In his suggestive article, “Argentina and Canada: a comparative perspective of their economic development, 1919-1939,” Carl E. Solberg has argued that “at first glance, Argentina and Canada, two countries which are separated by thousands of kilometers and by large ethnic and cultural differences, seem not to have much in common.” But Solberg, and a few others who have made comparative studies of the two nations, have taken issue with this first impression. They have found a few basic similarities in the development of the two countries that provide a useful basis for comparative research. Prime among these similarities is a striking parallel in the size and rhythm of increases in their populations (Table 1); the decisive role which Great Britain played in both Canada’s and Argentina’s economic development from independence until World War II; the centrality of agricultural expansion on the Argentine Pampas and the Canadian Prairies to each country’s international trade; and systematic efforts by both countries to encourage immigration in order to help realize the full potentialities of their respective agrarian development.
Table 1: Comparative population growth, 1920-1939

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Argentina</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>8,556,000</td>
<td>8,861,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>10,029,000</td>
<td>11,592,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>11,315,000</td>
<td>13,948,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The few comparative studies of Argentina and Canada have also recognized important differences between the two countries. Canada, for example, had no landed aristocracy, as opposed to Argentina where large estate-owners played a prominent role in national and regional politics. Moreover, while the landed Argentine ruling class pursued a policy of open and free trade and opposed industrialization, beginning in the 1870s the Canadian economic elite supported protectionism for the accelerated development of industries. These dissimilarities have been used to explain basic differences between the political regimes in Canada and Argentina, including the relative political instability of Argentina as compared to Canada.

This type of comparative analysis is most enlightening, and needs to be extended to other subjects. A similar analysis of the Jewish communities in each country can be useful both to those interested in the histories of these countries, and to those wishing to deepen their understanding of Jewish history. Thus far, there has been little comparative analysis of the Canadian and Argentine Jewish communities. The only attempt to draw some parallels between the Jewish communities of Canada and Argentina was by Moshe Davis in his multinational comparative essay “Centers of Jewry in the Western Hemisphere: A Comparative Approach.” While raising some basic questions regarding the study of contemporary Jewry in general, Davis’ study focused largely on the weakening of Jewish identity and issues of political representation in the communities he discusses. Davis suggested that the reason for differences in the political representation stem from the different political cultures of the host societies. In short, he concluded that the forms of political organization adopted by Jewish communities had
less to do with the preservation of Old World heritage than with Jewish accommodation to the political culture of the new diaspora in which they found themselves.

This paper offers a much wider comparison of the history of the Canadian and Argentine Jewish communities. The first issue analyzed is that of economic policies, more specifically the extent to which Canadian and Argentine national policies regarding agricultural development and industrialization have shaped Canadian and Argentine Jewish communities and their respective integration, in both rural and urban settings. The second issue addressed in this study is immigration and especially the impact of Canadian and Argentine immigration policies on Jews. Certainly, national immigration policies mirror the economic and political priorities of the state even as they also mirror the ethnic self-image and priorities of the larger receiving societies. At the same time, immigration has had a shaping influence on the internal history of Canadian and Argentine Jewish communities. Accordingly, this essay will first focus on the immigration policies of Canada and Argentina from the beginning of the exodus from Czarist Russia in the early 1880s to the outbreak of World War II in 1939. Our emphasis then will be on understanding how differences between Canadian and Argentine political cultures fixed boundaries for Jewish community advocacy on behalf of further Jewish immigration.

I

In 1881, when a torrent of violent pogroms swept over Jewish communities in the south of Russia sending thousands into flight, both Canada and Argentina were in the midst of intensive territorial expansion. Canada was then engaged in the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway, an engineering marvel that eventually breached the Rocky Mountains to link Canada by rail from ocean to ocean. In the process the vast Canadian Prairies were opened to organized agricultural settlement. In Argentina, the violence in Russia coincided with the conclusion
of the “Conquest of the Desert,” the major military operation against the indigenous peoples in the south, which ultimately resulted in their lands being in the hands of the federal government. Colonizing the vast territorial expanse west of Ontario in Canada, and south of the Province of Buenos Aires in Argentina, became key economic and political challenges for their respective governments.

Canadian and Argentine authorities took notice of the wave of Jews then fleeing westward out of Russia. In August 1881, President Julio A. Roca of Argentina and his Minister of the Interior, Antonio del Viso nominated an *ad honorem* special immigration agent, José María Bustos, to “direct to the Argentine Republic the Jewish immigration which has now begun in the Russian Empire.” Together with Carlos Calvo, Argentina’s immigration point man in Paris, del Viso was authorized to contact Jewish organizations in France and Germany—especially the Alliance Israélite Universelle—in an effort to stream Jewish emigration to Argentina. While the Argentine government’s welcome of Jewish immigrants raised some domestic opposition, the government was steadfast in maintaining an open door to Jewish immigrants. For a time, the results were minimal. Most Jews who left Europe looked to the United States as their first choice for a new home.5 Anything else was second best. Yet the fact that Argentina was welcoming Jewish immigration did not go unrewarded. In the years which followed, large groups of Jewish immigrants arrived in Argentina.6

Argentina’s policy of encouraging immigration, including Jewish immigration, became more aggressive under President Miguel Juárez Celman. Beginning in 1887, the government paid the transportation of immigrants who, while still in Europe, had acquired land for settlement from Argentine landlords. These payments became very considerable. Although they were officially regarded as loans to potential settlers, in fact, they were a government subsidy to the private settlement of the Pampas. This financial assistance was also a key factor in
the immigration to Argentina of the first large contingent of Jewish settlers. Some 820 Jewish settlers were among the passengers on the German ship *Weser* when it docked in the port of Buenos Aires in August, 1889, and three weeks later the Immigration Department paid the *Weser*’s shipping agency 43,168.50 pesos for the tickets of 800 *Weser* passengers. Clearly, the government must have covered the tickets of a considerable number of Jewish immigrants.\(^7\) It was these early Jewish pioneers in Argentina who paved the way for the tens of thousands of Jewish agricultural settlers who eventually followed.

Canada also sought to take advantage of the 1881 flight of Russian Jewry. Alexander Tillock Galt, Canadian High Commissioner in London, saw a possible economic opening for Canada in the settlement efforts of the Mansion House Committee, which had been established to support and reestablish pogrom victims in new homes. He was particularly impressed by the interest which the Rothschilds had shown to help their Russian brethren. Whatever his sympathy for the hard-pressed refugees, Galt also had a somewhat more self-serving reason for pushing Canada’s involvement in a Jewish settlement scheme. Among his other Prairie business interests, Galt was among the promoters of town-site development projects that could not help but benefit from a successfully organized and funded settlement program and, even more, from any spin-off capital investment by the Rothschilds.

Accordingly, Galt impressed upon Canadian Prime Minister John A. Macdonald that Canada might benefit from tapping into the funds raised by the Committee to help establish Jewish agricultural colonies on the Canadian Prairies. Not only would Canada get much-needed settlers but, by welcoming Jews, Galt hinted that Rothschild might be induced to invest capital in the Canadian Pacific Railway. Somewhat reluctantly, the Prime Minister approved Galt’s initiative and in May and June of 1882, three groups, consisting altogether of 340 Russian Jews, arrived in Winnipeg with the intention of settling the land. The
Mansion House Committee financed the transportation of the immigrants as well as an initial outlay for their settlement. The government of Canada provided the settlers with land, albeit only after a delay of some two years.\(^8\)

As in Argentina, this large group of immigrants opened the Prairies for more agricultural immigrants and, by its very existence, promoted urban immigration as well. But the experiment with agricultural colonization was an experience unique to Canada and Argentina. In no other immigration country—the United States, South Africa or Australia — did Jewish agricultural settlement play quite the same role. Equally striking is the fact that in both Canada and Argentina the first Jewish agricultural settlements were made possible through the aid of the government: in Argentina, by government paying the transportation costs of most of the first settlers, and in Canada, by government offering settlers free land.

