

Interest Groups and Foreign Policy Making: Canada and Palestine, 1946-1948

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Résumé

L'étude des influences nationales envers les organismes chargés de la politique étrangère relève de l'art aux Etats-Unis.

Toute une génération d'érudits Américains s'est consacrée non seulement à l'analyse du fonctionnement des institutions officielles du gouvernement, mais elle a également fait l'analyse des moyens par lesquels ces institutions ainsi qu'un nombre sans fin d'autres organismes moins officiels, publics et privés, (particulièrement les groupes d'intérêt) ont des interactions, et bien souvent entrent en conflit lors de la procédure visant à établir une politique étrangère américaine.

Jusqu'à présent, on peut dire que l'intérêt de la nation canadienne en regard des problèmes relatifs aux affaires étrangères s'avère être tout au plus à peine marqué.

L'érudition des Canadiens semble ne mener nulle part si on la compare au degré de perfectionnement de son voisin américain dans l'étude des influences nationales sur la réalisation de politique étrangère.

Il semble qu'il y ait une pauvreté de travaux d'érudits allant au-delà de ces tentatives d'ordre plutôt descriptif et qui plongent dans les eaux troubles de l'influence du groupe d'intérêt national dans la réalisation des décisions canadiennes en politique étrangère.

Nulle part ailleurs ces différences d'analyses du groupe d'activité ne sont mises plus en évidence que lors de la réalisation de la politique étrangère tant canadienne qu'américaine envers le Moyen-orient.

Les auteurs Américains William Quandt et Robert Trice soulignent avec insistance l'influence importante que les groupes d'intérêts américains — tant pro-Israël que pro-Arabe — ont eu sur la réalisation de décisions politiques des U.S.A. au cours des années antérieures remontant jusqu'à l'appui du gouvernement Truman pour un plan de partage de 1947 et la reconnaissance capitale de l'état naissant d'Israël.

Cet article vise dans un premier pas à faire le développement d'une analyse systématique de l'influence d'un groupe d'intérêt sur la politique canadienne au

Moyen-orient, analyse politique comparable à celle faite aux Etats-Unis. La période visée dans cette analyse porte sur les années relatives au partage et à la reconnaissance de l'état d'Israël au cours des années 1946 à 1948, et sur en examen des tentatives d'un groupe d'intérêt cherchant à influencer ce partage et cette reconnaissance.

The study of domestic influences upon foreign policy-making has become something of an art in the United States. A cursory glance at the library shelves will illustrate, as the American academic and onetime policy advisor Roger Hilsman has noted, that interest in foreign policy decision-making is "rooted deeply in the political and organizational processes" of the American political culture.¹

A whole generation of American scholars has devoted itself to analysis of not only the functioning of the formal institutions of government, but also the ways in which these institutions and countless other less formal public and private bodies (including, and especially, interest groups) interact, and often collide, in the process of making American foreign policy.

To what extent is it possible to apply Hilsman's axiom to the Canadian scene? To this point, Canadian public interest in external issues would appear to be at best 'occasional'², and Canadian scholarship seems to come nowhere near the level of sophistication of its American counterpart in the study of domestic influences upon the making of foreign policy. To be sure, one must note the existence of several excellent analyses of the formal mechanisms of foreign policy making in the Canadian system — such names as Eayrs, Lyon, Thomson and Swanson, and Stairs come immediately to mind — but there appears to exist a dearth of scholarly works which go beyond these rather descriptive efforts and which delve into the murky waters of domestic interest group influence upon the making of Canadian foreign policy decisions.

Nowhere are these differences in analyses of group activity more in evidence than in the making of Canadian and American foreign policy for the Middle East.

