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Abstract

This article examines the humanitarian internationalism of the Jewish Labour Committee of Canada (JLC) between 1938 and 1952. Throughout WWII, the JLC sent aid to European resistance movements, and in its aftermath participated in the "garment workers' schemes," a series of immigration projects that resettled thousands of displaced persons in Canada. Undertaken independently by the Jewish-Canadian community, with the assistance of trade unions, the projects worked to overcome tight border restrictions and early Cold War realpolitik. In doing so, the JLC united Jewish institutions, trade unionists, social democrats, and anti-fascists across Europe and North America. It also acted in a pivotal moment in the evolution of Canada's refugee system and domestic attitudes toward racism. As such, the JLC's history is a microcosm for the shifting nature of relations between Jews, Canada, and the left writ large.

Résumé

Cet article examine l'internationalisme humanitaire du Jewish Labour Committee du Canada (JLC) entre 1938 et 1952. Tout au long de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, le JLC a envoyé de l'aide aux mouvements de résistance européens et a participé, après l'armistice, aux «garment workers' schemes», une série de projets d'immigration qui ont permis de réinstaller des milliers de personnes déplacées au Canada. Entrepris indépendamment par la communauté juive canadienne et avec l'aide de syndicats, ces projets ont permis de surmonter les restrictions frontalières et la realpolitik du début de la guerre froide. Ce faisant, le JLC a réuni des institutions juives, des syndicalistes, des sociaux-démocrates et des antifaçistes de toute l'Europe et de l'Amérique du Nord. Il a également agi à un moment charnière de l'évolution du système canadien d'octroi de l'asile et des attitudes de la population à l'égard du racisme. En tant que telle, l'histoire du JLC est un microcosme de la nature changeante des relations entre les Juifs, le Canada et la gauche au sens large.

Canada's rejection of refugees throughout the Second World War earned it a reputation for having one of the worst humanitarian records among western democracies at the time. In None Is Too Many, Irving Abella and Harold Troper describe the implications of Canada's exclusionary immigration system for the displaced in general and Jews in particular. Through collective action, effective organization, and some luck, the Jewish Canadian community extended aid to Jewish refugees, facilitating their resettlement in the war's aftermath. However, accounts of this period have tended to focus on one section of the community, centred around the Canadian Jewish Congress (CJC) and the Jewish Immigrant Aid Society (JIAS), while smaller organizations like the Canadian Jewish Labour Committee (JLC) have yet to receive sustained attention.
More recent oral history and archival initiatives point to the diversity of actors involved in efforts like the Tailor’s Project, one of a number of garment workers’ schemes that helped resettle thousands of displaced persons (DPs) in Canada.¹

This article foregrounds the role of the JLC in these schemes, while briefly retracing the origins of the organization and its humanitarian efforts during the war. In doing so, the article responds to appeals to push the field of Canadian Jewish studies in new directions through a more critical approach to communal organizations across the political spectrum.⁴ In the Canadian labour historiography, coverage of the JLC has been limited to its work on pivotal anti-discrimination legislation and civil rights campaigns in the 1950s and 1960s.⁵ I would argue that the networks and relationships the JLC had forged in its early years, and especially over the course of the garment workers’ schemes, laid the foundations for cooperation between it and the Canadian labour movement on anti-racism and human rights campaigns that lasted up to the 1970s.⁶

This article also adds to efforts to internationalize Jewish history.⁷ Despite the complex geopolitical and organizational constraints within which it operated, the JLC sustained networks of political support and funding in a way that allowed it to bring together a range of actors with otherwise competing interests across Europe and North America.

Finally, the JLC’s humanitarian internationalism helps us situate the Jewish refugee crisis within a canvas that juxtaposes histories of organized labour and humanitarianism with that of the Canadian Jewish community. From the beginning, the JLC tapped into the Jewish community’s collective identity as a minority and a diaspora in Canada while being immersed in labour organizing. If the JLC enjoyed strong ties with the trade unions and Canadian social democrats, it also had a foot in the mainstream of the Jewish community represented by the CJC and other Jewish communal organizations. Members of the JLC articulated a unique sense of themselves and of their place in this country that inspired their humanitarian, labour, and anti-fascist politics.

**The JLC and the Crisis of European Jewry**

Jewish labour leaders founded the JLC in New York in 1934, before expanding into Montreal two years later. The initial phase involved establishing connections in Canada, with the JLC operating until 1938 as an extension of the American branch.⁸ In Canada, the JLC reached out to first- and second-generation émigrés involved in the Workmen’s Circle, the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), as well as major unions like the International Lady Garment Workers’ Union (ILGWU) and
the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (ACWA). Worth mentioning are Maishe Lewis, Michael Rubinstein, Bernard Shane, and Kalmen Kaplansky, each of whom occupied various positions in the JLC’s leadership until the 1960s.

In her work on the American JLC, Catherine Collomp notes its extensive relationship with organized labour in the United States and the European antifascist resistance. These transnational connections proved essential to the success of its humanitarian operations on behalf of Jewish refugees.

The history of the JLC cannot be understood apart from the political formation of its members in labour politics and the traditions of Jewish socialism, including Bundism and Labour Zionism, broadly defined. It was linked to a vibrant labour movement enriched by the cross-fertilization of ideologies and organizational techniques between Europe and North America. Carrying faint echoes of the Bund’s own approach to organizing in the old country, the JLC positioned itself as a non-sectarian organization, “in the everyday party sense,” by which it meant that it embraced “all the various democratic and labour trends in the Jewish labour movement.”

The JLC’s trajectory in the years that followed would be marked by its dual character as a political party and a relief organization. At its founding convention in 1934, sending aid to labour organizations in Europe, Jewish or otherwise, was foremost in its agenda. Anxious not to duplicate the work of other Jewish organizations, like the much larger American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (the “Joint”) or the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS), the JLC saw its main strength in the trade unions. In the United States, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) responded to the JLC’s appeals by donating up to USD 150,000 to its relief fund. This allowed it to channel direct support to the European underground resistance, through its network among members of the “democratic labour movement” in Scandinavia, France, and Poland.

The ideological background of the JLC’s founders informed the nature of its response to the rise of fascism in Europe and to appeals for solidarity from across the ocean. In 1938, it sent thousands of dollars to various organizations in Poland, including schools and orphanages run by the Bund. But by September 1939, the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany had occupied Poland, dividing the country between themselves.

Canada’s entry into the war in the same year reinvigorated the Canadian JLC’s fund-raising drive. As a registered war charity, the JLC Fund channelled donations from trade unionists and members of the Jewish community through the Canadian Red Cross, the Imperial Order of the Daughters of the Empire and other charitable organizations. The JLC also worked with the CCF in raising awareness on the threats posed by fascism, on one hand, and Soviet communism on the other. By 1942, how-
ever, the Canadian JLC coordinated with the Canadian Aid to Russia Fund, which transmitted donations of clothing, food, and medical equipment to the Soviet Union. After the capture of several European cities by the Soviets from the Nazis, growing numbers of refugees, many of Polish Jewish origin, were in need of aid in DP camps located in Russia. In the context of the united front, the “Aid to Soviet Russia” campaign represented a massive humanitarian effort.

The JLC’s campaigns to raise funds in Canada drew on the experiences of European Jews. One typical appeal in 1943 adopts almost Biblical overtones, urging people to support the resistance with “the means of deliverance . . . to continue their heroic fight against Hitler.” Despite difficult economic circumstances, unionists contributed up to a day’s wages in response to such appeals. Through the JLC, their donations reached European resistance movements and organizations providing aid to growing numbers of the displaced. Those donations included up to a ton of clothing per month. JLC appeals emphasized the success of the European resistance in saving “tens of thousands of Jews from the Warsaw Ghetto alone, who are now in hiding, aided by the non-Jewish population.” The donations of the Canadian unions and Jewish organizations reached thousands of dollars throughout the war, channelled increasingly through the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA).

In addition to aid, the JLC planned to resettle their European contacts in North America. In 1939, the JLC in New York drafted a list of names known to US immigration officials as “The AFL list.” The list had been redrafted several times over the course of the war. Their Canadian counterparts kept track of the same list and suggested names of their own. The JLC appealed to the humanitarian sympathies of the Canadian government, vouching for the people on their list based on shared values. Despite an apparently hopeless situation, the JLC took the long-view, presenting a narrative of solidarity with those who would rebuild Western democracy on the ruins of the Third Reich: “if brought to freedom and safety from extermination, the gifts of intellect, courage and experience of these people will be once more at the service of democracy both here and after the war in their own Countries.” There were also more pragmatic reasons to frame these appeals as they did. Writing in 1942 to Canada’s then Deputy Minister of Mines and Resources, tasked with processing immigration claims, the JLC nevertheless felt compelled to stress that the “most rigorous scrutiny of the record of these men and women proves them to be unquestionable opponents of any kind of totalitarian philosophy.” If members of the JLC took great pains to emphasize that none of them were communists, they also had to reassure authorities that they were not prioritizing their own kin.