Moosomin in Canada (nicknamed “New Jerusalem”) and Mosesville in Argentina (“The Jerusalem of Argentina”), both ended up in failure and disillusionment shortly after their respective establishments. In the case of the Canadian colony, its sponsor—the Mansion House Committee in London—was too far away, too administratively and financially weak, and, in the end, too little committed to colonization in Canada to save the enterprise. It failed.\(^9\) In Argentina, however, while the Mosesville settlement floundered near collapse it found a savior in the person of Baron Maurice de Hirsch. In the decade after 1881, this rich, Paris-based, railroad developer and financier helped, inter alia, the Alliance Israélite Universelle extend its resettlement program in aid of pogrom victims and in 1890 endorsed wholesale emigration and agricultural colonization as the best solution to Jewish suffering in Russia. Mosesville was the focal point for a particularly audacious resettlement plan for Argentina that the Baron de Hirsch had conceived in 1892 and promoted for three years until proven impractical. His initial plan was to establish “a sort of autonomous Jewish state where our co-religionists would be
protected from antisemitic attacks once and for all.” While he also hoped to enlist other wealthy Jews to his scheme, the first “territorialist” Jewish experiment in modern Jewish history, Baron de Hirsch decided to strike out on his own, using his own money to shape what he was convinced would be a model of large-scale successful Jewish colonization. To carry out his effort he established the Jewish Colonization Association, endowed it with fifty million francs (then the equivalent of ten million US dollars) and administered it personally from his main office in Paris.

Hirsch’s first step was to negotiate the acquisition of enormous tracts in Argentine National Territories. But his “territorialist” scheme soon proved impossible. He did not succeed even in consolidating economically the few large colonies he founded in the provinces of Santa Fe, Buenos Aires and Entre Rios. Without a wholly Jewish contiguous territory in Argentina, there could be no autonomous Jewish state. Although his grand plan failed, the individual colonies he financed and to which he offered continuous support managed to survive as individual Jewish agricultural centres.10

In Canada, the Jewish agricultural settlements did not have any “baron” with deep pockets to rely on. Herman Landau, a London Jewish financier with connections to the Canadian Pacific Railway, sponsored the establishment of a Jewish agricultural colony at Wappella, but Landau was not wealthy enough to underwrite any large-scale scheme of Jewish agricultural settlement in the Canadian west. He could not even provide sufficient funds for the small settlement that he helped initiate at Wappella.

In 1891, the leaders of the Young Men’s Hebrew Benevolent Society (YHBS) of Montreal, also supportive of Jewish agricultural settlement schemes in the Canadian west, negotiated with the federal government for the allocation of large tracts of land to Jewish settlers. But, like Landau, the YHBS did not have enough resources to support even the already existing small settlements fighting a desperate battle to
survive. In 1892 the YHBS turned to Baron de Hirsch and his Jewish Colonization Association for assistance, who offered them the funds necessary to establish one colony, the Hirsch colony. Whether the members of the YHBS were just grateful or cautiously hedging their bets against the possibility of dipping into the JCA purse again, they renamed their organization “The Baron de Hirsch Institute.” The Baron may have been flattered but commitments were elsewhere. He and the JCA, although ready to support the Canadian group’s efforts, were primarily absorbed by—and financially committed to—their Argentine enterprise. The Canadian colony would never be more than a sideshow.11

The difference in the size of the two agricultural projects—the Argentine large, the Canadian small—was not only caused by the difference between the amount of Jewish capital investment available to each. It was also a product of the different agricultural and economic cultures of Canada and Argentina. The prevailing agricultural systems on the Pampas and Prairies were both dominated by extensive dry farming on large tracts by individual farmers, rather than intensive cultivation of a variety of products on smaller plots of land. In both countries, production was geared towards grain export, and in the case of Canada it was largely limited to wheat.12 This led to the spreading out of settlers across the land, and worked against the formation of concentrated villages where the religious and educational services—deemed indispensable even by the most undemanding Jewish settlers—could adequately be met.

This difficulty was problematic for Jewish settlers in both countries, but it was more severe in Canada. Of the thirteen Jewish colonies eventually set up in Canada, only Edenbridge was a concentrated village. In the rest, the settlers lived on their individual 160 acre (65 hectares) plots of land, as did the Jewish farmers in Argentina who cultivated even larger farms. But in Canada, where very long and cold winters tended to exaggerate distance between settlers, the sense of isolation could be particularly severe.13
In Argentina, on the other hand, the Baron de Hirsch and the Jewish Colonization Association purchased very large sections of land and settled larger Jewish groups in a contiguous fashion. If the Baron never was able to create the Jewish State he desired, he did succeed in creating wholly Jewish sub-districts, each of them called a colony. In Canada, however, where the public land was dispersed by the Dominion Lands Commission or private land was purchased from the Canadian Pacific Railway or its agents, the Jewish Colonization Society’s kind of colonial experiment in Argentina contradicted Canadian colonization policy which increasingly disapproved of homogeneous ethnic enclaves.

By 1921, the population of all the Jewish agricultural colonies in Canada supported by the Jewish Colonization Association amounted to 1,278, half the total of 2,568 Jews listed as farmers in the Canadian census. In Argentina, there were 20,382 individuals in Jewish farming families living in JCA colonies in 1925. An unknown number of other Jewish farmers in Argentina must have settled on the land without the help of the JCA. The huge difference in numbers of Jewish agricultural settlers in Argentina and Canada notwithstanding, agricultural settlements in both countries contributed to the process of Jewish community formation in the two countries. They served as a first destination and temporary absorption center for many Jewish immigrants, far larger than the number of farmers who were to be found in the colonies at any given moment would suggest.

In Canada the phenomenon of agricultural settlement would also influence the dispersion of the Jewish population across the western provinces. Louis Rosenberg, studying Canadian national census data from 1881 onwards, underlined the impact of agricultural settlements on the growth of the Jewish population in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta. In 1881, only 31 Jews were counted in these provinces. In 1911 there were 14,293 Jews in the west, a full 18.9 percent of the Jewish population of Canada at that time. Many had passed through one or another of the agricultural colonies.
In Argentina, in 1909, between 43.5 percent and 48.6 percent of the Jewish population lived outside of Buenos Aires, in provincial towns and villages. During the years 1910 to 1914, as a large wave of Jewish immigrants arrived in the country, 41.24 percent of these Jews requested that immigration authorities send them to the interior, and, of these 54.25 percent went directly to the Jewish colonies.¹⁸

As shown, the predominantly agrarian orientations of Argentina’s and Canada’s economies and settlement policies help to explain the history and geographic distribution of the two national Jewish communities. What role did both countries’ industrialization policies have in shaping the history of their respective Jewish communities?

II

The National Policy, as a system of high protective tariffs levied by Canada on industrial imports, preceded the completion of transcontinental railway construction from Ontario to British Columbia and the opening of the prairies to intensive colonization. Initiated by Prime Minister John A. Macdonald, the National Policy had several goals: First, to secure the local market (which consisted of 3,689,000 inhabitants in 1871) for the nascent Canadian industry and thereby provide work for Canadians who might otherwise drift southwards in search of jobs; Second, to attract American capital investment by encouraging—if not forcing—the establishment of branch plants of American industries in Canada; Third, to support the fledgling railway cargo moving westward from the industrializing east in exchange for the agricultural products moving out of the west; Last, to provide the government with an important source of import customs revenue. Although not primarily intended to structure the flow of immigrants and in seeming violation of Canada’s pro-agricultural bias, the impact of this industrialization policy was to attract industrial labour, often into more urban centers.¹⁹
Canada, as part of the British Empire, did not place tariff barriers on British goods. Argentina, for different reasons, also did not maintain tariff barriers against Britain. In fact, Argentina fell under the economic spell of Britain from the date of its liberation in 1810. As early as 1825, bilateral trade treaties were formalized and during the latter part of the nineteenth century British capital remained a major source of investment capital for a number of key Argentine enterprises, including railroad building, banking, speculative land acquisitions and urban transportation.\textsuperscript{20} At the time when the National Policy was being instituted in Canada, the Argentine Congress was also discussing the merits of a national tariff system, but less as a way of protecting domestic industry from foreign competition than as a source of income to the state.\textsuperscript{21} Protectionism, however, did not win the day. Weak Argentine industrialists favoring protection were no match for powerful estate-owners interested in the uninterrupted export of meat and cereals to Britain and Europe and who also wanted to keep the local market open to inexpensive European, and particularly British, manufactured goods. Tariffs, they feared, would raise the cost of imported good while encouraging Britain to retaliate with tariffs against Argentine agricultural products. With no close economic rival—unlike Canada, which had to contend with the looming industrial power of the United States—Argentina felt no immediate need to protect its industry.

