Anatomy of A Failed Strike
The T. Eaton Co. Lockout
of Cloakmakers-1912

SUSAN GELMAN

Introduction

Le 14 Février, 1912, soixante cinq fabricants de manteaux employés dans le departement J-4 de la manufacture de la compagnie T. Eaton, furent fermés dehors à cause de leurs refus de coudre les doublures dans les manteaux en utilisant de nouvelles machines, sans une hausse des salaires. En l'espace de deux semaines, le nombre de grévistes augmenta de huit cents fabricants de manteaux et ouvriers vètement employés à la manufacture de Toronto. La majorité de ces derniers fut des tableurs juives européens qui formaient le corps principal de la nouvelle Union de Fabricants de Manteaux, Local 14. Le soutien pour la grève fut obtenu de l'Union Internationale d'Ouvrières Vètement et du Conseil de Métiers et Travail de Toronto (C.M.T.T.) qui donnèrent aux fabricants de manteaux la position de délégué pour la première fois. Sous l'influence du C.M.T.T. et la presse travailliste, la grevè gagna de l'élan et les fabricants jouèrent un rôle important dans la lutte des classes contre la compagnie Eaton et ses habitudes monopolisatrices. Pendant quelque temps, il sembla que la grevè réussirait à dépasser les differences éthniques au sein de la classe ouvrière de Toronto. Mais, lorsqu'il devint évident que la grevè fut perdue, le C.M.T.T. et la presse travailliste retirèrent leur appui pour les grévistes, et les mêmes individus qu'ils avaient tenté proteger au debut furent maintenant les étrangers qu'ils considérèrent responsables de plusieurs des problèmes dans la manufacture.

On February 14, 1912, sixty-five cloakmakers employed in department J-4 at The T. Eaton Co. factory in Toronto were locked out for objecting to sewing linings into cloaks with the use of new machines, without an increase in wages. Within two weeks there were an additional 800 cloakmakers and garment

workers employed at the Toronto factory on strike.[1] The majority of those on strike were East European Jewish tailors, who formed the main body of the fledgling Cloakmakers Union Local 14. Support for the strike was drawn from the International Ladies Garment Workers Union and the Toronto District Trades and Labour Council (T.D.L.C.), who offered the Cloakmakers delegate status for the first time. Under the influence of the T.D.L.C. and the labour press, the strike gained momentum and the cloakmakers became important in the 'class struggle' against Eaton's and its monopolistic practices. It appeared for a while that the strike would serve to cut across ethnic lines within the Toronto working class. But as it became evident that the strike was lost, the T.D.L.C. and the labour press withdrew its support from the strikers; and the very individuals they initially sought to protect were the foreigners they now saw as responsible for many of the problems in the factory.

I

In the early years of the 20th century, the Cloakmakers Union was, in effect, a Jewish union. It had grown out of the close-knit immigrant community of 'The Ward'. The Ward, which commonly designated the streets between Queen, College, Yonge streets, and University Ave.[2] comprised a common living and working environment for this growing Jewish working class. These streets housed many new garment industries as well as the Eaton factory. At that time, those employed in the garment industry in Toronto were predominately Jewish tailors. "No other ethnic group dominated a single industry the way the Jews dominated the garment industry . . . ."[3] Most of the these Jewish tailors were immigrants who had recently arrived from eastern Europe. They had provided an available source of labour for the growing ready-made clothing industry. In 1911, 80% of those employed at Eaton's were Jewish tailors, mostly men.[4] During these early years of the Cloakmakers Union the majority of its members were drawn from the Eaton factory.[5]

It was within this atmosphere that the Cloakmakers Union was founded in September 1909. The new union was the work of 14 young tailors who worked in Toronto's garment industry. Like most of the East European Jewish population of The Ward, these young cloakmakers had grown up in Czarist Russia. But unlike the mass of working-class Jews, these young unionists were socialists. They had a 'revolutionary spirit' from the pre-communist days of Russia that had led to the failed 1905 revolution.[6] By 1880 the majority of Jews in Russia had been confined to the small towns and villages of 'The Pale'. Most lived a religiously orthodox life, earning their living as artisans; many indeed, as tailors. Few were concerned with the political problems of the wider society.

But a handful of Marxist and socialist intellectual Jews had experienced life outside the *shtetl*. When they immigrated to Canada, they brought with them their socialist, often radical, ideas. Although most of the Jews they sought to represent were not inclined to hold socialist ideas, the union served as one of the stabilizing forces within the community.

The first meetings of this new union were held in the home of Udel Cohen on Simcoe Street. As the union grew, meetings took place in the Zionist Hall under the first chairman, S. Koldofsky. Membership in the union was open to all who worked in the process of manufacturing cloaks; operators, finishers, pressers and cutters.[7] In 1911, the Cloakmakers Union joined the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union (I.L.G.W.U.) becoming Local 14. In many ways the Toronto Cloakmakers Union paralleled the I.L.G.W.U. Both unions had similar immigrant and ethnic origins. Like its Canadian counterpart, the American based I.L.G.W.U. was a Jewish union originated by cloakmakers. Joining the I.L.G.W.U. and in turn the American Federation of Labour (A.F.L.) gave the Toronto Cloakmakers union a greater sense of identity within the larger society.[8]

The early history of the I.L.G.W.U. was marked by constant struggles between radical socialist and conservative trade unionists. This was to a large degree influenced by the radical International Workers of the World (I.W.W.) in major cities such as Montreal, Cleveland, Chicago and St. Louis. But by 1910, amalgamation with the A.F.L. served to moderate these radical elements within the I.L.G.W.U. The presidency of Abraham Rosenberg also provided a strong stabilizing and conservative influence for the I.L.G.W.U. It was under Rosenberg's guidance that all the locals within the I.L.G.W.U. were placed under strong central control. But regardless, the I.L.G.W.U. was to remain the most radical element in the A.F.L. The success of the 1910 New York general strike was evidence of this radical element. The New York Cloakmakers' strike lasted ten weeks and ended successfully. The outcome was The Protocol of Peace. Although it was only in effect until 1915, The Protocol of Peace was the first collective agreement to be reached in the ready-made clothing manufacturing industry.[9] It was the success of this strike which urged the Toronto Cloakmakers to join the I.L.G.W.U.[10]

Within a year of the amalgamation of the I.L.G.W.U. and the Cloakmakers, Rosenberg expressed concern for the radical influence he saw rising within Local 14. Just prior to the Eaton strike, Rosenberg was quoted as saying, in reference to the Toronto union, that:

> The Union is now strong and vigorous despite internal disharmony of a temporary nature, due to some militant spirits, who are however, cooling down and becoming more practical . . .[11]

It was during this time that a "rebellious faction"[12] was noted within the Cloakmakers Union. The chairman, Koldofsky, was forced to give up his position, whereupon the next chairman, Gordon, quickly relinquished his seat in favour of a Montreal friend of his by the name of Lapidus.[13] Lapidus became the business agent for the Toronto local, and it was he who provided much of the influence behind the 1912 Eaton strike.