Anticipating the Nazi occupation of France in 1940, the JLC in New York through their allies in the AFL, convinced the Roosevelt administration to accept around 1,200
of these individuals into the US. They managed to do so before the borders closed in 1942. As the US at this time proved more amenable to immigration of any sort than Canada, many of the refugees arrived in New York, before both countries sealed off their borders entirely. But the fact that they succeeded at all in guaranteeing safe passage to North America for most of them is remarkable. Looking back at this moment years later, it would be a point of pride for Michael Rubinstein, the first chairperson of the JLC in Quebec, that the “majority of those rescued were not Jews. We did not ask them their nationality or ethnic origin—theyir passport was their love of freedom and proven service to humanity.”

Profiles on the lists convey, even in their brevity, a sense of urgency on behalf of comrades stranded in France. The other asylum seekers shared similar trajectories of exile. Those not captured by Vichy officials or the Gestapo sought refuge in the unoccupied south of France. From there, a few managed to travel to Spain before reaching the main port of exit in Lisbon, where a JLC representative was stationed. The JLC promised to support the refugees financially upon their arrival in either Montreal or New York. In Canada, the JLC tapped their networks within local Jewish communities in various cities to support those who arrived. The CJC provided financial assistance to what it classified as the “Labour Committee cases,” while the JLC helped match them with jobs and housing, prefiguring the kind of collaboration and support extended to DPs after the war. On this matter, relations between the CJC and the JLC were not always smooth. A letter from Saul Hayes, then National Director of the CJC, threatened the reduction of allowances to several “proteges of the JLC” who had managed to make it to Canada just before the outbreak of war. He urged them to seek employment as the CJC had strained its resources to the limit with the refugees they had helped sponsor. A more sustainable scheme of cooperation in the resettlement and integration of Jewish refugees would have to wait until after the war.

Post-war Canada and the DPs

By the end of 1945, the JLC’s most important work still lay ahead with tens of thousands displaced. Among them were Jews who continued streaming into camps after instances of persecution persisted, especially in Eastern Europe. In Poland, the case of the Kielce pogrom drew the special attention of the JLC as it targeted many already traumatized survivors within the Jewish community and local members of the Bund. As a result, many Jewish DPs hoped to leave Europe behind entirely, moving to Palestine or North America.

UNRRA’s chequered career complicated matters. The overburdened agency tasked with managing the DP camps faced controversies over mismanagement. Allied military authorities sparred with UNRRA over jurisdiction of the camps spread across
the French, British, American, and Soviet zones of Germany. Meanwhile, debates persisted over whom best fit the arbitrary definitions of displaced person or refugee. The British were initially reluctant to assign any special status to Jews in the DP camps, as it reminded them too much of Nazi racial policy, instead lumping them together with their co-nationals by country of origin. But doing so meant overlooking the specific needs of the most vulnerable and inspired conflict between Jewish and non-Jewish DPs from the same country. Reports of crime and in-fighting among Europe’s traumatized DPs soon filled the popular press. Jews were accused of being “infiltrees,” competing for aid with DPs of other ethnic backgrounds.

By 1947, the DP camps had become a financial burden. For Western governments that had supplied the most funding for UNRRA, they had to be dismantled at some point because aid could not be supplied to the DPs indefinitely. Jewish DPs who had fled to Soviet-occupied territories during the war had an especially difficult time. In Poland, Jewish socialist organizers had tried to escape both the Nazis and the Soviets. After the war, they found themselves stranded in camps, separated from their families, among thousands of other refugees. There Jews were subject to both racialized treatment as well as the obligation, for those considered Polish nationals, to return to Communist Poland as part of efforts to repopulate the Soviet bloc. The trouble was that many Jews from Poland had been pressed into fighting for the Soviets, and in the ensuing chaos they too were suspected of being communists and consequently viewed with suspicion in the DP camps or subject to repatriation. Since the Yalta Conference of 1945, British and American authorities assisted with repatriation of people unwilling to return to Eastern Europe. They also closely monitored the activities of Jewish organizations supporting those who wanted to resettle in Palestine or North America. While the British restricted Jewish immigration to Mandate Palestine, for a time, Soviet authorities actively encouraged Jewish immigration there as part of efforts to compete for influence with the west. The reversal of Soviet support for Israel in 1949 coincided with a crackdown on Jewish institutions and on emigration from countries behind the Iron Curtain.

Realpolitik left little room for optimism for Jewish DPs across Europe. Most remained at the behest of countries like Canada with a poor record for taking them. Since the 1930s, Canada’s de facto closed border policy had much public support. During the war, it preferred to keep its hands clean of “enemy aliens” from all sides. Citizens of Japanese and German descent were targeted for internment on Canadian soil, even as the country closed its doors to Europe’s Jews. When devastating images of the DP camps started flowing in, public sympathy was difficult to maintain. An October 1946 Gallup poll surveyed whether Canada should welcome Jewish refugees who had attempted to enter Palestine under the noses of the British authorities and were locked up in internment camps. Across sectors and regions, the survey revealed very little sympathy for their cause on the part of over half (61%) of the Canadian
population. At best, most Canadians were ambivalent on the matter.

At high policy levels there appeared to be more openness to reforming the country's immigration system and its intake of refugees. Between 1946 and 1948, the Senate created the Standing Committee on Immigration and Labour. The Committee included Canadians who had worked as administrators in the DP camps for UNRRA and became vocal advocates for a more liberal immigration policy in the post-war period. Concerns over DPs and immigration policy overlapped with discussions over Canada's international obligations since the end of the war. Federal leader of the CCF and a close ally of the JLC, Major James “MJ” Coldwell had long been calling for the country to support UNRRA and international institutions as a safeguard against isolationist nationalism that had led to global conflict. His opinions converged with members of the Department of External Affairs, concerned with Canada's image in the world, and military officials who had served during the war. Together, these individuals insisted on stronger engagement with relief and reconstruction efforts in Europe, in line with the country's new commitments under the International Refugee Organization (IRO), which took over from UNRRA in 1947.

Pressure to lift immigration restrictions could stem from less altruistic motivations: the post-war economic boom saw growing demand for workers by industry. In 1946, the Canadian government floated the idea of recruiting DPs to address labour shortages in the steel, lumber, and paper mill industries, after consultations with unions and employers from those sectors. In the fall of 1947, the Department of Mines and Resources, with the Department of Labour, had prepared for the admission of 20,000 people from the DP camps. By January 1948, at least 9,000 of those had arrived in Canada, with the rest expected to come in May. To assuage concerns about the logistics of transporting and resettling DPs, the government had developed a systematic approach to handle the influx of people, through what were called “group labour movements.” In what was essentially a recruitment drive in the DP camps, several teams representing both labour and management had been sent over to Germany and Austria, seeking prospective workers. Coordinating with Canadian officials based in Heidelberg and London, the IRO facilitated the selection of potential immigrants, who went through a strenuous medical examination process both in the camps and upon arrival in Canada.

However, the teams sent by the Canadian government to the DP camps sought workers that fit the requirements of the mining and timber industries, following the racial biases stated explicitly in existing immigration law. These earlier schemes favoured Eastern European Christians and others who had experience as lumberjacks and miners. Nonetheless, they presented an opportunity for those in the Canadian Jewish community who considered developing a similar model. They could appeal to the sympathies of Canadian officials and the public in a pragmatic fashion, offering
to address labour shortages in the clothing industry. At the same time, they would agree to set limits on the numbers of people Canada could accommodate. But they would insist on a post-war immigration policy based strictly on domestic economic needs; in other words, one that did not discriminate on racial grounds.67 The message was as simple as it was utilitarian: refugees could become workers in garment factories. If, as they suspected, it turned out that most of them were Jewish, then all the better.

