Royal	Montreal, Quebec	21.3	Anthony Housefather	Liberal
Eglinton-Lawrence	Toronto, Ontario	16.5	Vince Gasparro	Liberal
York Centre	Toronto, Ontario	14.0	Roman Baber	Conservative
Toronto-St. Paul's	Toronto, Ontario	10.9	Leslie Church	Liberal
Outremont	Montreal, Quebec	9.1	Rachel Bendayan	Liberal
Notre-Dame-de-Grâce-Westmount	Montreal, Quebec	7.8	Anna Gainey	Liberal
Winnipeg South Centre	Winnipeg, Manitoba	6.9	Ben Carr	Liberal
Toronto-Danforth	Toronto, Ontario	2.2	Julie Dabrusin	Liberal
Toronto Centre	Toronto, Ontario	1.8	Evan Solomon	Liberal
44 other electoral districts		1.0-1.7	No Jews elected	
Burlington	Toronto, Ontario	<1.0	Karina Gould	Liberal
Winnipeg Centre	Winnipeg, Manitoba	<1.0	Leah Gazan	NDP
Nanaimo-Ladysmith	Nanaimo, British Columbia	<1.0	Tamara Kronis	Conservative
188 other electoral districts		<1.0	No Jews elected	

¹ Individuals are here identified as Jewish by religion, ethnicity or both religion and ethnicity.² Bolded names indicate elected Jews.

Sources: Elections Canada, "Estimation of the Jewish population," 2019; <https://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=ele&dir=pas percent2F43ge percent2Fjui&document=jew&lang=e>; Elections Canada, "April 28, 2025 General Election: Election Results," 29 April 2025, <https://enr.elections.ca/National.aspx?lang=e>.

In 2025, mainstream Jewish organizations evidently thought that was a good thing. They promoted what they considered to be *the* Jewish interest in the lead-up to election day. For example, the day before the election, Elan Pratzter, national chair of the Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs, wrote a widely circulated open letter to members of the Jewish community about "three recent experiences that underscored for me what's at stake for our Canadian Jewish community ... in tomorrow's vote." He attended a screening of the movie *October 8*, which "unpacks the deliberate, well-orchestrated campaign of hate targeting our community;" the Nova Musical Festival Exhibition highlighting the "lives brutally destroyed during the deadliest massacre in Israel's history;" and "the moving Yom HaShoah memorial event at

Shaarei Shomayim [synagogue] in Toronto." "In tomorrow's election," he wrote, "we must never lose sight of what our history makes chillingly clear: Those who target Jews ultimately make no political distinctions among us."²¹ Prutzer thus implored Jews to regard antisemitism as the top election issue and, at least by implication, vote for the party that most assiduously spoke out against antisemitism, namely the Conservatives.

The data I have analyzed shows that, in the mid-2000s and the mid-2020s, Jews did not in fact vote only in what the mass media, many political pundits, and the Jewish mainstream tended to regard as the Jewish interest. They also voted as Canadians. Perhaps influenced by their upward mobility, some Canadian Jews began drifting to the centre-right of the political spectrum as early as the 1970s. Influenced by the Trump threat and the Carney promise, their support for the Liberals grew by 19 percentage points between August–September 2024 and April–May 2025, while over the same period their support for the Conservatives fell by 13 percentage points. The forces influencing the Jewish vote were also clearly evident in my investigation of the social bases of Jewish party support and my analysis of successful Jewish candidates in 2025. In 2025, as always, Canadian Jewish voters were influenced by ethno-religious and non-ethno-religious factors, interpreting their interests in different ways as they voted for different parties.

Robert Brym is a fellow of the Royal Society of Canada and emeritus professor of sociology at the University of Toronto. He has published more than two hundred scholarly works and received multiple awards for his publications and teaching, including the Northrop Frye Award (University of Toronto), the *British Journal of Sociology* Prize (London School of Economics), the Outstanding Contribution Award of the Canadian Sociological Association, and the Louis Rosenberg Canadian Jewish Studies Distinguished Service Award. His main research projects have focused on the politics of intellectuals, Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union and its successor states, the second *intifada*, and Jews in Canada. For downloads of his published work, visit <https://utoronto.academia.edu/RobertBrym>.