The strike at the Eaton factory was typical of a trend of unrest from 1901-1916 within seasonal industries. During these years, clothing industries experienced the highest number of strikes in Canada next to the building and metal trades.[14] In Ontario alone there were 195 strikes, fifty-nine of which involved firms in the garment industry.[15] Poor weekly wages and the high rate of seasonal unemployment were common in the ready-made clothing industry, such that many of these workers were impoverished during these years before the war. Earnings on a weekly basis were not enough to maintain a decent standard of living over a year.[16] The weeks of unemployment hence left most workers without any income and no public or private financial protection.

Strikes were legal, but management was not forced to negotiate. Eaton's attitude in denying any voice to the cloakmakers' committee was evidence of the lack of worker strength and union recognition. There were no laws to protect the collective rights of employees even to approach management to protest wages and conditions without fear of reprisals. This left employees vulnerable to the whims of management. The firing of cloakmakers by Eaton's was a common method of union-breaking and was especially easy for a company as secure in its position within the manufacturing industry as was Eaton's.

The Toronto Eaton factory was one of the largest employers of cloakmakers and garment workers in the years just prior to World War I. Union sources indicate that there were approximatly twelve hundred hand tailors employed in the Eaton Toronto factory just prior to the strike.[17] In the Eaton's 1915 catalogue the company claimed to employ several thousand in the Toronto factory, which had been built in the late 19th century.[19] Factories in Hamilton, Montreal and Winnipeg were built soon afterwards. Within 15 years of its beginning,[20] the Toronto factory was producing a full line of women's and men's clothing, as well as fur garments and some household and farm items.[21] Eaton's was by then the largest single factory retail outlet in the city selling ready-made clothing.[22] During these unstable economic times The T. Eaton Co. boasted that: "all garments are made in our factories;" therefore, they maintained, "we save you the middleman's profits."[23]

In 1911, Eaton was reported to be constantly expanding its factory. Essential

to this expansion was an ever-increasing mechanization. Mechanization within the ready-made clothing industry in Toronto was increasing the ability of this highly competitive industry to meet the needs of the expanding market. An article in *The Home Journal,* describing the Toronto Eaton factory in 1908, emphasizes Eaton's role within this competitive market for ready-made clothing:

> There are some 211 machines at work here, all working at high speed and turning out ready-made garments at a price which defies competition from the home worker. Very few women, in fact, bother nowadays making this class of garment when they can purchase them for a very little more than the cost of material alone.[24]

This rise of these mechanized factories brought with it many of the same sweatshop problems within a new set of circumstances. The new emphasis upon business efficiency and industrial growth gave birth to an increasingly rigid work environment. A volatile situation was generated by low wages, lack of worker rights and strenuous working conditions. An Eaton worker who had taken part in the strike recollects this situation in his reasons for the events of 1912:

> The strike was for conditions of course-prices-we didn't make enough-them days you were nothing but a machine, what they give you, you got to take it, you got to take it . . . if you don't . . . Them days you got to be in five minutes to eight, inside because then the door is closed and you needed a pass to go in. There is the door manager in the office there, you come in to have a pass to get back to the job, and to go out, and ask for a pass to get in again. And naturally you got to tell them why you got to go out and what you got to do and if it is a satisfactory answer they give you a pass to get out. You couldn't get out; the doors are closed, and as far as prices were concerned . . . got to take it . . . could not object . . . this is what you get. This is why we decided to go on strike.[25]

II

The initial lockout and ensuing strike had clearly occurred because of a demand by the cloakmakers over wages. The issue was not the employment of the new machines, but that this new work was demanded of the cloakmakers without an increase in their rate of pay. In addition, the finishers, who traditionally had done this work, were threatened with unemployment. In a statement to the press, Lapidus stated that the strike was a result of "a change in the system . . . whereby men operators had been called upon to extra work which did not bring them extra pay."[26] The Department of Labour reported that the lockout and strike was due to "a straight demand for more wages to enable the operators to meet the ever increasing cost of living."[27]

A week prior to the lockout the cloakmakers had been requested to perform the new job; at that time a committee headed by Saul Gold met with the management of the Cloak department. This meeting did not result in any communication from company management. The issue came to a head the Wednesday of

the lockout when the cloakmakers were presented with an ultimatum to take on the extra work or leave the premises. The operators requested an hour to discuss the issue but within ten minutes they were escorted off the job by police.[28]

The evening of the lockout was the scene of a mass meeting at the Labor Temple. Fifteen hundred Eaton employees and members of the Cloakmakers Union gathered in what was described in the newspapers as a militant atmosphere,[29] to discuss the next step in establishing their position. Under the direction of Lapidus, cloak and garment workers were appealed to in both Yiddish and English. Lapidus emphasized that the new system would certainly result in the finishers' losing their jobs.[30] Lapidus was crucial in motivating the workers who were still on the job to strike. A resolution was unanimously passed that the remaining employees would protest in a body directly to Eaton's management against the lockout. In addition they proposed that a sitdown strike be conducted, similar to the one Lapidus described he had taken part in, in England. A union member recalled that:

> The following meeting dealt with the same issue. This time there was an order from the firm that work be started or those involved would be ousted by the police. It was decided that when the department J-4 employees were ousted the other three departments would walk out in sympathy. The following morning we were all out on strike.[31]

Lapidus clearly condoned militant action. In a statement to the press, he stressed the fact that any strike was a long hard violent struggle of ". . . possible arrests, broken heads, hunger and privation . . ."[32]

On the morning of February 15, 1912, over 500 cloakmakers ceased work at the Eaton factory in a sympathy strike with the original sixty-five locked-out cloakmakers. Within an hour after the start of the day the striking workers were escorted out of the Louisa Street entrance to the factory by two police inspectors, only to be met by two or three dozen more officers and two mounted police. The police had been slowly gathering over the morning in anticipation of a confrontation. But there was none. The workers quietly marched through the streets of The Ward to the Labor Temple on Church Street. On March 1 the number of workers on strike increased again; many were garment workers, members of The United Garment Workers Union (U.G.W.). The total number of Eaton's employees now on strike totalled 882.[33] The garment workers had joined the strike when the U.G.W. Toronto General Organizer H.D. Rosenbaum's request for a settlement to the strike had been denied.[34] A Special Committee of striking Cloakmakers-Local 14 and Pressers Local 92 of the I.L.G.W.U. was formed to negotiate the strike. Their terms were clear: They refused to return to work until the locked-out cloakmakers were rehired.[35]

The major spokesman for Eaton's was its company manager, W.G. Dean.