As a result of different Canadian and Argentine industrial policies during the crucial period of large immigration preceding World War I, by 1914 Canada had a much larger and significantly more intensive industrial sector than did Argentina, although they had roughly the same size of population.\textsuperscript{22} During the war, industrial production expanded greatly in both countries but along different tracks: Canada sought to supply the war effort, while Argentina worked to substitute for now missing overseas imports. When the war ended, both countries suffered a post-war economic slowdown. Argentina left its unprotected domestic industries to face the onslaught of foreign
goods as the price of maintaining traditional wheat and meat markets in Britain and Europe. Canada struggled successfully to re-adjust its wartime industries to meet post-war civilian demands, but not without some painful dislocation. For a short period in the later 1920s, the largely protected Canadian industry was the engine of Canadian economic growth.23

The Depression of the 1930s forced the countries of the British Empire to reappraise their economic policies. The results had a devastating impact on Argentina. After the Ottawa Conference of 1933, a system of imperial preferences was adopted. Locked out of the British market, Argentina’s exports to its traditional trading partner fell sharply. In an attempt to win back the British market, Argentina offered advantages to British manufactured products over domestic and other foreign goods, thus further subordinating the interests of its own manufacturing industry to those of the meat and grain exporters. But the drastic decline in the prices of rural products and the falling incomes created a domestic market for cheap goods supplied by local manufacturers. The war which broke out in 1939 cut Argentina off still further from British products and acted as a further spur to domestic industry. As a result, from 1935 to 1943, the total number of Argentine factories increased by 60 percent, the industrial labour force by 83 percent, and the value of production by 110 percent.24

Industrial expansion shaped the economies of both Canada and Argentina. But to what extent did the National Policy in Canada affect the economic integration of Canadian Jews and how did their experience differ from those of Jewish immigrants to Argentina? Some answers can be derived from an analysis of Louis Rosenberg’s statistical work (Table 2):

Table 2—Gainfully Occupied Canadian Jewish Population (in percentages)25

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupations</th>
<th>Jews (1921)</th>
<th>Jews (1931)</th>
<th>All Origins (1931)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Merchandising</td>
<td>38.22</td>
<td>35.94</td>
<td>7.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>30.45</td>
<td>29.62</td>
<td>11.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All others</td>
<td>31.33</td>
<td>34.44</td>
<td>80.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22 Haim Avni
Although the importance of manufacturing decreased slightly between 1921 and 1931, due to the structure of occupations in Canada, manufacturing was second only to commerce as a source of employment for Canadian Jews, and far more important to Jews than to the Canadian population generally. Of all the male Jews engaged in manufacturing in 1931, 86.7 percent were immigrant males and 82.0 percent immigrant females. Since 79.5 percent of all gainfully employed Jewish males and 57.1 percent of females were involved in manufacturing, one must conclude that not only was manufacturing a core occupation for Canadian Jews but particularly so for Jewish immigrants.

Not all the branches of manufacturing were equally important. A full 67 percent of those employed in manufacturing in 1931 were concentrated in “Textile goods and clothing,” just one of the eighteen manufacturing categories enumerated in the official statistics. Together with “Fur and fur goods,” “Leather and leather goods” and “Metal products”—three categories which followed in importance—these four branches gave work to 83 percent of all Jews engaged in manufacturing. Although actual percentages varied from city to city, the fact of a dominant Jewish role in the garment industry remained constant.

Of course, Jews were not alone. While we do not know how many of the 13,247 workers in the garment industry in Toronto in 1901 were Jewish—or of the 13,223 in Toronto in 1911 or 10,605 in 1921—we do know that in 1931, the 15,010 Jews who were engaged in all branches of this industry across Canada constituted less than one quarter of the total number of garment workers. In Toronto, the 5,242 Jewish men and women who were occupied in the production of garments in 1931 made up 46.04 percent of all garment workers. British workers formed 43.25 percent of the total, the second largest ethnic group in the garment industry.

It has been argued that poor Jews gravitated toward the clothing industry because locally-produced sewing machines were comparatively inexpensive, required little training, and afforded immigrants a marketable if often low-paying skill.
While some Jews worked in small home workshops, many found employment in a system of large operations, commonly known as “sweatshops”, which predate the arrival in Canada of the large wave of Eastern European Jewish immigrants in the early years of the twentieth century. Once Jewish immigration moved into this labour market, “sweatshops” became very much a “Jewish” industry. The industry was dominated by individualistic activity—piecework—in which workers were paid for individual production, rather than for a fixed wage within a cooperative team. And being individualistic in structure and rewards, the work offered the hope of upward mobility, of advancing from simple “sweat” labour to a position of contractor or another more entrepreneur-like status in the hierarchy of the needle industry. This “making it in America” model fit well with the upwardly mobile aspirations of many Jewish workers recently arrived from Poland, Russia or Galicia.

Like the garment trade, manufacture of fur and fur goods also attracted Jewish immigrant workers. Some had experience in the fur trade in Europe. This, together with an abundance of raw material in Canada and of local demand, led to a marked Jewish concentration in this sector: In 1931, Jews constituted 48.65 percent of all workshop owners and managers in the Canadian fur industry, 31.82 percent of all wage workers were Jewish. Oddly, this was not the case with footwear and furniture, two other areas of Canadian manufacturing in which Jewish workers might have been expected to figure highly. The number of Jewish producers of leather and leather goods and of wood products was comparatively small, as was their share in other industries.

Data on Jewish economic sector involvement in Argentina is far less precise than is true of Canada. Jews were surely concentrated in what Adolfo Dorfman has termed “small industrial-commercial industry,” including “workshops for shoemaking, tailoring, hat making, harness making, baking, etc.” The number of these establishments grew from 7,300 in 1895 with 38,400 workers to 8,000 with 41,000 workers in 1908 and
9,700 with 63,500 workers in 1914. But in none of these censuses, nor in those of 1935, 1941, and 1946 was the religion or ethnic origin of the owners or workers given. In the absence of official census data, we must rely on other types of sources. The Jewish Colonization Association gathered census-type information in 1908-9 and again in 1941-3. We also have a modest 1936 study by Simon Weill, Director General of JCA in Buenos Aires and two extensive and reliable historical surveys published in 1940, as well as the memoirs of Jewish workers. There has been, in fact, only one systematic effort to reconstruct the professional composition of the Eastern European Jews in Buenos Aires, but the scarcity of reliable data renders the research somewhat suspect. While these sources are individually tentative, together these and other partial but useful sources allow us to draw some conclusions regarding industry’s role in the absorption of Jewish immigrants in Argentina.

In 1908-9 Rabbi Samuel Halfon carried out a Jewish census on behalf of the JCA. He reported that Jewish craftsmen at all skill levels were occupied throughout Argentina, but were especially concentrated in commerce and the production of furniture. In Rosario, the second largest city of Argentina, he visited a Jewish factory where two-thirds of the hundred workers there were Jews. Another report dated 1910 indicated that in Córdoba, the Republic’s third largest city, there were seventeen furniture workshops owned and staffed by Jews. In Córdoba, as in Buenos Aires, they were producing a line of inexpensive products that did not compete with either the higher quality imports from Europe, or with the products of the few larger and more modern Argentine plants.

These largely Jewish workshops were not heavily capitalized. Skilled carpenters or merchants, with very little money, could start up small shops with very few workers or farm out work to home-producers in a sweat-system. A report published in 1919 by the Department of Commerce of the United States attested to the primitive level of production and products of this industry. A 1928 visitor reported that many Ashkenazi Jews
found their living in this niche of the local market. As late as 1935, with a more diversified Argentine industrial base, almost a quarter of all Jewish workshops and industrial plants in metropolitan Buenos Aires—102 out of a total of 427—were still producing furniture, beds and rubber products. The common denominator of all these products was their large-volume and low-cost market share, a market share not accessible to more expensive imported goods. Without foreign competition, wood products and furniture, including iron beds, provided a sheltered niche which Argentina’s import support policies left open for poorer, local and often Jewish manufacturers. This provides a remarkable comparison with Canada, where only 0.82 percent of the gainfully employed Jews found their living in manufacturing “wood and paper” products.