On the American side, scholars such as William Quandt and Robert Trice have analyzed in rather full detail the plethora of interests and influences, both public and private, one must contend with in attempting to study the formulation of US policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. Both authors note with particular emphasis the substantial influence which American interest groups —

both pro-Israel and pro-Arab — have had upon the making of U.S. policy decisions over the years, going back to the Truman Administration's support for the U.N. partition plan of 1947 and the subsequent recognition of the incipient State of Israel.

This article — entailing an examination of interest group attempts to influence Canadian policy toward partition and recognition in the 1946-1948 period — is intended as a first-step toward the development of a systematic analysis of interest group influence on Canadian Middle East policy comparable to that found in the United States.

An analysis of interest group influence in the making of Canadian policy towards the Middle East is appropriate for several reasons. First, given the relative success of American groups in influencing US policy for the Middle East, an analysis of Canadian pressure group activity with regard to the same region would appear consistent with an attempt to compare interest group influence in the presidential and parliamentary systems. Second, the Middle East is far from alien to Canada's international experience. Through its traditionally very strong involvement in UN peacekeeping operations, Canada has in one form or another been involved in the Middle East for most of the generation following the Second World War. Third, the Middle East, and in particular the Arab oil-producing Middle East, has been one of the major beneficiaries of a fairly distinct shift in Canadian foreign policy during the 1970s in the direction of those foreign relations which will best fulfill the needs of Canada's domestic environment.⁴ And finally, an analysis of this sort will provide us with an opportunity to empirically verify or invalidate Peter Dobell's charge of a traditional Canadian governmental bias in favour of Israel in the Arab-Israeli conflict, which has been largely motivated by the activities of a powerful 'Jewish lobby' in Canada.

It is . . . an important factor in Canada's international posture that it has constantly shown more sympathy for Israeli than for Arab positions in the Middle East conflict . . . the well-organized Jewish lobby in Canada has pressed relentlessly for support of Israel . . . The remarkable influence of Canadian Jews comes less from their numbers — almost 175,000 in 1961 — than from their wealth, their financial support of the Liberal party, their superb organization, and their concentration in the large cities which vote Liberal . . .⁵

We make no judgement at this point, but will allow Mr. Dobell's contention to guide much of our analysis of interest group activity in the making of Canadian policy with regard to our case study. While we will not likely be able to arrive at any general over-riding conclusions regarding the making of foreign policy, an analysis of this sort will likely provide us with knowledge of some of the basic structural, institutional, political and cultural incentives and constraints

to interest group influence upon the making of foreign policy in Canada.

Canadian governmental involvement in the Middle East, for all practical purposes, began on April 2, 1947, when Britain 'formally and without warning', referred to the U.N. the question of its mandate in Palestine (which had been granted to Britain by the League of Nations following the First World War). Given Canada's important 'middle power' role in the early post-World War Two period, she was bound to become involved in this issue. Such involvement, says Lester Pearson, was quite upsetting to the government of William Lyon Mackenzie King, for it forced the reticent Prime Minister to take a stand on an issue he had up until then adroitly avoided.⁶

Mr. King's cautiousness was based in large part upon a fear of undue haste; of an escalation of Arab-Jewish violence; of a confrontation between British, American, and Soviet interests; and especially of committing Canadian resources (and potentially, lives) to an area where Canada had no direct interests.⁷ However, the course of events, and Canada's growing international responsibilities, began to overtake this cautious attitude.

At the U.N. Lester Pearson — who had succeeded Norman Robertson as Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs in September 1946 at the same time as Mr. King had passed the External Affairs portfolio on to Mr. St. Laurent — was selected Chairman of the General Assembly's Special Session on Palestine. With Mr. Pearson as Canada's primary representative to the Palestine issue, it was all but inevitable that the policy of 'careful functionalism' advocated in Cabinet by Mr. King was to be circumvented.⁸ For, as Pearson readily admits in his memoirs, he felt a special religious attachment to the issue which perhaps went far beyond practical political considerations.⁹ This deep personal sentiment and the high profile taken by Supreme Court Justice Ivan C. Rand — Canada's representative to the United Nations Special Commission on Palestine (UNSCOP) — in the formulation of the majority report recommending the partition of Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state with an economic union, did not in the least please the Prime Minister.