**The Garment Workers’ Projects**

Under the auspices of the CJC, chaired by Hayes, the JLC, JIAS, and industry representatives met to organise the first in a series of garment workers’ schemes that they called the Tailor’s Project.68 The idea of recruiting Jews as tailors made sense in that they made up a conspicuous proportion of employees in the clothing sector in Toronto and Montreal. The JLC reasoned that Jews likewise accounted for a high proportion of workers in the European garment industry; and in any event, Jewish DPs would likely have some knowledge of tailoring.69 In addition, many of the labour organizers on the JLC/AFL list had worked in the garment unions.70 Like the CJC, the JLC had received numerous requests from local Jewish organizations to help secure permits for DPs hoping to be resettled in Canada, where they could work in the garment sector.71 Finally, the Joint’s Paris office had also conducted a survey of DPs that confirmed the JLC’s instincts: of the over 200,000 DPs they surveyed, 16% professed some involvement in the “needle trades,” leaving a pool of about 38,000 potential candidates for selection.72

Deliberations between the CJC, JIAS, and the JLC resulted in an arrangement that included representatives from both organized labour and industry. In these exceptional circumstances, ethnic solidarities could prevail over earlier class frictions.73 Max Enkin, a business representative from the Men’s Clothing Manufacturers Association of Montreal and a CJC member, worked with establishments like the Montreal-based Tip Top Tailors company that agreed to absorb a proportion of DPs able to work in their factories and shops. Samuel Posluns, president of the United Jewish Welfare Fund (UJWF) and associated with the cloak manufacturers of Toronto, proposed a similar scheme for the city.74

The JLC, in turn, ensured that the garment unions would be on board with the resettlement projects; a task made easier by the fact that leading organizers in the ACWA and the ILGWU were Jewish. Their personal ties with government officials also facilitated approval for the projects.75 Kalmen Kaplansky and Maishe Lewis, who occupied positions in the JLC’s leadership, corresponded with the CCF’s MJ Coldwell who, consistent with his support for Canada’s involvement in international humani-
tarianism, lobbied Parliament on behalf of the operation, while organizing meetings between the garment unions and immigration officials. 76 Samuel Herbst, a labour organizer for the ILGWU in Winnipeg, established some rapport with fellow Winnipeg local, Arthur McNamara. 77 As Deputy Minister of Labour, McNamara oversaw the labour immigration schemes, and approved the delegations sent to collect DPs in the British Zone in Germany. 78

The names of the schemes consequently reflected the unions and industries involved in what would come to be known as the Tailors', Furriers', Dressmakers', and Millinery Workers' projects. 79 As the first of the schemes, the Tailor's Project became a model for the subsequent campaigns carried out between 1947 and 1952.

In the meantime, the JLC referred to the refugee lists they had drafted during the war, with many revisions along the way. 80 Jews in the US quickly received word of the Canadian government's labour immigration schemes. Some of them, frustrated by the latest American deadlock over the DP problem, looked to Canada as an alternative for their friends and relatives still stranded in the camps. The New York JLC office passed enquiries of those who had heard of the Tailor's Project on to their Montreal colleagues. 81 The JLC and its union affiliates were receiving such letters from the spring of 1947 up until the winter of 1948. Despite these appeals, the JLC could not promise anything, even for those on their own lists. The selection process in the DP camps allowed for limited control over whom they could recruit. At the last minute, the Immigration Branch of the Department of Mines and Resources even imposed a “60–40” quota, ensuring that Jews accounted for only 40% of all DPs selected from the camps. 82 While that was later changed to a 50–50 ratio, this was only the start of a string of bureaucratic hurdles that the “travelling circus,” as Kaplansky described the delegations later, faced. 83 Fortunately, these restrictions proved less rigid than they appeared on paper, as the Tailor’s Project team would realize when they first made their rounds in the camps in the fall of 1947.

“Through the Eye of a Needle”

In August 1947, the Tailor’s Project delegation left for the DP camps in Germany. 84 Enkin and Posluns represented the garment manufacturers, while the JLC sent Shane and Herbst. After delays in securing clearances to access the camps at the Canadian High Commission in London, the delegation moved on to the city of Frankfurt in the US Zone. There, the IRO’s local staff instructed them about the protocols for selection. After negotiating with the IRO, the delegation agreed to draw up to 500 DPs from the British Zone, of whom 300 could be Jews. From the US Zone, they could recruit 400 potential Jewish tailors and 224 non-Jews. DPs in the Austrian camps were divided along similar lines. 85 The quotas reflected the proportion of Jews who
were in the camps. The IRO wanted to better manage Jewish DPs, as staff struggled to solve the influx of Jews and balance the numbers of DPs between camps. Not all were concentration camp survivors or their relatives. Some had fled persecution in Poland well after the war but by this time it had become nearly impossible to distinguish between them. Left to their own devices, many had joined an illicit trade in cigarettes and relief goods. This was by no means limited to Jews, although they were characterized as spearheading the black market that had emerged amid the stagnating conditions of camp life. The ports had only recently been opened, allowing for unhindered transport of relief goods into Germany. Military authorities, American diaspora organizations like the Joint, and the IRO continued wrangling over the management and allocation of aid to the DPs.

The real work of sorting through the DPs for potential tailors began in Hanover in late September. The selection process itself was overseen by soldiers who took the DPs out in batches. For the delegation, it presented a moral quandary. “Imagine the situation,” Enkin later recalled, “500 people would go to the examination centre . . . and we were only allowed to select 15–20 people. You found yourself like a god, that you [can tell people] you can go, but you have to stay.” “Few had been left unaffected,” continued Enkin, by a tragedy that affected so many to such a personal degree. Although they tried to be as objective as possible, Shane and the others referred to the lists they had brought with them, hoping largely in vain to find cousins, friends, or comrades.

Shane and Herbst gave last-minute lessons in tailoring to those who showed the most promise. After a week, the criterion for acceptance was simply to be able to hold a needle in one’s hand. In most cases, the delegation picked names as in a lottery. So much was left to chance that for the few who were selected it was like passing “through the eye of a needle.” As for the quota on Jewish tailors: while they had accepted it in principle, in practice the realities of the selection process urged members of the delegation to play a little loose with the numbers. Ultimately, the sheer complexity of the operation, including the difficulty of finding non-Jews willing to enter the garment industry, meant that Jews accounted for nearly all those they selected in the Tailor Project and in the subsequent immigration schemes. The relationships forged between members of the Jewish delegation and the immigration officials tipped the scales in favour of a more lenient approach. Despite some having initially “stuck to the letter of the law,” after a few weeks, many brushed aside their bureaucratic scruples, and there is little indication that the delegation followed the 50–50 quota for the Tailor’s Project. In this both the Joint and the IRO staff likely had some hand, as they had been involved in the pre-selection of candidates screened by the delegation. The Joint had itself been involved in vocational training for DPs in the hopes of aiding their resettlement out of post-war Germany.
Of the 3,000 DPs selected by the delegation by the end of October, Enkin confirmed that well over half were Jewish.96 "When the selection team returns to Canada," noted a CJC update on the delegation’s activities, “it will report to Mr. McNamara [Deputy Minister of Labour] that the percentage ruling will have to be changed.”97 The last members of the Tailor’s Project delegation left Europe in late November.98 They expected DPs selected by the project to arrive in monthly batches from November until the following spring, disembarking on the Beaverbrae and the S.S. Sturgis at the Port of Halifax, and moving on to Toronto or Montreal.99

Those hopes were dashed when the first batch of DPs selected by the Tailor’s Project delegation did not include any Jews at all. They had failed the medical exam and were replaced with people selected from the other immigration schemes seeking farmers, lumberjacks, and domestic workers.100 A Canadian government circular, still making its rounds in the camps at the time, excluded Jews from recruitment into these sectors. Canadian officers higher up the bureaucracy appear to have insisted on the original quota. First, they restricted slots to single adults and families with pregnant women, arguing that there was a shortage in housing to host most of them upon arrival in Canada.101 The officials also screened out DPs “for political reasons,” while denying permits to a further 900 DPs and their relatives who were diagnosed with tuberculosis.102 Medical examiners denied visas even to those who had been hand-picked by the delegation—they had already turned away some of the elderly and infirm—and had reached official processing centres in Paris, Rome, and London.

Shane and the others expected these rejections and for this reason had listed down about a thousand more individuals than they were authorized to select. Their fears proved well founded. “Both of us know that a lot of headaches are connected with the Canadian affair,” wrote the New York JLC’s Lazar Epstein to Shane as he urged his colleagues to pressure Ottawa.103 “Letters about discrimination are flowing in every day,” and for Epstein there was “no doubt that the attitude towards the Jewish tailors is stricter and more rigid than with the non-Jews.”104 Responding to a unionist in New York who sent a belated appeal for his relatives after the delegation’s return to Canada, Shane confessed that they could not help anyone beyond those they had already selected. He added that even those who were chosen were required to go through the regular screening process in which “hundreds . . . have been rejected for medical or other reasons and there too we are helpless, since it is not in our power to change the decision of the medical examiner, or even the security officers.”105 Despite this, the JLC hoped to push for the inclusion of Jews in the next batches of DPs to set sail for Canada. The subsequent garment workers’ schemes could also include some of those they had to leave behind.
Between Palestine and Canada

The difficulties faced by the Tailor’s Project delegation coincided with a delicate international situation. In the spring of 1947, a few months before members of the team left for Germany, the European refugee crisis loomed large in negotiations over the partition of Palestine. Under the auspices of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), several British and American commissions of inquiry had surveyed conditions among Jews in DP camps. When by November of that year the UN General Assembly voted in favour of partition, few seemed to have a handle on the political pressure cooker. It has been argued that DPs played a role in the minds of governments like Canada’s that voted in favour of partition while never truly lifting its own immigration restrictions against Jews until after the fact. Western governments considered having “hard core” cases who could not be resettled in other countries assimilate into German society. But it was clear, for those who encountered Jewish DPs on the ground, that few opportunities existed for long-term integration in situ.