Like Canada, the Argentine garment industry, with its sweatshop system, preceded the arrival of large numbers of Jews. But unlike Canada, the garment industry did not acquire anything like the centrality in Jewish life that it did in the north. A survey published in 1940 noted that thirty years earlier Jewish garment manufacturers in Buenos Aires had employed only 540 workers. In the absence of other solid data this number has frequently been quoted, even though it did not refer exclusively to Jewish workers or include all Jews employed at that time in the needle industry. The Jewish presence in the textile and clothing fabrication grew in later years, particularly after World War I, and became a dominant factor in some sub-branches of the clothing manufacturing sector, such as the silk and weaving industries. This was made possible by a combination of factors including the arrival of more skilled Jewish textile workers in Argentina, an increase in capital investment and, most particularly, a comparative lack of foreign competition in cheaper fabric production.

In contrast to Canada, where only 3.48 percent of the gainfully employed Jews were engaged in the fur and leather industries, in Buenos Aires they apparently represented a much larger share of the Jewish industrialists and workers. Of the 427 manufacturing plants and workshops enumerated by Simon
Weill in 1935, 113 were producing fur products and 100 more were making women’s bags, belts, hats, suitcases and other leather goods.\textsuperscript{37} 

For all the internal differences noted between the Jewish industrial entrepreneurship and work force in Canada and Argentina, there are still remarkable similarities between the economic position of the Jewish communities in the two countries. Jewish immigrants in both countries played an important role in developing industries that replaced imports and drew on local raw materials in both Canada and Argentina. In part this similarity may be attributed to the common pool of skills and aspirations Jewish immigrants brought with them from the old world. The differences, which are striking, are in large part a product of the different economic policies followed by Argentina and Canada, differences which influenced the development of manufacturing in the two Jewish communities, particularly in each Jewish community’s formative periods. But these differences were more important in shaping the particularities rather than in the kinds of Jewish industrial activities, and these differences became even narrower when external conditions during the Depression forced Argentina to begin protecting its local market. Argentina’s Jews, ensconced in several industrial sectors that would be protected, took a very active role in expanding industry and manufacturing in these areas. Again, however, national policies and priorities dominated. With the outbreak of World War II, the two Jewish communities were shaped more by the differences in their respective countries’ political cultures as expressed in their foreign policies—Canada’s participation in the war and Argentina’s neutrality—than by their respective economic policies.

\textbf{III}

Given Canadian and Argentine agricultural and industrial realities, what were their respective policies regarding immigration? The first Canadian Immigration Act (1869) entrusted the Prime Minister and Cabinet with almost absolute authority to decree
and regulate immigration. Immigration was an area in which Parliament, aside from passing necessary legislation, had little continuous consultative role. Moreover, as much immigration activity took place outside of Canada, it was an area in which the Canadian judiciary also had limited authority. A high concentration of power was also the case with subsequent immigration acts through the 1940s. Orders of the Privy Council (Cabinet) were the dominant legal instrument for instituting policy regulation, and the officials in charge of immigration, while not above criticism and political pressure, were given much freedom in implementing policy.38

In Argentina, the Law of Immigration and Colonization (Law No. 817) enacted by the Congress in October of 1876 also left much to the discretion of the executive branch of government and its officials. It empowered officials to “protect the honest, hardworking immigrants and to propose adequate means to avoid the arrival of those who are corrupt or useless.” But there were also limits on power. The legislation defined more clearly the rights of immigrants and subjected the Immigration Commissioners to judicial intervention.39 An example of this kind of intervention is the admission of the first large group of Jewish settlers in August 1889. When the SS Weser arrived in Buenos Aires, the immigration officer in charge decided that the “strange-looking” Eastern European Jews should be sent back to Europe. While all the non-Jewish passengers were allowed to disembark, Jews were kept on board until this decision was appealed and overruled by a judge, protecting the immigrants’ rights as stated in law.40 Another example is the 1902 case of seven Gypsy families from Serbia. The Department of Immigration ordered them returned to Europe on the ship that brought them because the Department considered the Gypsies to be poor nomads without desirable professions. A habeas corpus order issued by the court on the Gypsies’ behalf—and possibly upon the request of the ship’s agents—forced immigration authorities to reverse their decision.41

This difference between the Canadian and Argentine legal
systems with reference to immigration did not imply any major difference in the kind of immigrants which the two countries desired to attract. In referring to the Anglo-Saxons and Northern European immigrants during the debate on the Law of Immigration, one of the most prominent Argentine senators proclaimed: “Does anyone doubt that it would be convenient to acclimate in our own land this virile, intelligent race that has made the prosperity of the United States? It may be one of the greatest achievements we can aspire to!” And the Congress unanimously agreed with him.42 Canada targeted these same immigrants and in due course adopted explicit discriminatory regulations that clearly reinforced this preference.

Restrictive immigration regulations operated in both Canada and Argentina. They were originally designed to prohibit the admission of sick individuals who might endanger the public’s health. In 1879-80 Canada added restrictions against the landing of indigent immigrants, and in 1891 a Privy Council Order prohibited the landing of all paupers, and regulations stipulated the presentation of considerable sums of “landing money.”43 Facing various forms of social unrest, including union protest and anarchist threats, the Argentine House of Representatives and the Senate took only one day—November 22, 1902—to discuss and pass legislation forbidding the admission of immigrants convicted of breaking the law, as well as those whom immigration officers suspected as politically dangerous. The President of the Republic signed the bill into law that same day. Under the law, any foreign-born individual suspected of being a danger to the public order could be deported any time after being allowed into the country. Despite its harshness, “The Law of Residence,” as it was called, and its 1910 legal companion, “The Law of Social Defense,” did not limit immigration. Instead, they became political tools available to Argentine authorities in dealing with leftist leaders and organizations.44 The Canadian equivalent to these Argentine laws was the clause in the 1910 Immigration Act which expanded the undesirable classes of immigrants to include “any person...who
advocates in Canada the overthrow by force or violence of the government of Great Britain or Canada, or other British dominion, colony, possession or dependency; or the overthrow by force or violence of constituted law and authority.” Even when used against the left, this provision of the law never became a major deterrent to immigration.45

Physically, politically—and in the case of Canada—economically “sick” immigrants were officially excluded. These provisions restricted the admission of individuals, not groups. But Canada also implemented a series of regulations and laws that were applied collectively to members of certain ethnic or racial groups. In this context, individual merits—or faults—might allow a case to be made for the exceptionality of that individual. But as a general rule, all members of the ethnic or racial group in question were treated the same. Canadian immigration law and regulations, for example, gave distinct preference to those from Britain and Northern Europe, and barred others. The first who were marked for restriction were the Chinese. To limit their presence in Canada, a special head tax of $50 was imposed on their admission in 1885, as well as other requirements insisting on special registration and documentation for all Chinese admissions. In the following years and decades, further efforts were made to keep the Chinese, as well as the Japanese, out of Canada. Canada also cunningly excluded East Asians arriving from within the British Empire. A 1908 amendment to the 1906 Immigration Act provided that “the Governor in Council may, by proclamation or order, whenever he considers it necessary or expedient, prohibit the landing in Canada of any specified class of immigrant or immigrants who have come to Canada otherwise than by continuous journey from the country of which they are natives or citizens, and upon through tickets purchased in that country.” With no ships sailing directly from India to Canada, this continuous voyage provision prevented the immigration of East Indians.46 Its general wording also enabled it to be used as an obstacle to Eastern and Southern European immigration to Canada after World War I.
The policy of selecting immigrants on a “keep Canada white” basis was not a hidden agenda of Canadian authorities, but was public policy implemented by various means. The Immigration Act of 1910, for example, allowed authorities to prohibit, inter alia, the landing “of immigrants belonging to any race deemed unsuited to the climate or requirements of Canada.” The amending act of 1919 expanded on this by stating that the excluded immigrants might belong to “any nationality or race” who “...are deemed unsuitable having regard to the climatic, industrial, social, educational, labour or other conditions or requirements of Canada; or because such immigrants are deemed undesirable owing to their peculiar customs, habits, modes of life and methods of holding property, and because of their probable inability to become readily assimilated....”