Appendix

Table 4
Frequency distributions of weighted variables, n = 500

Variable	Percent
Age	
18–34	23
35–44	16
45–54	15
55–64	16
65+	31
Total	100
Gender	
Male	49
Female	50
Non-cisgender	<1
Total	100
Region of residence	
British Columbia	10
Prairies	8
Ontario	57
Quebec	23
Atlantic	1
Territories	0
Total	100
Annual household income	
< \$40,000	12
\$40,000–\$69,999	13
\$70,000–\$99,999	18
\$100,00–\$149,000	23
\$150,000+	34
Total	100
Denomination	
Orthodox & Modern Orthodox	17
Conservative	27
Reform & Other	30
Just Jewish	26
Religion	
Jewish	83
No religion, Jewish ethnicity	17
Total	100
Educational attainment	
Grade 8 or less	0
Some high school	2
High school diploma or equivalent	8
Registered apprenticeship or other trades certificate/diploma	0
College, CEGEP or other non-university certificate or diploma	10
University certificate or diploma below bachelor's level	6
Bachelor's degree	36
Master's degree	22
PhD, MD, LLB, other professional degree	15
Total	100

Note: Percentages may not equal 100 due to rounding.

1

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2

Ian Buruma, "The Deplorable Rise of MAGA Catholicism," *Globe and Mail*, May 8, 2025, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-the-deplorable-rise-of-maga-catholicism/>.

3

Campbell Clark, "Liberal power couple back Harper on Mideast," *Globe and Mail*, August 4, 2006, <https://tinyurl.com/bdda4aen>; Michael Medved, "Jews, Conservatives, and Canada: North of the border, why have they gone to the right?" *Commentary* 136, no. 4 (2013): 30-32; Paul C. Merkley, "Reversing the poles: How the pro-Israel policy of Canada's Conservative government may be moving Jewish voters from left to right," *Jewish Political Studies Review* 23, no. 1-2 (2011): 39-60.

4

Historically, there was little difference between Liberals and Conservatives on the left-right spectrum. However, the characterization of the Liberals as centre-left and the Conservatives as centre-right is accurate for recent decades. For example, people on the left typically tend to favor an increase in corporate taxes and government spending on social services, those on the right a decrease. I created a left-right scale of voter attitudes on these two issues using data from the 2015 Canadian Election Study. The scale ranged from 107.5 on the left for the NDP to 4.1 on the right for the Conservatives. The Liberal score was 76.8. Robert Brym and Marina Morgenshtern, "The politics of Jews from the USSR/FSU in Canada," in *Russian Jews as a Political Body: A Global Perspective*, ed. Vladimir (Ze'ev) Khanin and Olaf Glöckner (Brill, 2025), 145.

5

In Quebec, the shift to the Conservatives had not begun by 1983, but I have not been able to find polling data indicating when the shift started. However, a 2018 survey found that Jewish support for the federal Liberals in Quebec was about 24 percentage points lower than in 1983, while support for the Conservatives was around 21 percentage points higher. J. A. Laponce, "Left or Centre? The Canadian Jewish Electorate, 1953-1983," *Canadian*

Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique 21, no. 4 (1988): 701, 704-5 Robert Brym, Keith Neuman, and Rhonda Lenton, *2018 Survey of Jews in Canada*, SPSS data file (Toronto: Environics Institute, 2018). Laponce's analysis is based on a data set that merged 235 Gallup polls that sampled nearly 219,000 electors, including just over 2,300 Jews. The 2018 survey polled 2,335 Jews in Canadian cities with large Jewish populations, including Montreal, home to about 96 percent of Quebec's Jews (n = 528 for purposes of the cited data points).

6

Sixty-five respondents had to be drawn from the Ekos web panel to ensure adequate representation of individuals who identified as Jewish ethnically but identified with no religion.

7

For a useful and sound compilation of polling results, see Wikipedia, "Opinion Polling for the 2025 Canadian Federal Election," last modified September 16, 2025, 04:34 (UTC).

8

Leger, "Canadian Politics: Survey of Canadians," March 24, 2025, https://leger360.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Leger-CAN_voting_intentions_March_24th-FINAL.pdf.