Even so, it is difficult to deduce the intentions of states from a series of disparate facts. What cannot be denied is that the rapid pace of events took an emotional toll on the DPs, diaspora organizations like the JLC and humanitarian workers who, while trying to steer clear of the tussle over borders and immigration quotas, found themselves caught up in the wheels of global geopolitics.

Amid mass demoralization over an uncertain fate, Jewish DPs turned to the kind of self-organization to which they had grown accustomed. In the camps, Orthodox and other religious organizations thrived alongside Zionist parties. Zionist representatives, from the socialist left to the revisionist right, had stepped up their recruitment drive for potential settlers in Palestine. They had taken up leadership positions among the DPs from whom they enjoyed significant support. The war had marked a turning point in their fortunes as they urged communal solidarity on behalf of a Jewish national home, positing Israel as a place of refuge whereas western democracies refused them entry. In this they were not alone. Polish and Lithuanian DPs, among others, developed a strong sense of national identity in the camps, seeing exile as an opportunity to rebuild the countries they had lost but could not yet return to. Like the JLC, Zionist organizations ferried relief to their own members and supporters. In the diaspora, they organized themselves under the larger umbrella organization of the Jewish Agency which provided medical relief and education for DPs in the camps. With many of the Bund’s leading lights having perished in the Holocaust, Bundist influence over the DPs had diminished significantly, as it had in the diaspora. Zionism, as did Bundism and other movements in their prewar heyday, now provided more than anything, some sense of direction and communal solidarity, as Jewish DPs—many of them immediate survivors of the Nazi prison...
To Shane and Herbst, however, all this presented as thorny a dilemma as Canada’s immigration authorities. A few months before they left for Germany, an international scandal broke out over the Exodus, a ship bound for Palestine transporting over 4,000 Jewish DPs from France. Defying the British blockade, the Haganah, a Zionist paramilitary organization, commissioned the ship as part of a covert immigration scheme to Mandate Palestine. As the Exodus entered the Port of Haifa, British Mandate authorities used brute force in turning the DPs away transferring them onto prison ships bound for Germany. There, the IRO struggled with the sudden influx of people who were herded into transit camps, even as the British threatened the expulsion of the Joint from the British Zone. To the Canadian delegation, the incident would have recalled painful memories of their own government rejecting Jewish asylum seekers on board the St. Louis in 1939, over half of whom perished during the war.

Amid escalating tensions between the native Arab population and European Jewish migrants in Palestine, terrorist tactics by the Irgun that split from the Haganah hardened attitudes on all sides. Canadian UNRRA staff like Elizabeth Brown expressed concern at what they saw as a dehumanizing attempt to use DPs as a bargaining chip for Zionism’s political ends. As chief of UNRRA’s Jerusalem office until 1947, Brown had little sympathy for the Jewish Agency. For one, the Agency issued thousands of certificates of immigration to Jews who had made their way to Palestine during the war. These overlapped with those granted by British Mandate authorities who belatedly allowed certificates to be issued to 200,000 Jews after 1945. The certificates, however, were non-transferrable, preventing those who wished to do so from returning to Europe. Austrian, Polish, and Greek Jews who had settled in Palestine but changed their minds turned to UNRRA for support.

For its part, the JLC found middle ground. At its 10th Anniversary National Convention, it condemned “brutal acts of terror perpetrated by the terrorist groups [the Irgun] . . . a tragic misfortune for Jewish people” even as it supported the “launching of relief activities on behalf of the survivors of the Hitler regime now in Palestine.” As early as 1946, the JLC lobbied the Canadian government, through the trade unions, to push for the entry of tens of thousands into Palestine while pushing for the relaxation of Canada’s immigration restrictions. On both counts, it won over two major labour federations, including the Canadian Congress of Labour which agreed to a resolution suggested by the JLC on Palestine while amending its Constitution against racial discrimination. This was one sign of the JLC’s success in overcoming xenophobic sentiments within the unions—critical to securing their support for the garment workers’ schemes. After the war the Canadian JLC had also established a
working relationship with socialist Zionists in Poalei Zion who supported resettle-
ment of DPs in North America. On the other hand, the JLC faced hard-line Zionists
within the Canadian Jewish community, who insisted that the resettlement projects
distracted from efforts to populate the new state of Israel. In their view, according to
Kaplansky, the Jewish DP problem was an “Israeli problem . . . treated as if they were
synonymous.” The delegation’s experiences of the camps complicate assumptions
of any overwhelming consensus on Palestine among DPs. Shane commented that
for many it made “no difference . . . where they go, and that is in contradiction to
the statements made by the Jewish administration of the camp which is completely
in the hands of the Zionists.” One letter from a representative of the Joint who
had identified Bundists among the tailors noted they had become “an inconsequent
minority in the camp.” The decimation of Europe’s Jewish population saw the dis-
persal of rival political cultures, with Zionism now providing some sense of direction
and communal solidarity among those living in protracted limbo.

Nevertheless, the Joint, as did IRO staff, shared the JLC’s enthusiasm for the garment
workers’ projects because it could raise morale among them. On the part of leading
figures within the CJC, there was likewise little opposition to supporting immigra-
tion to Canada. The situation in Palestine was far from stable, hardly making it the
most attractive option for Jewish DPs who might otherwise better adjust to life in
Montreal or Toronto with the support of an established institutional community as
well as friends and relatives.

Adjusting to Life in Canada

Soon after the Tailor’s Project delegation returned to Canada, the JLC was already
working on the next phase of the garment workers’ schemes through the Furriers’,
Dressmakers’, and Millinery Workers’ projects. Cooperation between the JLC and its
affiliated unions, the CJC, and JIAS extended to these subsequent initiatives. Despite
the initial rejections of DPs by immigration authorities, the Tailor’s and Furr-
riers’ projects alone resettled 2,500 DPs in Canada. Including their partners and
children, the DPs would easily have reached 6,000 altogether, a significant propor-
tion of the total number of Jews allowed to enter Canada in 1948. For perspective,
only 11,000 Jews would be allowed into Canada even when immigration restrictions
eased somewhat in 1949. This made it the third largest receiving country for them
after Israel and the United States. The American government would adopt a model
akin to Canada’s DP recruitment scheme only by June 1948, after which it eventually
exceeded the numbers of Jews whom Canada allowed in.

The JLC and the CJC would reimburse the Canadian government for most expenses
incurred by the garment workers’ projects. This included personal travel of the
union delegates in the selection committees on top of facilitating the filing of paper-
work for DPs upon arrival in Canada. Without guarantees that all DPs who arrived through the schemes would be cared for on their own initiative, they expected the government to call an end to the whole affair. State support did not extend to job selection or housing for DPs, who were envisioned to resettle in Winnipeg, Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver.

Over the coming years, the workplace would become a site for adjustment to their new lives in Canada. Members of the ILGWU took the lead for those taken in through the Tailor’s Project. While the Jewish bosses had agreed to employ the DPs in their respective factories, their existing workers did much of the legwork in training and integrating them into their workplaces. Coordinating through the JLC, the unions divided DPs between their respective union shops in various cities. Many joined and became quite active in their unions which fundraised for their long-term support. In this, the DPs followed the trajectory of earlier generations of immigrants for whom the labour movement became an anchor for Jewish identity while facilitating their integration into Canadian society.

The JLC acted as a mediator between the government and the DPs who approached them, some of whom had encountered legal difficulties. Although the Jewish DPs had been victims of a great tragedy, they were not angels. Some invented names of relatives or produced fake documents, hoping to sponsor those they had left behind. Petty disputes over jobs and housing were signs that they carried something of the mindset of camp life into Canada. In addition, exchanges with immigration officials around this time reveal some level of hysteria over problems of destination: some Jewish workers were not going to the places originally assigned to them. Kaplansky admitted that many of the refugees ‘fresh from the DP camps didn’t exactly have the skills required by the industry, some even disappeared upon arriving [and] could not be tracked down.’ While it was the argument they had made to the Canadian government, the industries that participated in the Jewish immigration schemes were not at all concerned with finding labour. At best, most of them needed only seasonal workers under a set-up where DP ‘tailors’ and ‘furriers’ could move on after a year at most. For organized labour and industry alike, the whole point of the projects was humanitarian. Yet once everyone had caught wind of the situation, an implicit understanding developed between Canadian officials and the institutional Jewish community that they had to make do with the realities of the time.