While by “peculiar customs” the Act referred to members of certain religious sects—like the Mennonites, the Doukhobors and others, who hoped to find in Canada a home where they could practice their communal lifestyle—“immigrants belonging to any nationality” could be subject to exclusion if it was seen to serve the public interest.

In January 1923 the classification of European ethnic origins became explicit: “preferred” origins were the Anglo-Saxons from Great Britain, the “white” dominions and the United States, and those from Scandinavia, Germany, Holland and Belgium; individuals of “non-preferred” origins were from Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and, implicitly, Southern Europe. This differentiation was even more rigorous than the quota system first adopted by the United States in 1921 and reinforced in 1924 as a way to keep out the undesirables. The Canadian regulations did not reserve any legitimate space for these groups and, except for family reunification with those already legally in Canada, their immigration was restricted to those few individuals who could somehow get special permission to enter Canada, which was a rarely granted privilege.

Unlike Canada—and the United States—Argentina did not have to deal with the presence of East Asian immigrants and
consequently did not need to discuss their desirability. But the
frustration caused by the failure of the Law of Immigration to
attract immigrants from Anglo-Saxon and North European
countries did not move the leaders of the Republic to change the
law. According to the national census of 1914, only 6.87 per-
cent of the foreign-born inhabitants of Argentina were of the
more desirable origins.\textsuperscript{49} Nevertheless, the repeated recommenda-
tions of Juan Alsina, the powerful Director of the Department
of Immigration from 1891 to 1910, to draw a legal difference
between immigrants who came from countries with which
Argentina had contacts in 1853 when the Constitution was cre-
at ed, and those who came from the Russian, Austro-Hungarian,
and Turkish empires (with whom such relations had not exist-
t ed), were not acted upon.\textsuperscript{50} Nor were the views of Argentine
notables, who suggested in a 1919 opinion poll that ethnic ori-
gins should become a criterion for a selective immigration pol-
icy, to be mandated by Argentine law.\textsuperscript{51} Indeed, no ethnic or
racial preference amendments to the 1876 Law of Immigration
were enacted nor were any introduced into the published regu-
lations of the Department of Immigration.

Another difference between the Argentine and Canadian
immigration policies was the comparatively mild emphasis
Argentina placed on the agricultural capacities of the immi-
grants, as compared to the priority given agricultural immi-
grants by Canada. It was not until July 1938, during the worst
of the Depression, that immigration to Argentina became dras-
tically restricted. Thereafter, only “colonos contratados,” set-
tlers with a pre-arranged agreement of colonization were
allowed free entrance.\textsuperscript{52} In previous regulations, all those with
professions other than farming were allowed to enter, even
though the immigration agents and consuls abroad were
instructed to prioritize the economic needs of Argentina and
give preference to farmers when issuing immigration visas.\textsuperscript{53} In
Canada, starting in May 1922 and reinforced by a January 1923
order-in-council, those who were not British subjects, or citi-
zens of the United States, were permitted into the country only
if they were bona fide agriculturists (i.e. those who were coming to farm and had sufficient money to establish themselves as farmers) or were bona fide farm workers and were coming to labour in that capacity. Only two other categories were granted the privilege of entry into Canada: female domestic servants, who had reasonable assurance of employment, and the wives and children under eighteen years of age of those people who resided legally in Canada and could care for their dependents. These exceptions remained a constant feature of Canadian immigration regulations.54

Thus we find that although there were differences in their legal systems regarding immigration, Argentine and Canadian regulations were infused with the same goals—to prevent the entry of physically “disabled” individuals and to attract the same ethnic groups. But Canada outdid Argentina in enforcing vigorous rules excluding those considered ethnically, economically or socially and politically undesirable. The reasons for this difference are related, in large part, to the ethnic composition of the two nations, their economic and class structure, and their political cultures. In Argentina, Anglo-Saxon immigrants were highly valued by the ruling Spanish elite; yet, ethnically, the Anglo-Saxons were an essentially different group from that same ruling elite. In order to attract Anglo-Saxons the dominant class introduced far reaching changes in the Constitution and laws of the Republic, transforming an exclusively Catholic nation into a religiously pluralistic society, in which church and state were almost completely separated.55

In Canada the Anglo-Saxon immigrants and, to some degree, Northern Europeans more generally, were regarded as the ethnic and cultural kin of the majority of the population, or at least the English speaking majority. Those immigrants invited to enter Canada would reinforce the Anglo-Canadian dominance over the Catholic, French speaking population who formed the majority in the oldest province, Quebec. For that same reason, French Canada was generally opposed to the immigration. No similar ethnic opposition existed in Argentina.
Moreover, according to Harold Troper, Canadians, when looking across their southern border into the United States, feared an increase in social instability and potential for racial miscegenation which they believed was the consequence of the kind of “melting pot” urban-bound immigration flowing into the United States. This predisposed Canadians against urban-bound Southern and Eastern European immigration even before the great wave of these immigrants began arriving in Canada, about fifteen years later than the United States.\textsuperscript{56} In Argentina, the American experience, with its “melting pot” ideology, caused only admiration.

This is not to say there were not important advocates of open immigration in both Canada and Argentina. The main supporters of immigration in both Canada and Argentina were employers, whose main objective was to ensure for themselves an abundant and cheap labour pool. In Canada, narrow ethnic considerations, reinforced by an agricultural self-image, dominated immigration legislation before and after World War I. But the political culture provided labour intensive industry a suitable way to circumvent the overriding preference for agricultural immigrants. By arrangement with immigration authorities, special labour contracts and authorizations were granted to large employers allowing them to bring into Canada those otherwise designated as “undesirable” immigrants. In Argentina, no such agreements were needed.

Two similar dramatic events—in Buenos Aires in January 1919 and in Winnipeg in June 1919—provide clear evidence of the differences between the two countries’ immigration policies during the post-World War I “red scare”. Local strikes in large metallurgical plants protesting salary cuts and the hiring of strike breakers soon developed into general strikes which included the local (and in Argentina, national) workers. In the global context of revolutionary uprisings in Germany (Berlin) and Hungary and still fresh memories of the 1917 Russian Revolution, these strikes were immediately interpreted by the ruling classes in Argentina and in Canada as “Bolshevik”
inspired rebellions. Upper class militias were formed in both cities to suppress the “uprising” with bloodshed if necessary.

Furthermore, charging that immigrant agitators were behind the strike, Canadian authorities began to whip up anti-immigrant sentiment and took advantage of Section 41 of the Immigration Act, which allowed them to deport undesirable aliens. Canada also tightened its immigration restrictions, only to yield later by granting special permission to import immigrants to various labour-intensive organizations, such as the Canadian Pacific Railways and the Canadian Manufacturers’ Association. The “Tragic Week,” as the bloody events of January 1919 are known in Argentine historiography, did not cause changes in the immigration laws or regulations. Employers’ interests in unfettered immigration of cheap labour prevailed over xenophobia and the demands of restrictionists.57

Using immigration as a source of cheap labour, which was the employers’ main goal, forced much of organized labour into the anti-immigration camp. For unions a seemingly endless stream of competing immigrant labour was blamed for eroding salaries and working conditions. But in both Canada and Argentina, labour unions were too weak, dismissed as alien to the political culture, and did not have much voice in changing open door policies. When the “Great Depression” set in, however, and enough unemployed hands could be found locally, employers and workers joined in curbing further immigration. The restrictionists already in charge of immigration departments in both countries enjoyed almost unanimous support for closing down immigration. Accordingly the 1930s marked a new phase in the history of immigration to Argentina and to Canada. It became the era of closed doors.

IV

How, then, did Canadian and Argentine policies regarding “preferred” and “undesirable” immigrants affect the immigration of Jews and to what extent did differences between the two nation-
al political cultures shape possibilities for intervention on behalf of Jews, particularly during the 1930s era of exclusion?