From the onset of the lockout Dean stated that the cloakmakers were discharged for refusing to do the extra work that they felt would put the finishers out of work. He claimed that the new system to be employed would not leave any workers, especially the finishers, out of a job. Dean maintained that there "always had been a shortage of hand sewers . . . and having extra workers free would eliminate girls from working overtime at night."[36] He further claimed that the issue of the strike could not be wages or general conditions, for these workers, the majority of whom were Jews, were the best paid in the business: "The average weekly wage for these six months has been $17.80 . . ." for a five day week that did not include Saturday or late hours on Friday.[37] John Craig Eaton, in a statement to the press, clearly denied any legal right of the union to interfere between the company and its employees. The company, he stated, refused to be dictated to by the employees who were striking out of fear of the union. Factory hours, wages and working conditions were good, Eaton continued; therefore, the employees had no complaints. All those out, he stated, would not be rehired.

> . . . Rather than do that we will shut down our factories. We can afford to do so and will . . . When the men concerned are making good wages, have good hours, are working in a fine clean factory with excellent light, what more do they want?[38]

The strikers showed great collectivity of action: marches and mass meetings were held continually to keep the issue before public concern. They marched from The Labor Temple to the 'big store' (Eaton's retail store) to collect their last pay cheques.[39] Twenty-four-hour pickets were set up in front of Eaton's[40] to distribute hand bills,[41] while police were assigned by the City to guard the building.[42] Although there was a wide range of support among the cloakmakers and garment workers from the strike, there was an undercurrent of disapproval because of fear of unemployment. Many sought factory jobs elsewhere in the city and in the United States. On the whole activities were peaceful, but there were isolated incidents of violence between strikers and strike-breakers. Union meetings were often disturbed and minor street fights were reported to have broken out occasionally. In one incident reported to have come before Magistrate Denison of the police court, fines were kept to a minimum and the charges reduced from disorderly conduct to the use of the word "scab". Denison clearly expressed the fact that it was the use of the word "scab" that disturbed him the greatest.[43]

The Toronto District Labor Council (T.D.L.C.) voted unanimously to give the cloakmakers delegate status to aid them in their struggle against Eaton's.[44] Through the efforts of the T.D.L.C. the strikers received small financial contributions. Money also came in from other unions outside the city and the pro-

vince because of this connection with the T.D.L.C.[45] Fifty men were assigned by the T.D.L.C. to organize a street collection. They were able to collect $50.00 in one afternoon before being stopped by the police for illegally collecting money.[46]

The cloakmakers received a weekly strike pay from the I.L.G.W.U. at the rate of $3.00 for single men and $5.00 for married. This was later increased to $8.00 and $10.00 respectively.[47] Support from the I.L.G.W.U. went considerably beyond financial. Abraham Rosenberg, president of the I.L.G.W.U., appeared in Toronto early in the strike[48] to organize activities. Josephine Gacey, International Organizer for the I.L.G.W.U.[49] and Gertrude Barnum, Special Organizer for the Cloakmakers,[50] also acted closely with the strikers and the T.L.D.C. Barnum worked to extend The Protocol of Peace, which would ensure the settlement of labour disputes through conciliation between a committee of workers and management. If a settlement could not be reached, then a board of arbitration would be consulted. Although Barnum supported peaceful means of settling strikes, she also condoned militant action. As she explained to a women's club meeting, when a decision could not be reached, further direct action was called for ". . . that will make our civil war look like a football game!"

The strike-breaking efforts of Eaton's both extended the sympathy strike and widened the involvement of the I.L.G.W.U. and other union activity. On February 27, 1912, eighty cloak and garment workers at the Montreal Eaton factory on St. Catherine Street went out in a sympathy strike. The strike was in objection to work being sent from the Toronto Eaton factory to the Montreal factory.[52] Under the direction of Rosenberg, and the Montreal I.L.G.W.U. local organizer, Rosenfield, a strike committee was formed in Montreal to help settle the Toronto strike. The Montreal Eaton factory employed close to 12,000[53] workers; and according to the strike reports filed with the Department of Labour, the action of these eighty workers did not affect the productivity of the factory.[54] Eaton refused to negotiate with the strike committee either over the Toronto or the Montreal incident, and new employees were hired by the company.[55]

Within a few weeks after the Montreal strike it became apparent to the garment workers in Hamilton, that several factories there, not owned by Eaton's were doing the unfinished work from the Toronto Eaton factory. Local 256 of the U.G.W. supported these garment workers' claim that they had been unknowingly doing this extra work. On behalf of the striking Toronto workers Rosenbaum requested that the Hamilton local take action in protest. A mass meeting was held where Rosenbaum, Barnum and James Simpson,[56] addressed

the garment workers. A resolution was passed to inform all Hamilton clothing manufacturers that a sympathy strike would result should any further Eaton work be brought in.[57] In contrast to the Montreal situation, the Hamilton workers played it safe. They hesitated before calling a strike, and settled for warning their employers first, rather than joining their "comrades"[58] by striking.

III

The Toronto lockout and strike generated considerable debate, so much so that it would be remembered as the "most prolonged and bitter struggle the union was ever engaged in."[59] Because the cloakmakers and garment workers were fighting The T. Eaton Co., one of the largest retail and manufacturing chains in the country, the strike would become a major battle in the 'class struggle' for union recognition. In a statement to the press, Lapidus maintained that he was not out to break Eaton's, for it would be a hard job; but even if the strike failed they would have shown Eaton's that they meant business.[60] With this common enemy, Eaton's, it was only natural that the T.D.L.C. and the Cloakmakers should join forces. The involvement of the T.D.L.C. and the backing of the labor press served to widen the scope of the strike.