Despite the pleas of Mr. Pearson and others within the DEA, such as Escott Reid and Hume Wrong, and despite some fairly strong opposition within Cabinet, the government, and Parliament¹⁰, the Cabinet, under intense personal pressures from Mr. King, fell in behind the Prime Minister on the limited Canadian acceptance of the U.N. partition plan, and the subsequent delay in Canada's recognition of the nascent State of Israel.

On 20 May 1948 the provisional government of Israel requested recognition from the Canadian government. Unlike the Truman Administration in the United States — which, in a literal footrace with the Soviet Union, had been

very quick to grant such recognition within minutes of the end of the British mandate of 14 May — Canada under Mackenzie King was once again exceedingly cautious. It was only with the full retirement of Mackenzie King in mid-November 1948, and with the ascension of Pearson to the position of Secretary of State for External Affairs, that the Canadian policy on both conflict resolution and recognition in the Middle East became less tied to the Mackenzie King (and British) position.

In late November 1948 the Israeli government applied for admission to the U.N. This request was supported by both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., but was opposed by Britain. Still in the process of reshaping its policy, Canada under St. Laurent abstained on the vote; which subsequently failed to pass. However, says Pearson, by that time the new Canadian government had determined that the situation had become stable enough, and the government of Israel had shown itself secure enough, to permit some measure of 'de facto' Canadian recognition. Such recognition was granted on 24 December 1948 and was followed by 'de jure' recognition on 11 May 1949.¹¹

Hence, this first episode of Canada's involvement in the Arab-Israel conflict had come to an end, but not without charges from much of the Arab world and those of the pro-Arab position that the Canadian government had been excessively pro-Israeli in its policy orientation — largely as a consequence of extensive political pressure applied by Jewish and pro-Zionist pressure groups in Canada. In order to evaluate the validity of these charges, it is necessary that we analyze the activities of two pressure groups of the day — the pro-Israel and pro-Arab lobbies in Canada. We will here be borrowing to a large degree from Zachariah Kay's study of Canadian policy toward the Palestine issue up to the recognition of Israel (as well as his earlier study of the relations between the Canadian press and Palestine from 1939-1948).¹²

To begin, Kay notes the existence, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, of a vibrant and growing Jewish community of Canada, which tended to be pro-Zionist in orientation (to the extent that Zionism was anything beyond a rather ambiguous form of religious nationalism). As the concept of Zionism developed into a viable movement of Jewish national regeneration, so did Canadian Jewry's interest in Zionism tend to grow. However, prior to the early 1940s and the events in Europe, Canadian Jewish pressure on government remained minimal, as did Canadian governmental interest in Jewish and Zionist issues.

It was only in the last days of World War Two, as the true extent of the Nazi Holocaust became apparent, that the Canadian people — Jewish and otherwise — really began to think in practical terms of a national political homeland in

Palestine for the Jews, as promised by the British government in the Balfour Declaration.

By the 1946-1948 period the pro-Israel community in Canada had become for the most part embodied in several organizations: the Canadian Jewish Congress, the United Zionist Council of Canada (U.Z.C.), The Canadian Zionist Federation (C.Z.F.), the Zionist Organization of Canada (Z.O.C.), the non-Jewish Canadian-Palestine Committee (C-P.C.), the Canadian Council of Clergymen. Representatives of the chief activists of these groups — those of the U.Z.C. and the C-P.C., in particular — along with representatives of the Arab Office and the Canadian-Arab Friendship League, were invited to make separate representations before the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs in July of 1946. Thus, the interest groups did not lack in representation before members of Parliament; although, says Kay, the mandate of this committee was so narrow as to make it quite impotent and without influence upon the government.¹³