In February 1916, Jews in both Canada and Argentina convened nationwide conferences to deal with national Jewish issues. In both cases, delegates called for the establishment of a central immigrant aid society to work against the threat of restrictions on immigration. They were convinced that when the war would end, Jews from devastated communities in Eastern Europe would seek new homes in the West and their ability to immigrate would depend largely on the existence of strong organizations with the capacity to lobby on their behalf.58 The demand for a national Jewish immigration organization was met in Canada in June 1920 by the organization of the Jewish Immigrant Aid Society (JIAS), which was established by the Canadian Jewish Congress with the support of the Canadian Committee for the Jewish Colonization Association and several other organizations. Existing local immigrant aid societies in Winnipeg, Vancouver, Toronto and in the eastern provinces of Canada became affiliate agencies.59 In Argentina, the Jewish Colonization Association sponsored the creation of the Sociedad de Proteccion a los Inmigrantes Israelitas (SOPROTIMIS) — the Society for the Protection of Israelite Immigrants. At first, populist Eastern European leaders in Argentina resented the organization as a patronizing effort by the older Jewish elite to usurp control over the immigrant support organizations already in existence. Eventually, however, SOPROTIMIS prevailed to become the dominant Jewish community voice on immigration.60 In both communities, Baron de Hirsch’s JCA played a central role, albeit in different degrees, in the establishment of the agencies to help Jewish immigrants.

In Canada, JIAS had its hands full very soon after its birth. In the immediate post-war period, Canadian immigration authorities insisted that immigrants arrive by direct voyage from their countries of origin, and present a passport duly issued by their national governments. The passport provision of the regulations could not be met by people who escaped their
country and did not possess passports or—as in the case of the new Soviet Union—possessed documents issued by the new regime which were not recognized in Canada. Hundreds of would-be Jewish immigrants were detained at ports of arrival, fearing deportation back to Europe. From July 1, 1920 to June 30, 1921, the first year of JIAS’ activity, 1,788 Jewish immigrants were detained; 1,306 of them were released through the organization’s intervention, 232 were deported and 2 died while in detention. Another 226 managed to escape detention and the cases of 22 were still pending at the end of this period. In the following year, Canadian immigration requirements became even more stringent. New visa regulations demanded that each immigrant possess large sums as “landing money.” Again, hundreds of immigrants—sometimes almost entire shiploads of hopeful immigrants—were denied admission to Canada. JIAS provided the immigrants with some welfare services and lobbied with local immigration officers on their behalf. Because these officers in the port of entry had wide latitude for discretion on individual cases, JIAS was sometimes successful in pressing individual appeals. Nevertheless, increasing rigidity among immigration officials and an obvious animosity towards ‘foreign’ immigrants in general and Jewish immigrants in particular, proved increasingly problematic to JIAS’ efforts. Confronted more and more by a hostile bureaucracy, JIAS and its supporters gradually began to leapfrog over immigration officials to lobby national political leaders on Jewish immigration issues.61

A general election in December 1921 brought William Lyon Mackenzie King’s Liberal Party to power, with only a one-vote majority in the House of Commons. With this delicate parliamentary balance, Samuel Jacobs, a Jew and Liberal Party Member of Parliament from a largely immigrant Jewish district of Montreal, became an important member of the Liberal caucus. Of immediate importance to Jacobs, Lyon Cohen, the head of the Canadian JCA and other Jewish leaders, was the fate of thousands of Jewish refugees from the Soviet Union then
stranded in Rumania. In 1923 some members of the Canadian Jewish community requested that the Canadian government permit the Jewish community of Canada to bring these refugees into the country at a rate of 100 per week, to a total of 5,000. In the political climate of the day, the Minister of Immigration and Colonization authorized this movement. He also agreed to special arrangements to deal with the fact that most of these refugees did not have appropriate passports or other documentation. For its part, the JCA, working with JIAS, made numerous assurances to the government. They promised that the Canadian Jewish community would underwrite the maintenance of these immigrants until they found employment and that some arrivals would settle on the land. Assurances were also made that the newcomers would be distributed across Canada rather than be allowed to congregate in Montreal. Above all, the government was promised that the new immigrants would not become public charges. According to the government’s count, 3,329 immigrants from Rumania were admitted under this scheme by the end of 1924, although a few hundred quickly left Canada for the United States.62

A general election in October 1925 left the survival of Mackenzie King’s Liberal government hinging on the support of the National Progressive Party. This enhanced Samuel Jacobs’ position even more. As a result, an additional quota of 3,000 immigration permits for the year 1926 was obtained by the leaders of JIAS, over the loud objections of senior officials of the Ministry of Immigration. When federal political instability brought about more elections in September 1926, another Jewish Member of Parliament was elected: A.A. Heaps, of the Independent Labour Party, representing the North Winnipeg constituency with its many Jewish voters. The Liberal government of Mackenzie King needed the two votes of Heaps’ party—along with those of the Progressive Party—in order to stay in power. Jewish political leverage on the government would seem to have never been greater and Jewish leaders hoped that they would be able to negotiate a stable
annual allocation of visas for Jewish immigrants. In December 1926 a large Jewish delegation, which included the Jewish Members of Parliament, had long and bitter discussions on immigration issues with the senior officials of the Ministry of Immigration. The Deputy Minister of Immigration, W.J. Egan, and his assistant, the former Secretary of the Department of Immigration, Frederick Charles Blair, were unyielding in their hostility to unrestricted Jewish immigration, let alone any special immigration allotment set aside for Jews. The officials had their way. In spite of the critical importance of the Jewish members of Parliament, no special quota was earmarked for Jewish immigrants and the political intervention ran aground. The fall of the Liberals from power only solidified the restrictionists in the Immigration Department. In the following years, from 1927 to 1931, the total number of Jewish immigrants was maintained more or less on the same level as in 1925 and 1926. This level of Jewish immigration, however, was only due to what would become the standard methods of securing permission for Jewish immigrants during this period, namely by family reunification, or by limited approval of individual immigration permits for those supported by Members of Parliament or other dignitaries.⁶³

There were no detentions or deportations of immigrants in post World War I Argentina. Yet there were problems of securing free entrance for refugee Jews and those who could not provide valid passports or police certificates from their countries of origin. As opposed to Canada, the Argentine presidential system did not afford Jewish voters or Jewish Representatives of Congress any opportunity to intervene politically on behalf of Jewish immigrants. But, in accordance with the Argentine tradition, patrician intervention based on personal contacts and respect did have an impact. That was precisely how Rabbi Samuel Halfon, Chief Rabbi of the Western-European styled Congregación Israelita de la República Argentina, who was on the JCA’s payroll, would achieve his successes. Using his prestige and the influence of the JCA, in November 1921 Rabbi
Halfon convinced the Director of Immigration, Remigio Lupo, to accept the Rabbi’s personal endorsement of applications made by Jewish residents in Argentina on behalf of the immigration of their relatives who could not provide legally required documents. The same courtesy was granted Rabbi Halfon at the beginning of 1922 to enable the entry of Jewish refugees from Rumania and elsewhere who did not have immediate relatives in Argentina. In these cases, the Rabbi was authorized to file affidavits on their behalf.64

But Halfon’s achievements could not survive personnel changes in the Department of Immigration following presidential elections of 1922. In July 1923, Juan Ramos, the new Director, halted the flow of refugee immigrants from Rumania. New and personal efforts to intervene with Ramos and the Minister of Agriculture, Tomas Le Breton, were started in Buenos Aires, Paris and Rome. In Rome, JCA’s Director General met with Ramos and Le Breton in May 1924 at an international conference on immigration. These personal efforts to cultivate Argentine authorities culminated in a new agreement. The JCA was authorized to arrange the immigration of Jews whose papers were incomplete, but only if the Jewish organization would guarantee that these immigrants were trained craftsmen or farmers who qualified for settlement in the JCA’s own colonies. The JCA undertook to distribute the immigrants in the provinces, to work to prevent their concentration in Buenos Aires, and to pay for their transportation to the interior, thereby saving the government from any expense. The JCA’s recruitment activities in Europe were subject to review by Argentine consuls and the Department of Immigration could cancel the whole agreement at any time. The agreement continued for some time, although the pressure to place Jews without recognized documentation lessened as time passed.65

In 1928, an international Jewish Immigration Congress was convened by SOPROTIMIS in Buenos Aires. The feeling among delegates was that Argentina should remain open to Jewish immigrants. It was only a matter of organizing proper
services for receiving and placing them. Yet, two years later, as the world economic crisis took hold, Argentina instituted its first major restrictive immigration regulations. In view of the chaotic economic situation, the SOPROTIMIS did not consider it desirable or possible to intervene against the regulations.