The strike would not only be fought in the Labor Temple and in the streets but also in the labour press. Eaton's refusal to negotiate and their use of police in dealing with the strikers became a vivid opportunity for the labour press to use the company as a symbol of exploitative industrial capitalism. *The Labor News* and *The Lance* conducted an attack not only against The T. Eaton Co. but also against John Craig Eaton himself. He was identified as "the most disappointing figure in Toronto's commercial and industrial life to-day . . ."[61] Past Toronto strikers were drawn upon to discredit his labour practices and his attitude towards the working class. Eaton's philanthropic gestures towards the city were labelled false becaause of his refusal to close the store on Labour Day. He was clearly pictured as a hypocritical patriot. The nation was called upon to join in with the T.D.L.C. to fight this oppression.[62] Eaton was satirized as the "King of Canada" who like all czars would be dethroned.[63] Support for the cloakmakers was called for in this ". . . first strong battle for justice . . ."[64] against the Eaton monopoly.

The labour press also considered themselves as the voice of reason and the conscience of the strike. *The Labor News* and *The Industrial Banner* saw themselves as the only true friend of labour and the free voice of the press.[65] It was claimed that the dailies were suppressing news reports of the strike while continuing to run Eaton's large daily advertisement.[66] Support for the strike was seen to diverge between the labor papers and the dailies. The daily press had

handled the strike casually and neutrally, although there was once incident of criticism against the strikers' motives. *The Toronto Star* accused the strikers of not knowing why they went on strike and of using the incident at the factory as an excuse to start trouble.[67] In the March 1 issue of *The Labor News*, a statement by Lapidus appeared which seemed to address this accusation. He was quoted as saying that: "The Cloak Makers' [sic] Union has no intention of calling a strike at the T. Eaton Co. and neither have we been looking for an opportunity to pick a quarrel."[68]

The issue of the lockout and strike dominated the T.D.L.C. meetings during the months of February and March. This had become an important issue in the "general working class movement of the city".[69] In a motion before the house, Eaton was placed on the "unfair list for running sweatshops and using the police to deal with the strikers who had been unjustly locked-out.[70] A letter was sent to the Chief of Police to protest their involvement in capitalist oppression.[71] The daily press was condemned for denying the free flow of news, and the Council put themselves on record as preferring no press to one which backs a capitalist exploiter.[72]

On March 7 a lengthy resolution was passed by the T.D.L.C. clearly stating the terms of the strike against Eaton's. The strike was declared "a protest against the introduction of an entirely new process of work in a department, without a conference with the employees of the department."[73] It further stated that there had been no discussion with the employees on any of the following matters:

1) the possibility of doing the work by the new method
2) The amount of extra work entailed
3) the just recompense for such extra work

The council had outlined the reasons for the strike against Eaton's more clearly, but with different emphasis than the Cloakmakers Strike Committee had previously done.

As the strike lengthened, collective action became more pronounced. Under the direction of Barnum, the T.D.L.C. endorsed a general boycott not only of the Eaton Co. but of all employers sympathetic to Eaton's as well. Barnum had made clear to the T.D.L.C. the importance of educating the people in general sympathy with the strikers.[75] Shortly thereafter, the T.D.L.C. appointed a permanent publicity officer for the strike.[76] Under the initiative of A.J. Stevenson, Secretary of the T.D.L.C. and Joe Simpson, a delegate, it was brought to the Council's attention that the striking cloakmakers were suffering from starvation because of the length of the strike. After a three-hour discussion of the issue, the Council agreed to donate $50.00 to partially fund a mass meeting to

aid the strikers. The entire meeting would not be funded, for as delegate Sanderson stated, and the Council agreed: "The committee had already incurred too much expense".[77] The meeting would serve the purpose that Barnum wanted, though, to keep the issue of union recognition alive before the public eye.

On March 20, over 3,000 men, women and children gathered at Massey Hall. This was the largest such meeting to attract public attention for the strikers. Attendance was reported to be largely "foreign"; speeches were delivered in both Yiddish and English. The platform was taken several times by leading labour figures, Gertrude Barnum, Joseph Gibbon of the Street Railway Men's Union, J. Dogett and Andrew Miller of the Carpenters Union to name a few. When Rosenbaum of the G.W.U. took the podium, militancy was incited in the crowd. He addressed those present on the urgency of full union recognition in preventing lockouts and strikes such as those in which the cloakmakers and garment workers were engaged. The community was urged to stand by the Eaton boycott as the only means to let their voices be heard above Eaton's refusal to arbitrate.[78]

The following Saturday, March 23, public attention was drawn to the strike. Under the direction of Barnum and the Strike Committee, two large parades were held. In the morning, 300 children from the ages of six to twelve were driven in drays and pleasure vans throughout the streets of The Ward near the Eaton factory. Waving brightly coloured banners and streamers they appealed to public sympathy for support of the strikers.[79] Later that day, over 2,000 men, women and children appeared again on these downtown streets. Accompanied by eight mounted police,[80] the marchers followed the streets from The Labor Temple, passing the Eaton factory to Spadina Ave., along Spadina to College St. and back to The Labor Temple. They were not met entirely with approval from the onlooking crowd who scoffed as well as cheered.[81]

The Strike Committee, with the aid of the T.D.L.C. and Gertrude Barnum, organized a city-wide boycott of Eaton's retail trade. Strikers called on Jewish homes that were spotted receiving Eaton's deliveries to support the strike.[82] *The Lance* reported in early March that the boycott of the Eaton retail trade had been successful among the Jewish population. The paper claimed that a substantial number of customers had transferred their business to Simpson's.[83] A former striker, however, recalled that door to door solicitation for the boycott was anything but well received.[84] But the Jewish community made considerable attempts to aid the strikers financially. The Associated Hebrew Charities distributed food and several Jewish women's organizations conducted street collections for the strike fund until they were stopped by the City.[85]

The first meeting with Eaton's held on behalf of the strikers was initiated by The Strike Committee through the Jewish community. Committee representatives B. Fliegel, S. Gold and A. Nessenovitz requested that Magistrate Cohen[86] and Rabbi Jacobs[87] meet with Eaton's. The Committee wanted Eaton's approached with a proposal requesting them to rehire all the locked-out and striking workers. This meeting did not resolve anything. The Eaton representative stated that the company would accept applications through regular channels. But the Strike Committee felt that this was not a guarantee that the original locked-out cloakmakers would be rehired. In their statement to The Strike Committee, Magistrate Cohen and Rabbi Jacobs suggested that the strikers "withdraw all the malicious and uncalled for statements which had been circulated regarding the T. Eaton Company".[88] The strikers were further advised to act "as right and honourable men", and hence they would be assured that Eaton's would give them "fair and just treatment".[89] They further stated that The Strike Committee had denied that any of the strikers were involved in the campaign to slander Eaton's and had maintained that they would publicly absolve themselves from any part in this aspect of the strike if they could be assured that all of the locked-out and striking workers would be rehired. Magistrate Cohen and Rabbi Jacobs could not do this.[90] Within a few days the Strike Committee under the supervision of the T.D.L.C. denied any claim that they had revealed to Magistrate Cohen and Rabbi Jacobs that they had not been involved in the slanderous remarks against John Craig Eaton. To deny any connection with this campaign, they stated, would be "dishonourable to our friends".[91] It was apparent that an issue of contention between the T.D.L.C. and the Strike Committee had been stumbled upon.