With the passage of the question of the future of the Palestine mandate from British to U.N. hands in April 1947, and the subsequent UNSCOP investigation and partition recommendation, the Arab and Jewish interest groups in Canada tended to dramatically increase their activities vis-a-vis the government. However, the Arab side — given its rather small Canadian constituency; its poor organizational skills; its tendency to engage in highly confrontationist activities (both within Parliamentary committee and in the general community as a whole); and a certain Canadian ignorance of the Arab culture — tended to be limited in its persuasive capacities.¹⁴

Yet, says Kay, the Canadian Arab community had four elements in its favour: a pro-Arab expert in DEA (Miss Elizabeth MacCallum); public reaction to Jewish terrorist activities against British mandatory officials; a British government friendly with the Arabs; and anti-semitic sentiment militating against the Jews.¹⁵

We must note that the pro-Zionist community had a fair degree of access to many of the top political and bureaucratic decision-makers, including St. Laurent, Secretary of State Paul Martin, Minister of Finance (and then Justice) Ilsley, and the Prime Minister himself. In the *Mackenzie King Record*, is to be found a description of the meeting of King and St. Laurent with the Jewish Agency representative in New York (and later Israel's Foreign Minister) Moshe Sharett, in April of 1948. Mr. King wrote that he found Sharett to be 'frank and pleasant', and that 'I was immensely taken with his manner and appearance; an exceptionally fine advocate'.¹⁶

One of the main vehicles through which the pro-Zionist interest groups were

able to reach the Prime Minister was through its association with various Jewish and pro-Jewish MPs and Senators, such as the then Jewish Liberal MP for Spadina (now Senator) David Croll, Senator Arthur Roebuck, and J. A. Bradette, Chairman of the House External Affairs Committee. Sometimes these contacts were helpful, sometimes less so. An example of the latter was Croll's request in early 1948 that the Prime Minister meet with Dr. Nachum Goldmann, one of the key leaders of the World Zionist Federation. Wrote King of this proposed meeting:

'... was glad that St. Laurent agreed it would be unwise for me to see Goldmann which would only lead to the press asserting there was some relationship between our Government and the Jews, and this at a time when the Chairman of the Security Council at New York was an appointee of our Government ...'¹⁷

Thus, Jewish and non-Jewish pro-Zionist groups had uneven success in their approaches to the Liberal government under Mr. King. While they apparently did not lack access to formal makers of political decisions, the lobbyists were unable to change their views. For, as Presthus has noted in summarizing pressure group activity in Canada, it is not only access into the system which presents the major problem for Canadian lobbyists, but the difficulty of achieving their goals *despite* the opportunity to be heard.¹⁸ A pressure group may, through its resources, contacts, and public campaigns be able to reach the upper echelons of decision-making, but this is quite inefficacious if the key decision-maker is adamant and unyielding in his position and is able to maintain control over the behaviour of other decision-makers. Such would appear to be the case in the 1946-1948 Palestine issue, as the Zionist groups had access to Cabinet but were met by the immovable attitude of Prime Minister Mackenzie King.

However, this is far from the end of the story, for, as interest group theory suggests, if one avenue of governmental influence shuts down or is lost, the successful group will move on to the next. In this case, the Zionist groups, seeing all of their efforts to convince the seemingly inflexible Mackenzie King going for naught, turned their attention to that element of the policy process which appeared to be both vital in the decision-making process *and* more amenable to their position. Hence, the attention shifted to DEA in general, and its contingent at the U.N. in particular. And, as the central figure in this Canadian contingent, Lester Pearson became the central focus of most Canadian pro-Zionist interest group activities.

A whole body of literature on this period in Canadian diplomacy has arisen, and much of it has centered on the apparent political biases of Lester Pearson. Tareq Ismael charges that during the U.N. debate on partition Mr. Pearson was unquestionably supportive of the pro-Zionist position, and claims that "for his

efforts, Mr. Pearson was 'dubbed by Canadian Zionists as the Balfour of Canada'.¹⁹ Numerous others have made similar comments about the behaviour of Mr. Pearson in the partition debate.