**A Final Destination**

The Canadian JLC’s humanitarian efforts were launched within a unique set of circumstances that allowed for the development of relations of solidarity among everyone involved. The JLC transcended ideological rifts, including long-running class antagonisms, within the Canadian Jewish diaspora in a rare instance of cooperation
seldom repeated within the wider labour movement or in other communities as Cold War pressures intensified. It took time before the leadership of the Canadian Jewish community could assess the full extent of the crisis at hand and extend solidarity to the refugees. Support for the DPs required tight cooperation between the unions and manufacturers, while the CJC helped gather various strands of a much smaller, and therefore concentrated, Jewish community around one table. Rubin-stein, writing shortly after the war, stressed the importance of cooperation with a broad cross-section of their community, even as he argued that ‘complete uniformity in the Jewish Community for which unfortunately some are hankering, is as impossible and harmful as it is alien to a democratic society.’ The JLC focussed its efforts on ‘the tailor, cloakmaker, baker, capmaker and liberal Jew imbued with ideals of a free democratic world,’ as it adapted itself to become ‘the organized expression of collective action which everyone yearned for in those disquieting and uneasy days.’

The garment workers’ projects likewise affected Canadian politicians, immigration officials, and aid workers immersed in the DP camps, testing their loyalty to the demands of the bureaucracy and compelling sympathy toward the refugees. Their initial hesitations bring into sharper relief the changes that were taking place within the Jewish community and wider Canadian society. Only by the end of the war could there be freedom to even conceive of bringing Jewish DPs over to Canada, while considering prospects for their long-term integration. For Enkin, the projects constituted ‘one of the finest annals of humanitarian interest in one’s fellow man.’ Their significance lies in the context in which all parties attempted to come to terms with a rather complicated tug-of-war. Jewish DPs were caught between the Communists who demanded repatriation to rebuild the Soviet bloc, the Zionists who needed them for Israel, and the Canadian government that wanted workers, but preferred white, non-Jewish settlers.

In this complex human reality, the JLC’s humanitarian internationalism was a microcosm for the shifting nature of relations between Jews, Canada, and the left writ large which is only now receiving the attention that it richly deserves.

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2 Abella and Troper mention the JLC briefly in the context of the Tailor’s Project while Franklin Bialystok goes into more detail on the JLC and its relations with other Jewish communal organisations in *Delayed Impact: The Holocaust and the Canadian Jewish Community* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000), 50–62.

3 An oral history project funded by Impakt Labs is currently collecting oral testimonies from those resettled in Canada through the garment workers’ schemes and their descendants. See "The Tailor Project," *The Tailor Project*, last modified 2019, https://tailorproject.ca/learn-more/history/. Recent media coverage of the Tailor’s Project and the garment workers’ schemes, however, rarely mention the JLC, if at all, or have focussed mainly on the employers and businesses involved in carrying them out. See, e.g., "In the Media", *The Tailor Project*, last modified 2019, https://tailorproject.ca/tailor-project-today/in-the-media/. This could change as new information comes to light. But material on the JLC’s involvement in the garment workers’ schemes is available in the Ontario Jewish Archives and in a vast collection at the Canadian national archives. See, esp., The Jewish Labour Committee of Canada Collection, MG28-V75, Finding Aid No. MSS1291, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa (from here on cited as the JLC Collection, Library and Archives Canada).


8 It was not until 1938 that the Canadian JLC began conducting its affairs as an independent organisation, holding its 10th Anniversary Convention ten years later in 1948. See, i.e., 10th Anniversary National Convention of the Jewish Labor Committee of Canada Report, 1-3 November 1948, Volume 3, File 3, ‘Reports, Documents, Resolutions: JLC 1946,’ JLC Collection, Library and Archives Canada. Eventually, however, the official date of its establishment was moved back to 1936, as noted by Carmela Patrias and Ruth Frager, ‘This is our country, these are our rights’: Minorities and the origins of Ontario human rights campaigns’, The Canadian Historical Review (1):1–35, 2001.

9 The CCF was formed in Saskatchewan with the Regina Declaration, establishing a tradition of democratic socialism in Canada that was the precursor to today's New Democratic Party (NDP). See James Naylor, *The Fate of Labour Socialism: The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation and the Dream of a Working-Class Future* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016). As a sample of these connections, the Canadian JLC’s core staff in 1940 included members of the International Lady Garment Workers’ Union (ILGWU) [B. Shane, S. Kraisman, J. Berman], Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (ACWA) [F. Lerman, Phil Wasserman, J. Shuster], the United Hatters, Cap, and Millinery Workers International Union (UHCMWIU) [M. Silcoff and S. Sugar], the Bakers Union [A. Shkolnick], the Workmen’s Circle [Maishe Lewis, H. Carin, M. Winikoff, R. Belitsky, A. Kligman, N. Mergler, L. Papernick], Lubliner Verband [M. Gartenberg], the CCF–Jewish Section [N. Wevrick], and Left Poale Zion [A. Katz, S. Allen, M.
Bernstein, C.S. Aronoff, the Jewish Socialist Farband, and the Pocket Bookmakers’ Union. See letters and fund-raising appeals in Volume 7, Files 8-10, ‘Correspondence: JLC and the War Effort 1939-1940, - 1941, - 1942’, JLC Collection, Library and Archives Canada.

Lewis led the Bund in Svisloch (Sislevitsh, Y.) before immigrating to Canada and becoming literal forefather of one of the most prominent political families in the history of Canadian social democracy. Kaplan had a similar trajectory, leaving Poland for Quebec in the mid-1930s. He and Lewis would later run unsuccessfully as CCF candidates in Montreal. Shane was a labour organizer in the United States sent to assist ILGWU locals in Montreal and Toronto at around the same time. Rubin-stein, for his part, was involved in the circles of the Jewish Socialist Farband and the CCF in the Prairies before becoming the JLC’s first chairperson in Quebec. See Chanco, Diaspora Solidarities, 40-42.


In the United States, Baruch Charney Vladeck was general manager of the Yiddish newspaper Forverts, before becoming one of the founders of the JLC in New York. Nathan Chanan, Bundist editor of the same paper and general secretary of the Arbeter Ring, was a long-time confidant of the NY JLC. Adolph Held, president of the JLC by the mid-1940s, was previously European director of the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS). Sidney Hillman and David Dubinsky, stalwarts of the garment unions ACWA and ILGWU, had Bundist sympathies, along with dozens of Yiddish journalists and rank-and-file unionists. See Gail Malmgreen, “Jewish Labor Committee,” in Encyclopedia of American Jewish History, eds. Stephen Norwood and Eunice Pollack (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 2008), 251-255.

Tony Michels goes against an earlier paradigm that saw Jewish socialism in North America transplanted, fully formed as it were, from Europe. It developed instead through mutual interactions across the ocean, evident in the complex personal trajectories, organizational backgrounds, and international networks of the founders of the JLC. See Tony Michels, A Fire in their Hearts: Yiddish Socialists in New York (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005).


Collomp, Résister au nazisme, 245.


In the inter-war years, the Bund became the largest mass Jewish party in Poland. It was here that political tensions reached a boiling point, erupting in open street battles in Warsaw and other cities that pitted fascists against the tenuous alliance between Bundists, local Communists, and labour Zionists. See Alain Brossat and Sylvia Klingberg, English trans. by David Fernbach, Revolutionary Yiddishland: A History of Jewish Radicalism (London: Verso, 2016), 29-54.

Soviet authorities imprisoned Bundist leaders, of whom many sought refuge in neighbouring Lithuania. The suicide of Arthur Zygieulbaum, Bundist representative of the Polish government-in-exile in London, in May 1943 carried an explicit message for the Allies who bore responsibility for the massacre of European Jewry through their reluctance to intercede on their behalf. See Collomp, Résister au nazisme. 212-216.

JLC official registration as a war charity under the 1939 Canadian War Charities Act (October 1941), Volume 7, File 9, ‘Correspondence: JLC and the War Effort 1939-1940,’ JLC Collection, Library and Archives Canada. For more details on the JLC’s efforts throughout the war, see assorted reports and correspondence
in Volume 7, Files 9-15 (covering the period 1939-1945), JLC Collection, Library and Archives Canada.