The Strike Committee's report had accompanied a second statement by the T.D.L.C. Referring to the failed efforts of the Strike Committee under the guidance of Cohen and Jacobs to settle with Eaton, the T.D.L.C. called for a continuation of the boycott against the company. They also requested donations to aid the strikers. A T.D.L.C. statement signed by S. Lass, Treasurer and Jas. Stevenson, Secretary, brought out new information regarding the Eaton factory and the strike. Eaton was not the all-caring employer he claimed to be, stated the T.D.L.C. There was evidence that the factory was run under poor conditions, where the employees worked long hours at low wages. Young children of fourteen were required to work at starvation wages from 8 a.m. until 9 in the evening. Washrooms were poor and lockers for personal items were not provided, so that workers could not protect their clothing from those of the common immigrant.

Wraps from all sort and conditions of homes are to-day hanging packed together so that

vermin and disease from the miserable homes of immigrants are passed on to the clothing of the most delicate daughter of refined parents. It is quite plain that Mr. J.C. Eaton is not the sort of King who can do no wrong.[92]

Poor working conditions and the problem of the foreign worker mixing with other workers was a new aspect of the strike. This issue appeared several times in *The Lance*. The distinction between the foreign worker and the Canadian worker was appearing as a new issue. In an issue of *The Lance* one week prior to the statement issued by the T.D.L.C., an article appeared which drew attention to the foreign identity of the strikers. It was claimed that women and children, especially, were required to work long hours at low wages by the Eaton Co. During the busy season children were required to work from 8 a.m. until 9 p.m. Working conditions at the factory were less than adequate, neither lockers nor cloak rooms were provided. Cloaks and umbrellas were piled together in unsanitary conditions, the belongings of girls from all sorts of homes hanging closely together.[93] It was further noted that a public slogan had been passing that the strike was "only a strike of Jews".[94] This had succeeded in eliminating sympathetic strike support from the "Gentile cloakmakers', but not from the trade unionists who stood by the strikers fully.[95] The issue was again picked up by *The Lance* in May when they noted that the Eaton Boycott had failed. This they claimed was self-evident, for Toronto labour would not cease to patronize Eaton's merely because foreigners had called a strike. Failure of the strike was attributed to the fact that ". . . the foreign agitator has few friends in Canadian labour circles."[96]

On April 11 Lapidus was approached by the Eaton Co. to discuss the possibility of arranging for the employees to return to work. Upon the approval of The Strike Committee, Lapidus and Rosenbaum met with an Eaton executive and manager. Four consecutive meetings took place on April 11, 15, 16 and 17, but an agreement was never reached. The terms presented to Eaton's by the Strike Committee were endorsed by the T.D.L.C. First, the Committee demanded that the cloakmakers would return to work only if they were not obligated to sew the linings by machine and secondly, that all the strikers would have to be rehired, by application if necessary. The Eaton management apparently agreed to these terms, and even suggested that an adjustment bureau could be established to work out grievances. The Committee then arranged for the workers to return to work. But the Eaton representative returned to the meeting on April 17 declining any agreement previously made. He denied that he had any authority to act on behalf of the company, even to the extent of discussion of the strike or the strikers' return to work.

The Strike Committee was treated in the same manner as Magistrate Cohen and Rabbi Jacobs had been. Apparently, not all of the Eaton management was

totally against some form of settlement with the strikers. With this second refusal of Eaton's to negotiate the strikers met and voted to continue the strike by a vote of 766 to 963.[97] In a report published by the T.D.L.C., they stated that the majority chose to "remain out and support the action of their leaders."[98] *The Toronto Star* had hastily and unofficially reported on April 17 that the strike had ended on satisfactory terms.[99] This was far from the truth.

The labour press' campaign against Eaton's took up increased momentum when a scandal broke that proved to be in the interest of the strike. Private detectives working in England for a "secret committee" revealed to James Simpson that the T. Eaton Co. was advertising for strike-breakers. Eaton's had run a series of advertisements in newspapers in Leeds and Wales for factory machinists and hand sewers. Tailors were wanted to work on mantles, blouses, costumes and men's clothing in Canada. The advertisement promised that passage to Canada would be advanced.[100] Evidence was found that an agent for Eaton's had left Yorkshire with workers bound for Canada under signed contract. *The Labor News,* which first broke the story, printed copies of a cable sent by P.M. Draper, Secretary Treasurer of the Trades and Labor Congress of Canada to J. Ramsay MacDonald leader of the British Labour Party. Draper was informing MacDonald of the Eaton advertisements and requesting his help in stopping the importation of strike-breakers. MacDonald cabled in return, assuring Draper that the strike in Toronto was public knowledge in England, and if possible, the workers would be prevented from leaving for Canada.[101]

In May *The Lance* picked up the issue again, printing a letter sent by Draper to the Department of Immigration. Draper was requesting that Mr. Scott, the Superintendent of Immigration, act to ensure that no strike-breakers entered Canada. Scott replied that he had already acted upon the matter of possible strike-breakers arriving from England. But regardless, immigrants could not be stopped unless there was definite proof that they were under contract to work for The Eaton Co. The mere fact that a strike was in progress was not enough evidence for the Department of Immigration to act.[102] *The Lance* reiterated this seemingly futile effort on the part of organized labour to fight Eaton as evidence that the company had lost the fight. For if they had to resort to seeking strike-breakers in England then labour was rallying closer to the cause.[103]

The strike attracted little of its usual attention after mid-April. Public meetings and marches ceased; support from the T.D.L.C. and the labour press appeared to be dropping off. The I.L.G.W.U. however, continued to support the strikers by donating approximately $2,000 to the strike fund in May and June.[104] In June, as well, the I.L.G.W.U. lent its support to the failing cause of the strike by holding its international conference in Toronto.[105] *The Industrial*