Peter Stursberg, in his oral history of Pearson and what came to be known as the age of 'Pearsonian diplomacy'²⁰, devotes several pages to an analysis of this very issue. Stursberg cites Pearson's son Geoffrey as saying that he felt that his father "was fairly neutral about that issue. He wasn't committed to a state of Palestine, although he felt he knew a lot of the background . . . I think he was genuinely impartial."²¹ The younger Pearson does admit, however, that his father "supported very strongly the new State of Israel once it was on the map and never wavered in that support."²² In his memoirs, Lester Pearson himself appears to lend credence to this claim when he writes that "I have never wavered in my view that a solution to the problem was impossible without the recognition of a Jewish state in some form in Palestine."²³

Taking Mr. Pearson's words at their face value, one might ask three basic questions. First, to what extent was Mr. Pearson's supposed bias in favour of the State of Israel a reflection of his own Zionist tendencies or of his commitment to the decisions of the U.N.? Second, did Canadian Zionist pressure groups recognize Pearson's apparent bias and were they able to exploit it? And finally, how successful were the various groups in influencing both Mr. Pearson's position at the UN and the decisions taken by the Cabinet in Ottawa? In answering these questions, we will have brought our discussion full circle, and be able to look once again at Peter Dobell's charge of the existence and strength of a Canadian Jewish lobby.

On the first question, we can of course never be sure where the one stopped and the other began. But, Mr. Pearson's involvement in the U.N. resolution of the Suez crisis — which included an international 'smack on the wrist' for Israel, the forced pull-back of Israeli forces from the Sinai desert and the imposition of a U.N. peace-keeping force which the Israelis had nothing but distrust for from the outset — and Pearson's failure as Prime Minister to act in defence of Israeli interests as the diplomatic and military crisis of May-June 1967 reached a head²⁴ — would appear to provide some considerable evidence upon which one might infer that Pearson's support for the partition and the creation of the State of Israel was based less on his personal feeling for the concept of a Jewish state than on his deep and abiding belief that the new international system structured upon the principles of the U.N. charter could only survive if the nations of the world were to live by its decisions — in this case, the decision to partition the Palestine mandate into separate Jewish and Arab entities.

In terms of the second question; the evidence seems clear that, for whatever

reason, Pearson had, through his words and actions in the U.N., indicated a certain bias in favour of partition and creation of the Jewish state — and in so doing, made himself the object of considerable Canadian (and international) Zionist attention.

Miss Elizabeth MacCallum, the Arabist in DEA whom Zachariah Kay viewed as a factor working in the favour of the Arab cause in Canada, has noted that the Jewish Agency went out of its way to win Pearson to its cause, and that Moshe Sharett “waited on him almost every day.”²⁵ As Stursberg suggests, much of the disproportionate amount of Jewish lobby pressure upon Pearson and the rest at the U.N. may be more a reflection of the weaknesses of the Canadian Arab movement’s organizational skills than of the predominance of pro-Zionist influence.²⁶ And finally, on the issue of the real influence of the Jewish lobby on Pearson, Stursberg provides this comment:

Certainly, the Arabs felt that he (Pearson) was on the Jewish side and, years later, they were to tell Tommy Burns how Pearson puts his arms around Ben Gurion when he greeted him at the United Nations, although the General . . . *supposed that he could not have done anything else if Ben Gurion had clasped him to his bosom . . .*²⁷

We have for the most part already answered the third of our questions; that being the extent to which the pro-Zionist groups were able to influence both Pearson’s behaviour in the U.N. and the policy decisions of the Canadian government.