23 Fund-raising appeal entitled “Emergency Appeal For…[followed by a run-down of donations and political activity],” undated, Volume 15, File 21, ‘Correspondence: Appeal to TR Crerar Minister of Mines and Resources re Jewish refugees 1942-1943’, JLC Collection, Library and Archives Canada.

24 ibid.

25 Correspondence between the JLC’s Moishe Lewis and Margaret Meyer, War Service Convener, Municipal Chapter of Montreal of the Imperial Order of the Daughters of Canada, 1 October 1942, Volume 7, File 10, ‘Correspondence: JLC and the War Effort 1942’, JLC Collection, Library and Archives Canada.

26 Fund-raising appeal entitled “Emergency Appeal For…”, JLC Collection, Library and Archives Canada (n. 29).

27 Possibly an exaggeration, the JLC proudly noted that by early 1944 they had donated 7.5 tons of clothing in a single year, “the largest amount contributed by any organization either Jewish or non-Jewish,” to UNRRA. See Fund-raising appeal, Volume 15, File 21, ‘Correspondence: Appeal to TR Crerar, Minister of Mines and Resources re Jewish refugees 1942-1943’, JLC Collection, Library and Archives Canada.

28 Collomp, Résister au nazisme, 99-120.

29 Correspondence from JLC Executive to Thomas Crerar, Minister of Mines & Resources, 6 November 1942, Volume 15, File 21, ‘Correspondence: Appeal to TR Crerar Minister of Mines and Resources re Jewish refugees 1942-1943’, JLC Collection, Library and Archives Canada.

30 ibid.

31 Collomp, “The Jewish Labor Committee... Rescue of European Socialists,” 118. See also Michael Rubinstein’s speech for the JLC’s 1963 Banquet that mentions the 1,200 figure on p. 5, Volume 3, File 12, ‘Correspondence, Clippings, Press Releases: Annual Banquet, Claude Jodoin, Human Rights Award Honouree, 2 Feb 1963’, JLC Collection, Library and Archives Canada.


33 Collomp, Résister au nazisme, 99-120.

34 Michael Rubinstein Speech at the 30th Anniversary Banquet of the JLC, 29 January 1966, Volume 3, File 17, ‘Clippings, speeches - Annual Banquet, Michael Rubinstein, HR Award Honouree - 29 Jan 1966’, JLC Collection, Library and Archives Canada. In their later recollections, Michael Rubinstein and the CLC’s Claude Jodoin mention two notable individuals that the JLC had helped bring to America but who had returned to their home countries after the war: Erich Ollenhauer, leader of Germany’s Social Democratic Party, and Halvard Lange who would become Norway’s Minister of Foreign affairs in the 1960s. See Volume 3, File 12, ‘Correspondence, Clippings, Press Releases: Annual Banquet, Claude Jodoin, Human Rights Award Honouree, 2 Feb 1963’, JLC Collection, Library and Archives Canada.

35 Refugee Lists, undated, Volume 15, File 21, ‘Correspondence: Appeal to TR Crerar Minister
of Mines and Resources re Jewish refugees 1942-1943’, JLC Collection, Library and Archives Canada. Among the Polish Jews was Wulf Weviorka, ”noted journalist; former editor of the Haynt (“Today”); a Jewish anti-Fascist paper in Paris; in great danger in southern France.” Among the Italian socialist leaders was Pietro Nenni whose life was likewise “constantly in danger; Mussolini’s personal revenge may force the Vichy government to deport Nenni into the hands of Italian Fascists at any moment.”.

36 Correspondence from Michael Rubinstein to Thomas Crerar, Minister of Mines & Resources, 6 November 1942, Volume 15, File 21, ‘Correspondence: Appeal to TR Crerar Minister of Mines and Resources re Jewish refugees 1942-1943’, JLC Collection, Library and Archives Canada.

37 Correspondence between Saul Hayes, CJC National Executive Director, and Moishe Lewis [cc’d. Rubinstein, Bronfman, and Solkin], 6 May 1942, Volume 7, File 10, ‘Correspondence: JLC and the War Effort 1942’, JLC Collection, Library and Archives Canada.

38 Letter from Saul Hayes, CJC National Executive Director to Moishe Lewis as JLC National Secretary, cc’d. Rubinstein, Bronfman, and Solkin, 6 May 1942, Volume 7, File 10, ‘Correspondence: JLC and the War Effort 1942’, JLC Collection, Library and Archives Canada.

39 Ibid.

40 A series of pogroms convinced many to leave as noted by Kaplansky in “REPORT BY K. KAPLANSKY ON TRIP TO NEW YORK AUG. 6-16, 1946,” Volume 3, File 3, ‘Reports, Documents, Resolutions: JLC 1946,’ JLC Collection, Library and Archives Canada. See also Dariusz Stola, ‘Jewish emigration from communist Poland: the decline of Polish Jewry in the aftermath of the Holocaust,’ East European Jewish Affairs 47, no. 2-3 (2017): 169-188.

41 Susan Armstrong-Reid and David Murray, Armies of Peace: Canada and the UNRRA Years (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 162-185.


46 Armstrong-Reid and Murray, Armies of Peace, 162. See also Stone, Liberation of the Camps, 147.

47 Kaplansky, Oral History, Ontario Jewish Archives (n. 39).


50 Fitzpatrick, “The Motherland Calls”

51 US intelligence reports at the time also suspected that the Soviets had been deploying agents to infiltrate Jewish organizations in
efforts to relocate DPs to Palestine and Western countries. Through Project Symphony, the Office of Strategic Services, predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency, monitored the activities of the Jewish Agency and other Jewish organizations seeking to ferry people out of DP camps in Austria and Germany. See Kevin Ruffner, ‘Project SYMPHONY: US Intelligence and the Jewish Brichah in Post-war Austria (U),’ Studies in Intelligence 51, no. 1 (2007): 33-46. Declassified under the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act of 2007.

52 Stone, Liberation of the Camps, 179-182.


54 Since 1932, Canadian immigration policy was characterised by a racial schema which essentially barred all migrants with few exceptions. At the top of the hierarchy of ideal immigrants were British and American citizens, as well as white European farmers, lumber-jacks, and miners demanded by Canada’s resource-based economy and the efficient settlement of the prairies. The perception of Jews as city-dwellers meant that they rarely fit such criteria. See Abella and Troper, None Is Too Many, 198-199.


56 Less than a quarter approved of lifting immigration restrictions, while the rest were undecided or qualified their responses with the proviso that Jewish refugees “should be allowed in only if all other possible solutions to the problem had been tried in vain.” Opposition was highest in small rural towns. By province, an overwhelming 76% of Quebecers opposed admission of refugees of any sort, who might have received a slightly more positive reception in British Columbia. The Canadian Institute of Public Opinion commented on the irony of their findings, given that just a year before a majority had thought they should be allowed to settle in Palestine. See News clipping, “Gallup Poll of Canada: Canadians Oppose Taking Some Interned Palestine Refugees,” The Montreal Daily Star [data from the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion], 2 October 1946, Volume 7, File 22, ‘Correspondence: JLC 1946,’ JLC Collection, Library and Archives Canada.

57 Armstrong-Reid and Murray, Armies of Peace, 323-360. A few camp directors, notably Jean Henshaw and William Van Ark., stood as witnesses during deliberations over Canada’s role in the DP camps and highlighted the plight of Jewish refugees. See also Canada, Parliament, Senate, Standing Committee on Immigration and Labour: On the operation and administration of the Immigration Act, etc., Minutes of Proceedings, 20th Parl., 29 January 1948 – 11 February 1948, issues no. 1 and 2 (1948).

58 Armstrong-Reid and Murray, Armies of Peace, 31.

59 The expected transition from the Mackenzie King administration to that of Louis St-Laurent in 1948, who sought a more prominent place for Canada in the international arena, raised further hopes on the part of those pushing for a less discriminatory immigration policy. Louis St-Laurent’s experiences in the Department of External Affairs partly explains his commitment to a more internationalist foreign policy as Prime Minister. See Gerald Wright, ‘Managers, Innovators and Diplomats: Canada’s Foreign Ministers,’ Canada among Nations 2008: 100 Years of Canadian Foreign Policy, eds. Robert Bothwell and Jean Daudelin (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009), 61-81.


62 Ibid.

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid.

65 See especially Provisions 4.a, 4.c, 4.d, and postscript on Asian immigrants in the JLC’s copy of Canadian immigration law P.C. 695, which underwent several subsequent revisions until P.C. 1734, dated 1 May 1947, in Volume 15, File 21, ‘Correspondence: Appeal to TR Crerar Minister of Mines and Resources re Jewish refugees 1942-1943’, JLC Collection, Library and Archives Canada.