Thus political intervention on behalf of Jewish immigration was on the agenda for both the Canadian and Argentine Jewish communities. But they differed not only in their form, but also in their urgency. The battle against restrictions was more acute in Canada than in Argentina. Jewish negotiators with government and immigration officials in both cases involved the JCA, either directly in the case of Argentina or indirectly in the case of Canada. But while the JCA might have administrative and financial power over its own agricultural colonies, as a voluntary association, it had only limited influence on the urban Jewish immigrants who were the object of its pro-immigration lobbying. The JCA and its allies were concerned that Canadian and Argentine governments would hold them to their promises that Jews admitted under their auspices would not include seditious, criminal or revolutionary elements nor would any become a public charge. “Let us hope the Heavens will protect us from being put to such a test,” prayed Rabbi Halfon, while announcing to the JCA headquarters his success in winning concessions from Argentine immigration officials. He knew the limits of power which SOPROTIMIS, JIAS or any other voluntary association had in controlling the individual behaviour of those in it. And, of course, he knew the limits of Jewish organizational leverage with immigration authorities should anything go wrong. Rabbi Halfon, like many others, could only hope for the best.

As the persecution of Jews in Europe increased following the Nazi rise to power, the success of lobbying on behalf of Jewish refugee admissions declined. Canadian immigration regulations did not recognize any legal or administrative definition of refugees in the 1920s. Individuals were admissible as immigrants or not at all. This applied to survivors of the
Armenian genocide in Turkey, to Mennonites from the Soviet Union, and it applied to Jews during the Nazi era. Refugees were also unknown in the Argentine immigration laws. This was brought home to Jewish leaders in 1933 when they appealed for a special entry for German Jews. They might be refugees but they did not qualify as immigrants. The Jewish special pleading was denied.68

In Canada, Frederick Blair now headed the Immigration Branch of the Ministry of Mines and Resources. His animosity towards Jewish immigration was on record since his discussions with Jewish parliamentarians and others in December 1926. He had not changed except to become more powerful in the Immigration bureaucracy. In his role as Director of Immigration he saw to it that, when it came to Jewish immigration during the Nazi era and the Holocaust, the maxim would remain “none is too many.” Prime Minister Mackenzie King lined up behind this policy.69

Until August 1938, the Argentine government’s attitude was less hostile to Jews as a group than was the case in Canada. From that time forward, however, the JCA found it difficult to pry loose immigration permits for Jews, even for colonists going to JCA settlements and even though the decreed policy included an explicit clause favoring such immigrants. The deterioration in the JCA’s ability to intervene on behalf of Jewish immigrants was most clearly demonstrated when, after the defeat of France, the JCA requested entry permits for some members of its own Central Administration who had suddenly become refugees themselves. They were refused.70

From many perspectives, the political position of Canadian Jews, as citizens of a parliamentary democracy, would seem more advantageous than that of Argentine Jews. Despite direct access as a community to the highest echelons of political power, however, the Canadian Jewish community had no success whatever in moderating either Canada’s restrictive immigration policy in the late 1920s or the even more deleterious immigration policy during the Nazi era. Indeed, in the end,
Jewish immigration to Canada was considerably less than to Argentina. According to official records, 75,505 Jews entered Argentina during the eleven years from 1920 to 1930 while only 59,377 Jews entered Canada during the fifteen years from 1918/19 to 1932/33. During the Nazi era, according to official data, 24,488 immigrants registered as Jews entered Argentina. With the illegals who managed to arrive on tourist visas or crossed the borders in other ways and were not persecuted, the total number of Jews who found sanctuary in Argentina is likely closer to 40,000. As for Canada, a thorough study on this subject concluded that “between 1933 and 1945 Canada found room within her borders for fewer than 5,000 Jews, arguably the worst record of any western receiving country.”

One more major difference needs to be noted in comparing the two Jewish communities. The close proximity of Canada to the United States was perhaps the most important difference between it and Argentina. The role of the American colossus in the “North Atlantic economic triangle” (Canada, Great Britain and the United States) was, according to Mario Rapoport, much more important than in the “South Atlantic economic triangle” (Argentina, Great Britain and the United States). This also manifested itself in many aspects of the internal development of Canadian Jewry, such as the history of workers’ unions and class struggle. It was a key factor in distinguishing the role which immigration played in the formation and consolidation of Canadian Jewry as opposed to that of Argentine Jewry. Canada had as its neighbor the world’s most popular immigrant destination. At the peak of Jewish immigration to Canada and to Argentina—the decade before World War I—almost a quarter of the Jews who entered Canada (77,875) left for the United States. In Argentina, less than one fifth of the number of those who arrived (55,606) re-emigrated. A very few proceeded from Argentina to Chile or resettled in Uruguay or Brazil. A few oth-
ers just returned to the Old Country. For the vast majority Argentina was a destination, not a way station.\textsuperscript{74}

This difference became even more dramatic during the decade or so between the end of World War I and the world economic depression beginning in 1929. We do not possess exact data regarding the re-emigration of Jews from Argentina but, in view of the limitations on immigration to the United States and the chaotic situation in Eastern Europe, we must assume that of the 75,505 Jews who arrived in Argentina during these years—and of those who had settled there before—the number of those who returned to the Old World or emigrated to another country was considerably less than that which took place before World War I. In Canada almost one-half (48.26 percent) of all those Jews who entered in those eleven years (51,855) crossed the relatively open Canadian border with the United States (27,540). If re-emigration to other countries is added, we find that a full 58.56 percent of those who entered Canada left. Like other Canadians who crossed the border south into the United States, many were long-time residents and some were even Canadian-born.

The Jewish movement from Canada into the United States was paralleled by the efforts of Jews to gain entry to the United States from the south. Indeed, many Jews went to Cuba and Mexico with the expressed intention of moving to the United States as soon as possible. Unable to proceed northwards, they significantly strengthened the Mexican and Cuban Jewish communities. In Argentina, Jewish immigration during the inter-war period contributed decisively to the demographic, social and institutional consolidation of the community. In Canada, its impact was far more modest. Resentful that Jews used Canada as a back door into the United States, Frederick C. Blair and the other officials continued to oppose any concession to Jewish immigration in the interwar years.\textsuperscript{75}
To what extent, then, did the agricultural and industrial policies of Canada and Argentina influence the formation and the professional shape of their Jewish communities? What were their general policies of immigration? How did they apply them to the Jews and what possibilities of political intervention did the respective political cultures give to the Jewish communities to act on behalf of immigration? The following are our key findings:

(1) The agricultural policies of both Canada and Argentina provided the basis for the formation of Jewish agricultural settlements. They proved to be the first step for Jewish mass immigration to the two countries—although less so in Canada than Argentina—and an important factor for the distribution of the Jewish population. The difference in the size of the rural Jewish presence is due to the different natural conditions and national settlement policies, but must also include consideration of the greater degree of activity by the Jewish Colonization Association, the major Jewish settlement agency, in Argentina than in Canada;

(2) Industrialization policies in Canada and Argentina did not produce essentially different patterns of Jewish industrial activity. Traditional skills brought from the Old World predominated and the difference between the two Jewish communities was in the scope rather than in the kind of Jewish manufacturing;

(3) Canada and Argentina differed in their legislative approaches to immigration, yet they both shared a preference for Anglo-Saxon and North European immigrants. In addition, they shared restrictive policies regarding the physically sick and politically dangerous immigrants. Canada also attempted to bar the economically weak. Canada formulated strict racially and ethnical-
ly discriminatory regulations. Argentina did not. Canada did, however, allow political and business interventions that bypassed these regulations even as it complemented Canadian industrialization policies. Argentina, with a less exclusive legislation, did not need to make exceptions to its regulations;

(4) Starting in the early 1920s, Jewish political intervention was used to ensure the continuation of Jewish immigration. In Canada the Jewish vote and Jewish Members of Parliament were central in this effort; in Argentina, political interference was more the work of the Paris-based Jewish Colonization Association, using its prestige and influence in Buenos Aires. In both countries Jewish lobbying had virtually no impact during that era of greatest need for a Jewish haven, the 1930s. In the final analysis, Canada’s restrictive policy was more comprehensive and devastating than that of Argentina;

(5) The economic and political systems of the two countries helped define the framework for the emergence of the Canadian and Argentine Jewish communities. But the similarity of the two New World Jewish experiences was only partly due to the similarities in historical development of the two countries. The scope of Jewish activities in agricultural settlement, Jewish traditions in handicrafts and Jewish political efforts regarding immigration also helped shaped the two Jewish communities until World War II.