9

Robert Brym, "Jews and Israel 2024: A Survey of Canadian attitudes and Jewish Perceptions," *Canadian Jewish Studies / Études juives canadiennes* 37 (2024): 6-89; Robert Brym and Jack Jedwab, "Public Opinion and Canadian Jewry, 2024, Part 1: Who Are the Supporters and Opponents of the Pro-Palestinian Encampments?" *Canadian Jewish Studies / Études juives canadiennes* 39 (2024): 102-8; Lilach Marom and Ania Switzer, "Misunderstood, Overlooked, and Marginalized: The Construction of Jews and Antisemitism in EDI Policies and Plans in Canadian Higher Education," *Canadian Journal of Higher Education* 55, no. 2 (2025): 37-58; Talia Morstead and Anita DeLongis, "Antisemitism on Campus in the Wake of October 7: Examining Stress, Coping, and Depressive Symptoms among Jewish Students," *Stress and Health* 41, no. 1 (2025): e3529; Robert Brym, "The Decline of Canadian Multiculturalism and the Rebirth of the Jewish Question," *Society* 62 (2025): 63-71; Robert Brym, "A Survey on Antisemitism in Ontario's K-12 Schools," *Canadian Jewish Studies / Études juives canadiennes* 41 (2025): 10-63.

10

Brym, "A Survey on Antisemitism."

11

Brym and Jedwab, "Who Are the Supporters and Opponents of the Pro-Palestinian Encampments?"

12

Brym, "A Survey on Antisemitism."

13

For two reasons, the figures for the post-election survey may be off a little. First, they may be subject to a "bandwagon effect," the tendency of some people to say that they voted for the winning party even though they voted for a losing party. Moreover, the post-election survey included in its sample individuals who say they have a non-Jewish religion but identify as Jews by ethnicity, culture or ancestry—8.5 percent of all Canadians who identify as Jewish in any way in the 2021 census.

Such individuals are not considered Jewish in most Canadian social science research and are probably less likely to vote Conservative than are Jews, conventionally defined. JSpace Canada, "The Canadian Jewish Vote: 2025 Federal Election," May–June 2025, https://assets.nationbuilder.com/jspace/pages/2833/attachments/original/1749062992/JSpace-Canada_VotingSurvey2025_Slides_June4.pdf?1749062992; Robert Brym, "Jewish Continuity and the Canadian Census," *Canadian Jewish Studies / Études juives canadiennes* 39 (2024): 14–31.

14

Harold Troper, *The Defining Decade: Identity, Politics, and the Canadian Jewish Community in the 1960s*. (University of Toronto Press, 2019).

15

Maximizing the effective sample size in this way increases the reliability of findings. Re-running the regressions coding "Liberal" = 0 does not change the findings below in any meaningful way because few Jews supported parties other than the Conservatives or Liberals.

16

David Coletto and Eddie Sheppard, "How an Emerging Precarity Mindset is Impacting Public Opinion and the Canadian Election," Abacus Data, March 26, 2025, <https://abacusdata.ca/2025-election-precarity-mindset/>. This is a leading question and, unusually, it

provides an eleven-point scale, but I wanted to compare the Canadian public's responses to those of Canadian Jews, so I followed Abacus Data's lead.

17

"Don't know" and "no answer" options were provided for all questions and are considered missing data for purposes of this analysis.

18

Table 3 provides evidence for the existence of an "ecological correlation" between the percentage of Jews in an electoral district and the likelihood of a Jewish candidate running and winning. It does not show how Jews actually voted in the eight constituencies with the largest Jewish populations. To do that, one would need electoral district data on party preference by religion and ethnicity at the individual level. Such data are not available as of this writing.

19

Andrew Griffith and Jerome Black, "The Diversity of Candidates and MPs Stalled for Some Groups in this Election," *Policy Options / Options politiques*, May 30, 2025, <https://policyoptions.irpp.org/>.

20

For example, Perlita Stroh and Jamie Strashin, "Rising Antisemitism Sees Some Jewish Voters Turn toward Conservatives this Election: Survey Suggests Shift among Canadian Jews from Liberal to Conservative Support," *CBC News*, April 23, 2025, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/jewish-community-federal-election-antisemitism-1.7511453>.

21

Elan Pratzter, "Eve of the Election: A Message to our Jewish Community," CIJA: A Word From Our Chair mass email, April 25, 2025, https://www.cija.ca/eve_of_the_election_a_message_to_our_jewish_community.