66 Max Enkin, Oral History Interview with Phyllis Platnick, 24 March 1982, Tape Number AC 132, Ontario Jewish Archives.


68 Max Enkin, Oral History-AC 132, Ontario Jewish Archives (n. 73).

69 Kaplansky, Oral History, Ontario Jewish Archives (n. 39).

70 Refugee Lists, undated, Volume 15, File 21, ‘Correspondence: Appeal to TR Crerar Minister of Mines and Resources re Jewish refugees 1942-1943’, JLC Collection, Library and Archives Canada.

71 Assorted correspondence between the CJC, the Canadian Federation for Polish Jews, the Canadian and NY JLC, in Volume 7, File 23, ‘Correspondence JLC 1947’, JLC Collection, Library and Archives Canada. See also Chanco, Diaspora Solidarities, 79-81.

72 Abella and Troper, None Is Too Many, 261.

73 This was especially true in the garment industry in the 1930s, where labour strikes sometimes pit Jewish workers against Jewish bosses. See Ruth Frager and Carmela Patrias, ‘Ethnic, Class, and Gender Dynamics Among Jewish Labour Activists and Jewish Human Rights Activists in Canada’, Canadian Jewish Studies/Études juives canadiennes 21 (2013[2014]): 143-160.


75 Around this time, the leadership of the JLC consisted of Michael Rubinstein as chairperson, Maishe Lewis as National Secretary, Bernard Shane as National Treasurer, and Kalmen Kaplansky as the Director. See assorted correspondences and letter heads, Volume 3, File 3, ‘Reports, Documents, Resolutions: JLC 1946,’ JLC Collection, Library and Archives Canada.

76 The CCF and MJ Coldwell’s support for the JLC’s refugee efforts was evident even during the war. See e.g. Letter from Michael Rubinstein to MJ Coldwell, thanking the latter for facilitating the introduction between a delegation from the JLC and the Minister of Mines and Resources, 10 November 1942, Volume 15, File 21, ‘Correspondence: Appeal to TR Crerar Minister of Mines and Resources re Jewish refugees 1942-1943’, JLC Collection, Library and Archives Canada. For Coldwell’s role, see also Armstrong-Reid and Murray, Armies of Peace, 31.


78 Kaplansky, Oral History, Ontario Jewish Archives (n. 39).

79 In communications with the Canadian government, the projects operated under the auspices of the Overseas Garment Workers Commission.
See, e.g., names of individuals in copies of the earlier lists drafted in the 1940s, pencilled out and replaced with new names in Volume 16, File 10, 'Correspondence: Canadian Garment Workers Scheme 1949', JLC Collection, Library and Archives Canada. In the same file, some of these names appear in letters approving their immigration to Canada, exchanged between the JLC and Canadian officials in the IRO’s Paris office.


Abella and Troper, None Is Too Many, 258-279.

Al Hershkovitz, Oral History Interview with Phyllis Platnick, 19 November 1985, Tape Number AC 111, Ontario Jewish Archives.


Letter from Bernard Shane to Kalmen Kaplansky, Volume 7, File 23, ‘Correspondence: JLC 1947’, JLC Collection, Library and Archives Canada.

For some months Jews had also been flowing into Hanover from Bergen-Belsen, a German military base close to the infamous death camp, which had been converted into a DP camp after its liberation by British and Canadian force. The delegation visited Bergen-Belsen, where they faced a chaotic situation with in-fighting among traumatised DPs. About 7,000 Jews were still in Bergen-Belsen and were eager to move to Hanover after having heard of the delegation’s visit. See Letter from Bernard Shane to Kalmen Kaplansky, JLC Collection, Library and Archives Canada (n. 93). See also Mark Celinscak, Distance from the Belsen Heap: Allied Forces and the Liberation of a Nazi Concentration Camp (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015).

Armstrong-Reid and Murray, Armies of Peace, 177-181.

Bauer, Out of the Ashes, 208-209.


Ibid.

Kaplansky, Oral History, Ontario Jewish Archives (n. 39).

In Ottawa, garment industry representatives through the CJC continued to pressure immigration officials about the need for labour, so that they raised the number of total possible recruits under the scheme, of which Jews could now account for up to 60%. See Max Enkin, Oral History Interview with Phyllis Platnick, Tape Number AC 113, 13 April 1986, Ontario Jewish Archives.

According to oral accounts by Kaplansky and the trade unionist Al Hershkovitz who note that officials who were directly involved in the selection process became much more flexible after having seen the camps for themselves. See Kaplansky, Oral History, Ontario Jewish Archives (n. 39) and Hershkovitz, Oral History, Ontario Jewish Archives (n. 90).

Kaplansky, Oral History, Ontario Jewish Archives (n. 39).

As the delegation counted only individual adults, the actual numbers could have been twice that, when accounting for partners and children. The actual figures could not be confirmed until the DPs had set sail for Canada. See Memo from W. Friedman and A. Eaton of the National Council of Clothing Manufacturers of Canada, 21 October 1947, Fonds 31, File 2, 'Overseas Garment Workers Commission (Part Two of Two),' Men's Clothing Manufacturers' Association of Ontario fonds, 2008-12-4, Ontario Jewish Archives.


Correspondence, Fonds 31, File 2, 'Overseas Garment Workers Commission (Part Two of Two),' Men's Clothing Manufacturers' Association of Ontario fonds, 2008-12-4, Ontario Jewish Archives.


A letter from a commissioner associated with the Immigration Branch of the Department of Mines and Resources attempted to clarify: "We have today received a cable from our Canadian Government Immigration Mission Headquarters at Heidelberg advising that the reason there were no Jewish garment workers on the present sailing of the S.S. "Sturgis" is because 27 of this race from Amberg Camp which were earmarked for this vessel were being held for a recheck of x-ray and blood check which had not been completed prior to the ship's sailing. It was necessary to replace this group by others at short notice whether they were Jewish or otherwise." See Letter from C.E.S. Smith, Commissioner, Department of Mines and Resources-Immigration Branch to Norman Genser, Barrister-Montreal, 6 December 1947, Volume 15, File 22, 'Correspondence: B Shane's Mission to D.P. Camps in Europe – D.P. Tailors Immigration Project 1947-1948,' JLC Collection, Library and Archives Canada.


Ibid.


Abella and Troper, None Is Too Many, 275-285.

Stone, Liberation of the Camps, 194.

Even for German citizens living outside the DP camps the situation was grim. From Hanover, which was still recovering after intense bombing raids by Allied forces, Shane writes: "after seeing Germany the London bombings
(by Nazi Germany) were only child’s play. One can walk for miles and not find a house that was not bombed and the sights while walking the streets are frightening.” See Letter from Bernard Shane to Kalmen Kaplansky, JLC Collection, Library and Archives Canada (n. 93).

109 Many of these were anti-communist ultranationalists who opposed what they perceived to be the Soviet Occupation of Eastern Europe. A key difference between them and the Jewish DPs, argues historian Peter Gatrell, was that while the former sought to restore a national past, Jews could only look toward a future beyond Europe. See Gatrell, The Making of the Modern Refugee (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 123-124.

110 As a sign of its entry into the political mainstream, leaders of American Jewry under the JDC, and the CJC’s counterparts in the American Jewish Committee (AJC), had at first viewed Palestine as a solution to Europe’s Jews with some ambivalence, developed a tight working relationship with the Jewish Agency. See Yehuda Bauer, Out of the Ashes: the Impact of American Jews on post-Holocaust European Jewry (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1989), 193-236.


112 Margarete Myers Feinstein, ‘Jewish Women Survivors in the Displaced Persons Camps of Occupied Germany: Transmitters of the Past, Caretakers of the Present, and Builders of the Future,’ Shofar 24, No. 4 (Summer 2006): 67-89. Feinstein recalls various means taken by DPs, including political organization, to cope with life in the camps.

113 Cesarani, Final Solution, 776. See also Bauer, Out of the Ashes, 229.


116 Elizabeth Brown’s personal diaries are revealing of such sentiments on the part of Canadian UNRRAIDS. See Armstrong-Reid and Murray, Armies of Peace, 149-160.

117 Armstrong-Reid and Murray, Armies of Peace, 349-350.


121 Chanco, Diaspora Solidarities, 54-66.

122 Kaplansky, Oral History, Ontario Jewish Archives (n. 39).
123 Letter from Bernard Shane to Kalmen Kaplansky, JLC Collection, Library and Archives Canada (n. 93).