ENDNOTES

*This paper is dedicated to the memory of Prof. Moshe Davis (1916-1996), founder and head of the Institute for Contemporary Jewry, of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. It is an extended and revised version of a paper presented to the 18th International Congress of Historical Sciences in Montreal, August, 1995.

1Carl E. Solberg, “Argentina y Canadá: una perspectiva comparada


9Tulchinsky, Taking Root, pp. 115-118.


11Tulchinsky, Taking Root, pp. 119-126.

12Even in the years 1925-1929, when many other branches had developed in the economies of Argentina and Canada, wheat made up 33 percent of Canada’s exports and wheat, corn and flax were together 54.9 percent of Argentine exports. Solberg, “Argentina y Canadá,” p. 192.


14In 1896, when Baron de Hirsch died, the JCA owned in Argentina 200,919 hectares (501,547 acres); in 1933 the JCA’s lands totaled 617,468 hectares, (1,543,670 acres). Jewish Colonization Association, Rapport de l’administration centrale au conseil d’administration, 1896 and 1933.


16Jewish Colonization Association, Rapport, 1925. Some of the non-JCA colonies like Medanos near Bahía Blanca in the south of Buenos Aires province, General Roca in the Río Negro valley and cotton-growing colonies in the Chaco had considerable populations.


18Haim Avni, “Argentine Jewry: its socio-political status and organizational patterns,” Dispersion and Unity 12 (1971): Table 1; idem, Mi-bitul, Annex 1, Table 3, p. 370.


21Conde, “Problemas del crecimiento industrial, 1870-1914,” Table I, p. 61; Rapoport “La inserción internacional,” pp. 179-183; 23; Adolfo Dorfman, Historia de la Industria Argentina (Buenos Aires 1970), pp. 153-166, on the debate in 1875, the law of 1877 and its practical results.

22As can be seen from the following data:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Argentina</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>(1891) 4,833,000</td>
<td>(1895) 3,954,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1911) 7,207,000</td>
<td>(1914) 7,885,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial plants</td>
<td>(1890) 68,831</td>
<td>(1895) 23,300</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1910) 14,772</td>
<td>(1913) 48,779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5 workers or more)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers in plants</td>
<td>(1890) 351,393</td>
<td>(1895) 167,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1910) 480,252</td>
<td>(1913) 410,201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5 workers or more)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the Canadian census material, see Morris Altman, The Evolution of Plant Size in Canadian Manufacturing 1870-1910 (The Halbert Center for Canadian Studies, Occasional Paper No. 12, Jerusalem, 1993), Table I. The information on Canadian plants and workers is also contained there. The 1890 data also includes 57,097 plants with 4 workers or less which employed 91,932 workers; the 1910 data omits all these as well as the butter and cheese industries altogether, since the average plant size in this sector was in that year 1.7 workers per plant. Ibid., p. 4. For the 1895 materials on Argentina, see Dorfman, Historia de la Industria Argentina, p. 208; for Argentina’s National Census of 1914, see Conde, “Problemas del crecimiento industrial, 1870-1914,” p. 79.

23Dorfman, Historia de la Industria Argentina, pp. 311, 323-330; Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond and John English, Canada, 1900-1945 (Toronto, 1987), p. 217. The early development of the car industry in Canada (1906) and its success was a symbolic indication of Canada’s industrial superiority as compared with Argentina.


25Rosenberg, Canada’s Jews, p. 172, Table 114 and p. 160, Table 108.  
26Calculated according to Rosenberg, Canada’s Jews, Table 113, p. 170.  
27Ibid., Table 116, p. 176. The concentration in this single branch
amounted in Montreal to 75.72 percent, in Toronto to 66.99 percent, in Winnipeg to 51.54 percent of all those engaged in manufacturing.


34Rosenberg, Canada’s Jews, Table 116, p. 176.


36Benario, “Di Gueshichtliche Antviklung fun Idishn Handl und Industrie in Buenos Aires,” pp. 276-284. His data regarding the post World War I Jewish enterprises are more accurate than for the earlier period.

37A total of 1,181 Jewish men and 124 Jewish women were engaged in 1931 in manufacturing furs, and fur goods in Canada, a mere 2.10 percent of the Jewish Gainfully Occupied Population (Rosenberg, Canada’s Jews, Table 116, pp. 176, 178-9). Benario, “Di Gueshichtliche Antviklung fun Idishn Handl und Industrie in Buenos Aires,” pp. 274-5, 284-5, estimated the total number of Jews in this trade and manufacturing in 1939 in Buenos Aires alone to be 4,000 persons. See Weill, Población Israelita, p.15.


39Congreso Nacional de la Nación Argentina, Cámara de Senadores, Diario de Sesiones, Sesión del 5-8-1876, pp. 503-513. The rights of the immigrants were defined in articles 12-18, 50, 88, 91. See also, ibid. pp. 514, 525; session of August 8, 1876, pp. 554-5; session of August 10, pp. 572-3, 579-582.

40Avni, Argentina and the Jews, pp. 29-30.


42Senator Nicasio Orono in Congreso de la Nación, p. 555.

43Green, Immigration and the Postwar Canadian Economy, p. 13.

Legislativos Sobre estas Materias en la República Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1911), pp. 206-210. The Law of Social Defense was abolished in 1921. The Law of Residence was still in use by the Juan Domingo Perón regime in 1948 and later. See República Argentina, Congreso de la Nación, Camara de Diputados, Diario de Sesiones, Sesión 3-5-1948, p. 190.


Ibid., pp. 13-14.


Ibid., p. 27; Kalbach, The Impact of Immigration on Canada’s Population, p.15; Belkin, Through Narrow Gates, p. 129.

Avni, Mi-Bitul Ha-Inquvisittzia, p. 187

Juan Alsina, La Inmigración en el Primer Siglo de la Independencia (Buenos Aires, 1910), pp. 203-209.

Boletín Mensual del Museo Social Argentino, No. 85-90, January-June, 1919, passim.

Decreto 8972, Art. 10, Boletín Oficial, 6 August 1938, p. 10118. The treaties signed in 1937 with Holland, Denmark and Switzerland regarding the immigration of farmers, indicated the ethnic and professional preferences of Argentina at that time.

Avni, Argentina and the Jews, pp. 102, 120-1, 133, 139-40.

Dirks, Canada’s Refugee Policy, p. 42, and Belkin, Through Narrow Gates, p. 129, quoting P.C. No. 183; Alan G. Green, Immigration and the Postwar Canadian Economy, pp. 18-9; Kalbach, The Impact of Immigration on Canada’s Population, p. 16.

Avni, Argentina and the Jews, pp. 8-9.


Soviet Russia; the Government, in spite of the explicit clause in the 1919 Act which excluded such “undesirables,” accepted from 1923 to 1926/7 more than 19,000 of these immigrants. See Dirks, *Canada’s Refugee Policy*, pp. 38-41.

58 *Bericht funm Yudischn Congress*, Buenos Aires 1916, pp. 36-7; Belkin, *Through Narrow Gates*, p. 91.


65 Ibid., pp. 107-8


72 Quoted from Abella and Troper, *None is Too Many*, p. vi. For Argentina, see Avni, *Mi-Bitul Ha-Inquvisitzia*, Appendix 2, p. 372.


75 Rosenberg, *Canada’s Jews*, Table 92, p. 136; Troper, “Immigration policy, 1900-1950,” p. 54.