Banner made one last statement regarding the strike. They claimed that the boycott against Eaton's was successful since thousands of catalogues were continually being returned to the company from all across Canada. This was proof, they stated, that organized labour would continue to support the strike against Eaton's, who would be undercut by business rivals.[106]

The strike was never officially settled. Some of the workers were rehired but most did not return to work at Eaton's. A small number were re-employed each month from May to August when the number reached 100 and then settled down to 77. In July, Dean wrote to Coats, editor of *The Labour Gazette,* in reply to the government's inquiry as to whether the company was rehiring the strikers. Dean answered that they were receiving constant applications from strikers to return to work, but most were refused since the company had met their quota of such workers.[107]

Conclusion

Despite all efforts, little had been done to break Eaton's determination not to settle the strike. The T. Eaton Co. had clearly set out to break the union and to blacklist all those involved in the lockout and strike. Backing by the T.D.L.C. had not prevented the strikers from being rehired by Eaton's; this was already predetermined by the very fact of the strike. The cloakmakers and the T.D.L.C. had joined on a common ground: the fight for union recognition. The involvement of the T.D.L.C. and the labour press gave the strike greater momentum in this fight against Eaton's, a large symbol of expoitive industrial capitalism. But under the influence of the T.D.L.C., wage demands became a secondary issue to the employment of the new machines. As it became apparent that the strike was lost, it was increasingly evident that the cloakmakers were backed by the T.D.L.C. and the labour press to a large degree only because the former's fight was against Eaton's. The T.D.L.C. and the labour press came to confuse the identity of the cloakmakers and the place of the foreign worker in the strike. They were now uncertain if the foreigner belonged to the ranks of the working class or not. The actions of cloakmakers and the garment workers had not been enough to cut across ethnic lines within the working class of pre-World I Toronto.

Postscript

The Cloakmakers were to hold bitter memories of the 1912 strike. The strike against Eaton's had lasted twenty weeks and the strikers had put in a hard fight. In recollections of the strike written years later some cloakmakers recalled that although they had lost the strike, it had not ended in favour of Eaton's.[108] The

cloakmakers claim that they had won in the long run. Many of the cloakmakers who were left unemployed as a result of the strike founded new needle trades businesses in Toronto.[109] As a result, Eaton's business was so greatly affected by the strike, that it would never again experience the large share of the ready-made garment manufacturing industry that it had had prior to the strike.

> Thus the monpoly of the T. Eaton Co. in the Ladies' garment manufacturing industry was broken, to the point where after time the Eaton Co. gave up its independent production of garments.[110]

For the Cloakmakers Union, this was their legacy.

FOOTNOTES

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3. Irving Abella, ed., "Portrait of A Professional Revolutionary The Recollections of Joshua Gershman", *Labour/LeTravailleur*, 2, (1977), 186.
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5. Max Siegerman, "Our Union In The First Years of Its Existence", *Toronto Joint Board, Cloakmakers Union, I.L.G.W.U. Souvenir Journal Golden Jubilee, Fifty Years of Progress 1911-1961*, (1961), page 29.
6. Sam Kraisman, "Half A Century of Progress", *op. cit.*, page 6.
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8. Taped Interview, Harry Smith, op. cit.
9. Benjamin Stolberg, *Tailor's Progress, The Story of A Famous Union and the Men Who Made It*, (New York: Doubleday, 1944), page 49.
10. Sam Kraisman, "Half A Century of Progress", op. cit., page 7.
11. *The Lance*, (Toronto), Jan. 27, 1912, page 2.
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14. *Report on Strikes and Lockouts in Canada, 1901-1916*, The Department of Labour, (Ottawa, 1918), page 8.
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    Piva's figures are for 1921, where he shows that; most blue collar workers were only employed an average of 43 weeks and white collar 50 weeks, a trend which he claims was true for the entire period from 1900-1921.
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23. *The T. Eaton Co. Catalogue, Supplement Fall & Winter, 1915*.
24. "A Women's Clothing Factory", *The Home Journal*, 1908, page 10.

25. Taped Interviews-Harry Smith, op. cit.
26. *The Toronto Daily Star*, Feb. 20, 1912, page 7.
27. *Department of Labour, Strikes and Lockout Files*, op. cit. uncited news clipping.
28. *The Toronto Daily Star*, Feb. 20, 1912, page 7.
29. *The Globe*, (Toronto), Feb. 15, 1912, page 2.
30. Max Siegerman, "Our Union In The First Years of Its Existence", op. cit., page 29.
31. Ibid.
32. *The Toronto Daily Star*, Feb. 15, 1912, page 5.
33. *Department of Labour Strikes and Lockout Files*, op. cit.
34. *Department of Labour Strikes and Lockout Files*, op. cit., *The Toronto Daily Star*, March 1, 1912, page 1.
35. *The Toronto Daily Star*, Feb. 15, 1912, page 5.
36. Ibid, Feb. 15, 1912, page 2.
37. Ibid, Feb. 16, 1912, page 2.
38. Ibid, Feb. 15, 1912, page 2.
39. Ibid, Feb. 24, 1912, page 3.
40. Sam Kraisman, "Half A Century of Progress", op. cit., page 7.
41. *The Toronto Daily News*, Feb. 17, 1912, page 15.
42. *The Toronto Daily Star*, Feb. 16, 1912, page 15.
43. Ibid, March 26, 1912, page 15.
44. *Toronto District Labour Council*, Minutes, 1912, Feb. 15, 1912, page 75.
45. Ibid, March 1, 1912, page 85, & June 20, 1912, page 114.
46. *The Lance*, (Toronto), April 20, 1912, page 3.
47. *Department of Labour Strikes and Lockout Files*, op. cit.
48. *The Toronto Daily News*, Feb. 17, 1912, page 15.
49. Ibid, Feb. 20, 1912, page 7.
50. *The Labor News*, (Hamilton), March 22, 1912, page 1.
51. Ibid.
52. *Department of Labour, Strikes and Lockout Files*, op. cit., Strike 3453.
53. *The Globe*, (Toronto), Feb. 22, 1912, page 2.
54. *Department of Labour, Strikes and Lockout Files*, op. cit.
55. Ibid.
56. James Simpson, member Toronto Typographical Union, Labour representative of The Federal Royal Commission to Investigate Technical Education and a member of the Board of Directors, Labour Temple, Toronto.
    The Labor News (Hamilton), March 22, 1912, page 3, & *The Daily News* (Toronto), Feb. 10, 1912, page 3.
57. *The Lance* (Toronto), March 30, 1912, page 2.
58. *The Labour News*, (Hamilton), March 22, 1912, page 1.
59. Sam Kraisman, "Half A Century of Progress", op. cit., page 7.
60. *The Toronto Daily Star*, Feb. 15, 1912, page 5.
61. *The Labour News* (Hamilton), March 1, 1912.
62. Ibid, March 1, 29, 1912, page 2.
63. *The Lance*, (Toronto), March 23, 1912, page 1.
64. Ibid, page 1.
65. *Industrial Banner*, (London), April 1912, page 4.
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67. *The Toronto Daily Star*, Feb. 15, 1912, page 5.
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70. Ibid, Feb. 15, 1912, page 66.