124 A letter from Jacqueline Feltingoff, employed by the JDC to oversee resettlement efforts in the DP camp at Bergen-Belsen, mentions Shane’s “Bundist Comrades” who had approached her and now hoped that he would intercede in their behalf. Like all the Jews the delegation had selected, they had been excluded from the first batch of DPs that set sail for Canada. Feltingoff had first met Shane in the United States in relation to the JLC, where she had been a member of the National Executive. See Letter from Jacqueline Feltingoff, American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, to Bernard Shane, ILGWU-Montreal, 11 November 1947, Volume 15, File 22, ‘Correspondence: B Shane’s Mission to D.P. Camps in Europe – D.P. Tailors Immigration Project 1947-1948,’ JLC Collection, Library and Archives Canada.

125 Margarete Myers Feinstein, “Jewish Women Survivors in the Displaced Persons Camps of Occupied Germany: Transmitters of the Past, Caretakers of the Present, and Builders of the Future,” Shofar 24, No. 4 (Summer 2006): 67-89. Feinstein recalls various measures taken by DPs, including political organization, to cope with life in the camps.

126 For the rest of their trip, the JDC and the IRO wanted the delegation to tour as many camps as possible. See Enkin, Oral History-AC 113 (n. 100).

127 Enkin, Oral History-AC 132, Ontario Jewish Archives (n. 73).

128 Kaplansky, Oral History, Ontario Jewish Archives (n. 39) and Letter from Bernard Shane to Kalmen Kaplansky, JLC Collection, Library and Archives Canada (n. 93).

129 The CJC appointed Matthew Ram as its chief liaison officer in Europe for the subsequent immigration schemes patterned after the Tailor’s Project. As a former JIAS officer, Ram had accompanied the Tailor’s Project delegation across Germany. See Telegraph from Enkin to Genser mentioning Matthew Ram, in Fonds 31, File 2, ‘Overseas Garment Workers Commission (Part Two of Two),’ Men’s Clothing Manufacturers’ Association of Ontario fonds, 2008-12-4, Ontario Jewish Archives. See also Phone interview transcript with Enkin, Ontario Jewish Archives (n. 104) and Enkin, Oral History-AC 132, Ontario Jewish Archives (n. 73).


131 In 1948, 8,000 Jews came through other immigration projects, via the CJC and other private initiatives. Jews, however, still constituted a tiny proportion of the total number of DPs of various ethnic backgrounds admitted into Canada per year until 1952. 65,000 DPs were admitted in 1948. See Abella and Troper, None is Too Many, 279. See also Kaplansky, Oral History, Ontario Jewish Archives (n. 39).

132 A further 160,000 DPs of various ethnic and religious backgrounds – whose status just a decade prior marked them off as “non-preferred” – were allowed to resettle in Canada until the government’s special labour immigration schemes ended in 1952. See Julie Gilmour, “And who is my neighbour?” Refugees, Public Opinion, and Policy in Canada since 1900,” in Canada among Nations 2008: 100 Years of Canadian Foreign Policy, eds. Robert Bothwell and Jean Daudelin (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009), 171-172.

133 In Out of the Ashes, Bauer estimates that around 68,000 Jewish DPs entered the United States between the years 1949 and 1952 (p. 285). While the exact figures remain unclear, a much smaller proportion of Jewish DPs were allowed to enter Canada. See Abella and Troper, None is Too Many, 274-279. See also Adara Goldberg, Holocaust Survivors in

The United States’ Displaced Persons Act passed in June 1948 ultimately allowed in 400,000 DPs versus Canada’s 160,000. See Gatrell, Making of the Modern Refugee, 110-111.; In Enkin’s opinion the Canadian garment workers’ schemes had done a better job than the Americans. Despite sharing the same international networks and having more resources at their disposal, the American Jewish community relied primarily on official channels. Before 1949, even more stringent US regulations limited their ability to make much progress on the issue of DPs. In Germany, American immigration officers had even approached the Canadian garment workers’ delegations with questions about their methods. They wondered “why they couldn’t do it was because of American laws [and] bureaucracy,” continued Enkin, “they couldn’t do it, as we did through rough justice.” See Enkin, Oral History-AC 132, Ontario Jewish Archives (n. 73).

The IRO, supported by the Canadian government, did pay for the transport of DPs across the ocean, as well as the train that took them from the port of Halifax to Toronto and Montreal. See Enkin, Oral History-AC 113, Ontario Jewish Archives (n. 100).


Memo from W. Friedman and A. Eaton, Ontario Jewish Archives (n. 103).

According to the original plan, over half (55%) would go to Montreal, 36% to Toronto, and the rest divided between Winnipeg and Vancouver. The numbers were broken down as follows. Montreal got the largest share, with 1,261 DPs; 946 of whom were absorbed by the Montreal Men’s Clothing Manufacturers Association and 315 by the Montreal Ladies Clothing Manufacturing Association. In Toronto, they allocated 823 DPs, 436 of whom were absorbed by industries associated with the Toronto Men’s Clothing Manufacturers Association and 387 by the Toronto Ladies Clothing Manufacturers Association. The National Council of Clothing Manufacturers of Canada, meanwhile, assigned 145 DPs to Winnipeg and 50 in Vancouver. Larger businesses like Tip Top Tailors also separately negotiated to absorb 75 DPs in addition to 40 of their relatives. See “Canada to Receive 2,279 DP Workers for Needle Trades,” 6 November 1947, Daily News Record, Fonds 31, File 2, ‘Overseas Garment Workers Commission (Part Two of Two),’ Men’s Clothing Manufacturers’ Association of Ontario fonds, 2008-12-4, Ontario Jewish Archives, Toronto, Canada.

Hershkovitz, Oral History, Ontario Jewish Archives (n. 90).

The unions and other organisations that provided long-term support to the JLC and DPs affiliated with the garment workers schemes can be identified in its annual fund-raising banquets. See, e.g. lists in Volume 11, File 11, ‘Invitation & Guest List: JLC-Toronto Annual Banquet 1965, 1969, 1972,’ JLC Collection, Library and Archives Canada.

Kaplansky and Lewis spent a lot of time in Ottawa, lobbying MPs, especially their allies in the CCF, for the Department of Mines and Resources to offer a bit more assistance in the resettlement of the refugees. Yet there was a great deal of distrust, even in Kaplansky, as few would believe that he would help them for free. Instead, they attempted to bribe officials to seek permits or change their papers with limited success. See Kalmen Kaplansky, Oral History Interview with Phyllis Platnick, 20 September 1985, Tape Number AC 109-Side 1, Ontario Jewish Archives, Toronto, Canada.

Ibid.

Assorted correspondences between the JLC, the CJC, JIAS, the CCF [especially with M.J. Coldwell], and immigration officials, Volume 16, File 10, ‘Correspondence: Canadian Garment Workers Scheme 1949’ and Volume 16, File 11, ‘Correspondence: Canadian Garment
Kaplansky, Oral History-Side 1, Ontario Jewish Archives (n. 148).

Recall that Saul Hayes initially saw them as charity cases that could not rely on indefinite support from institutions like the CJC, echoing the arguments of the Canadian government. This was especially true during the war, when the material constraints of hosting refugees, mostly Eastern European and working-class, made them too great a burden to bear.

Rubinstein noted that “the raison d’etre and the growth of the JLC in Canada is perhaps even more telling than that of its parent body in the U.S.A.…. where there existed no central authoritative Jewish body, such as the CJC in our Dominion”. See Michael Rubinstein speech, “Ten Years of Strife, Rescue and Aid…,” republished article in Reports of the 10th Anniversary National Convention of the Jewish Labor Committee of Canada, 1-3 November 1948, Volume 3, File 3, ‘Reports, Documents, Resolutions: JLC 1946,’ JLC Collection, Library and Archives Canada.

As far as immigration policies were concerned, there would not be significant changes until after the UN Refugee Convention of 1951. Even then, the Canadian government would only respond meaningfully to new international norms around immigrants and refugees in 1967. As they did in the past, the JLC, alongside the CJC, the NDP and the trade unions, intervened in debates leading up to major revisions in federal immigration laws passed in 1967 which did away with all racial criteria in the selection of immigration. See interventions by the JLC’s David Orlikow, as acting NDP MP, in the immigration debates, in Volume 27, File 8, ‘Brief on Immigration by David Orlikow, M.P. including draft, Jan. 1965,’ JLC Collection, Library and Archives Canada. See also Laura Madokoro, “‘Belated Signing’: Race-Thinking and Canada’s Approach to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,” in Dominion of Race: Rethinking Canada’s International History, eds. Laura Madokoro, Francine McKenzie, and David Meren (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2017), 161-182.

Max Enkin, Oral History-AC 132, Ontario Jewish Archives (n. 73).