71. Ibid.
72. Ibid, March 7, 1912, page 82.
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74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
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77. *The Toronto District Labour Council*, Minutes, op. cit.
78. *The Department of Labour Strikes and Lockout File*, op. cit., Strike 3446.
79. Ibid.
80. *The Toronto Daily Star*, March 22, 1012, page 10.
81. *The Department of Labour, Strike and Lockout File*, op. cit., Empire, undated.
82. Taped Interview, Harry Smith, op. cit.
83. The Lance, (Toronto), March 2, 1912, page 1.
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85. Stephen A. Speisman, *The Jews of Toronto, A History to 1937*, op. cit., page 194.
86. Jacob Cohen, Bail Magistrate, appointed 1910, Ibid, page 250.
87. Solomon Jacobs, Rabbi of The Holy Blossom Temple, Ibid, page 53.
88. *Department of Labour, Strikes and Lockout File*, op. cit. March 20, 1912.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid.
91. *The Lance*, (Toronto), March 30, 1912, page 1.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid, May 11, 1912, page 4.
94. Ibid, March 23, 1912, page 1.
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid, May 11, 1912, page 4.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
99. *The Toronto Daily Star*, April 17, 1912.
100. *The Labor News*, (Hamilton), April 4, 1912, page 4.
101. Ibid.
102. *The Lance*, (Toronto), May 11, 1912, page 1.
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid, June 15, 1912, page 3.
105. *Industrial Banner*, (London), June 1912, page 4;
The Lance, (Toronto), May 11, 1912, page 1.
106. *Industrial Banner*, (London), April 1912, page 4.
107. Letter from W.G. Dean, T. Eaton Co.l to R.H. Coats, Esq. Editor, Labour Gazette, June 1, 1912, *Department of Labour Strikes and Lockout File*, June 3, 1012, op. cit.
108. Sam Kraisman, "Half A Century of Progress", op. cit. page 7.
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid.

Appendix

The following is an attempt to verify or dispute the union's claims regarding the effect of the strike on Eaton's share of the ready-made garment industry in Toronto. This quantitative analysis looks at the assessed business values for firms I could identify as garment manufacturers in the year 1910, 1911, 1912 and 1913. This data is presented to indicate a growth pattern in the

manufacturing of ready-made clothing in the years surrounding the strike. My intention is to show what proportion of the ready-made garment industry Eaton shared in each of the four years, what proportion of the garment industry other firms had, how this changed over the time period, and, lastly to see if changes in Eaton's business assessed value, either a loss or gain, were reflected in a loss or gain in the other firms in the industry.

In collecting the date I followed a procedure which relied on using both the city directories and the assessment rolls for Toronto. Both the directories and assessment rolls were consulted for one year ahead of the year in which I was working. Since the directories were published in January or February, the information they contain actually reflects the year before the cover date. In the case of the assessment rolls, the information is taken in either July or August of the year prior to that which it will form the base of taxation. The businesses listed in four categories in the directory were then collected, that being: cloak manufacturers, clothing wholesale and manufacturers, gentlemen's furnishings and wholesale and ladies wear manufacturing. Since some of the listings were ambiguous and included tailors, retailers and wholesalers who were not manufactueres, the next two steps would eliminate many firms which were not manufacturers. The firms were then checked against the alphabetical listing in the directory, and then located in the assessment rolls. I did not collect data on retailers, tailors, merchants tailors, agents or wholesalers. The objective was to locate clothing manufacturers, firms who produced ready-made clothing, including coats, for men, women, and children, as well as novelty or sundry items such as ties, but not millinery or shoes.

The actual number of manufacturing firms considered in this study are shown in Table I. The top figures in each category represent the final number determined as manufacturing firms. The bottom figures however, represent the actual number of manufacturing firms that could be located in the assessment rolls. Some businesses that were determined to be manufacturers were not located in the assessment rolls. This lack of information is a source of error in the total business assessment figures provided in Table III. It should be noted, however, that the directory listings were used to determine the total number of businesses in each category as presented in Table I.

The total number of manufacturing firms as presented in Table I show a general pattern of increase over the four years. The growth in the number of firms was progressive, where an almost equal number were added to the total in each year. Most of the categories, as shown in Table I, experienced the bulk of their growth during the two years from 1910 to 1911 and 1912 to 1913. Ladies wear manufacturing however, was one exception, which in fact fol-

lowed the reverse trend. The year 1911 to 1912 saw this category's greatest increase from 26 to 40, an increase which totally contributed to that year's growth. Cloak manufacturing saw its greatest increase in total number of firms from 1912 to 1913 where it picked up after two years of slower growth. Table II show that the number of cloak manufacturers which grew by 46.1% and 47% in the years 1910 to 1911 and 1912 to 1913 experienced the highest rate of growth of any of the categories over all the years. The year 1910 to 1911 experienced the highest proportional increase in the total number of businesses over each of these years with a growth rate of 27.1%. However, this rate of increase was not as great in the following two years where it is noted as 16% for 1911 to 1912 and 14.9% for 1912 to 1913.

In conjunction with Table I, Table III shows that the total assessed business values for all manufacturing firms increased. The steady growth of this increase is reflected in Figure II. However, although these values grew, they did so at a slower rate each year after 1911. As noted in Table IV the total values from 1910 to 1911 grew at a rate of 29.4% whereas this growth decreased proportionally from 1911 to 1912 to 12.1% and 17.9% from 1912 to 1913. The largest growth rate in each manufacturing category was experienced from 1910 to 1911 and 1912 to 1913, with the exception again in ladies wear manufacturing. This category grew by 52.5% from 1911 to 1912 after a slower rate of growth of 3% from 1910 to 1911 only to be followed again from 1912 to 1913 by a slower rate of 7.6%. There appears to be some correlation between an increase in the number of firms and the pattern of increase in the growth rate.

The assessed business value for the T. Eaton Co. declined from 1912 to 1913 from $145,125 to $123,750. As further shown in Table III this decline occurred after three years of increases from $94,470 to $128,145 and $145, 124 from 1910 to 1912. Table IV indicates that although the assessed business values for the Eaton factory had increased the rate of this growth was decreasing from 1911. From 1910 to 1911 Eaton had grown at a rate of 35.6% whereas from 1911 to 1912 the percentage growth was only 13.2% and 14% from 1912 to 1913. Table I indicates that in the first three years of the study Eaton's assessed business value for the factory was at least 16 - 17% of the total assessed business values for all manufacturing firms considered in this study. In 1913 this proportion dropped to 12.9%.

The other three categories considered in the ready-made garment manufacturing industry shared over 80% of the assessed business value during all years of this study. This is not a test for Eaton's monopoly of the manufacturing trade, but it does indicate that throughout this period these manufacturing firms which grew from 59 to 10 were worth over 80% of the

value of the total manufacturing industry. The sub-total of the assessed business values of the firms without including Eaton's, as shown in Table IV, increased at a smaller rate than Eaton's did until 1912 to 1913.

Figure II indicates the drop in Eaton's total assessed business value. All information so far points to the fact that Eaton's manufacturing establishment had decreased in its total business value after 1912. It is likely that the strike and boycott could have affected this, since such a decline in business value would take a year to be revealed by these records. Another proof which points to the strike as affecting an alteration in the business values is an obvious change in distribution in the business assessments. Figure I show that while the total business assessments grew over this period, the sub-total, which is the total business assessments minus Eaton's assessment also grew. Therefore, although Eaton's assessed value was declining as has been shown, and is explicit in Figure II, the remainder of the manufacturing firms grew. What Figure I is indicating is that the slack in business which the decline in the Eaton's value indicates, was in turn probably taken up by the other manufacturing firms, since their assessed business values retained a stable share of the overall. Therefore, Eaton's decline did not affect the overall assessment which continued to increase at the same rate as it had in previous years.

Evidence presented in the assessed business values for these manufacturing firms considered indicates that while in the year after the strike the total number of firms were not increased except in cloak manufacturing, there is no indication of a co-relation between this pattern and the strike year; since the overall trend had been towards an increase in the number of manufacturing firms over the entire four year period. This trend is also reflected in the general pattern of increase in the total business assessments for all firms with and without Eaton's assessed value. What does indicate that the strike could possibly have had an effect on business is Eaton's drastic decline in business value after 1912. All evidence points to the fact that this decline was exeptional and not part of an overall trend of growth experienced during these years from 1910-1913.

Examining the business assessments taken for clothing manufacturers, including Eaton, during the years from 1910 to 1913 indicates that the Eaton Co. did experience a lower business assessment in the year after the strike. Without access to the Eaton Co. employee files it is not possible to verify the fate of the unemployed cloakmakers and garment workers.* Research on the

* The T. Eaton Co. Archives is open to the public for research. Only catalogues, pictures and the general information files, which include press statements, and newspaper articles are open to the public. Access to business files and employees records (if they still exist) is closed.

number of manufacturing firms in Toronto, however, indicates that there was an increase during this time. An examination of the manufacturing firms does indicate a steady increase in the total assessed business values that Eaton does not share in after 1912. Therefore, the strike does not appear to have had an effect on the general increase in the number of manufacturing firms and their overall business value. But the assessed business value of these firms does retain their overall share of the total value, while Eaton suffered a decline. These results do not point to an effective boycott campaign against Eaton in the year of the strike.

Total Number of Businesses in Each Year
From Assessment Rolls and Directory

	1910	1911	1912	1913
Cloak Manf.				
Total Number	13	19	17	25
Total Located	12	17	16	23
Clothing Manf.				
Total Number	23	30	30	36
*Total Located	18	25	22	20
Ladies Wear M.				
Total Number	23	26	40	39
Total Located	21	21	28	29
Total Number	59	75	87	100
Total Located	51	63	66	72

*Includes Men's clothing. Table I

Percentage Growth by Number of Total Firms
By Category and Year

		1910-1911	1911-1912	1912-1913
Cloak Manf.		46.1	10.5	47
*Clothing Mf.		30.4	0	20
Ladies Wear Mf.		13	15.3	2.5
Total Located		27.1	16	14.9

*Includes Men's Clothing Table II

Total Assessed Business Value
In Dollars
By Year and Category

	1910	1911	1912	1913
Cloak Manufacturing	135,671	179,854	180,028	300,768
*Clothing Manufacturing	141,490	234,576	210,329	235,375
Ladies Wear Manufacturing	187,296	181,112	276,353	297,504
Sub-Total	464,457	595,542	666,710	833,647
T. Eaton Co.	94,470	128,145	145,125	123,750
Total	558,927	723,686	811,835	957,397

*Includes Men's Clothing

Table III

Percentage Growth of
Total Assessed Business Value

		1910-1911	1911-1912	1912-1913
Cloak Manufacturing		32.5	.09	67
*Clothing Manufacturing		65.7	-10.3	11.9
Ladies Wear Manufacturing		-3.3	52.5	7.6
Sub-Total		28.2	11.9	25
T. Eaton Co.		35.6	13.2	-14.7
Total		29.4	12.1	17.9

*Includes Men's Clothing

Table IV

Source: Assessment Rolls, Toronto, 1911-1914.

Total Assessed Business Value
Each Category As A Percentage of Each Year's Total

	1910	1911	1912	1913
Cloak Manufacturing	24.3	24.9	22.2	31.4
*Clothing Manufacturing	25.3	32.4	25.9	24.5
Ladies Wear Manufacturing	33.5	25.0	34.0	31.0
Sub-Total	83.0	82.2	82.1	87.0
T. Eaton Co.	16.9	17.7	17.9	12.9

*Includes Men's Clothing

Table V

Total Assessed Business Value Figure III




Total Assessed Business Value
Figure I
Assessment Value in Units of $100 Thousand Dollars
9.0
8.0
7.0
6.0
5.0
0
Total
Sub-Total


Total Assessed Business Value
Figure II
Assessment Value in Units of $100 Thousand Dollars
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
.5
Cloaks
Clothing
Ladies Wear
T. Eaton Co.
1910
1911
1912
1913