Even if we accept the argument put forth by Tareq Ismael that Pearson was Zionist in orientation, and that he had, at times, ‘acting in a personal capacity rather than in the name of his government’, pushed very hard in the U.N. for partition²⁸, what does this tell us about the influence of the Jewish lobby in Canada? The proof, as the saying goes, is in the pudding. Despite the attempts of the pro-Zionist interest groups to influence both Pearson and the Canadian government, the Cabinet, under Mackenzie King’s firm hand, remained fundamentally opposed to partition — accepting it, says Pearson, “only after we were convinced that there was no possibility of an agreement between Britain, the U.S.A., and the U.S.S.R. which might make possible any other solution”²⁹ — and delayed, *for a full year*, ‘de jure’ Canadian recognition of the State of Israel. And, furthermore, while one might argue that Canadian ‘de facto’ recognition — coming as it did shortly after the retirement of Mackenzie King and the ascension of Pearson to the position of Minister of External Affairs — might be a manifestation of Pearson’s (and St. Laurent’s) pro-Zionist tendencies, we would contend that the strength of this argument is weakened when one recognizes (a) that Canada, under St. Laurent, had abstained from accepting Israel’s request for admission to the U.N.; and (b) that, as Pearson notes, Canada’s rec-

ognition of Israel was accomplished “‘with no demure from London.’”³⁰

Furthermore, while certainly not in any way denying the attempts by Canadian Jewish and non-Jewish groups to influence Canadian bureaucratic and political decision-makers, we do reject the contention that these groups were, as George Ignatieff suggests, able to marshal their political weight to produce successful results, as had their counterparts in the United States.

‘I remember Brooke Claxton saying to me once when we were in doubt how to vote. “Don’t forget George, I don’t mind how you vote but’, he said, ‘Don’t forget that I have no Arabs in my constituency and I have I’ve forgotten how many hundred Jews’ . . .”’³¹

While surely not to appear naive and to deny that many Canadian politicians (especially Liberal cabinet members and advisors) were aware of such political considerations, we must again return to our ‘proof is in the pudding’ metaphor: if the Cabinet was so impressed by the political need to satisfy Jewish voters, then why did it fight partition and hold out on recognition? The answer seems clear. On the 1946-1948 case, at least, Peter Dobell and others have seriously overestimated the capacity of the Canadian Jewish community, acting as a unified interest group, to influence the making of Canadian foreign policy for the Middle East.

Conclusions:

What general comments might then be made about the interaction of the various pro-Israel pressure groups and the Canadian government in the hectic 1946-1948 period? In terms of interest group theory, we might turn briefly to William Stanbury’s three aspects on analysis: **TIMING**, **TARGETS**, and **VEHICLES**.³² In terms of timing, it seems that the various pro-Zionist interest groups had a fairly well developed idea of how the Canadian policy-making process operated. They appear to have begun their inputs into the system early, and to have planted the seed of their interests throughout the process. They did not lack access to the major domains of decision making, including the Prime Minister’s office. While, granted, as was the case with Mr. King’s decision not to meet with World Zionist Federation leader Nachum Goldmann, this access was not always complete, there is little evidence that key decision makers deliberately avoided representatives of the pro-Israel groups.

Similarly, the Zionist groups appear to have selected the proper targets for their attention. Early in the process, they readily took up the offer to make representations before the House of Commons External Affairs Committee. They did so, it seems, not with any illusion about the important role played by this committee in the formulation of foreign policy, but as a way of making sure that their arguments were heard by M.P.s and, hopefully, by the general public. Despite a clear attempt to court Parliamentary committee members, individual M.P.s, and members of the press, there was a clear understanding that the bulk of the Zionist groups’ resources must be targeted at the real centres of power,

the upper bureaucracy and the Cabinet. As we have seen, these groups were fairly successful in gaining entree into the upper echelons, but were rather unsuccessful in stimulating a change in policy attitude there. Not to be deterred, the Zionists, following interest group theory, sought influence within another area of the foreign policy bureaucracy: this time the Canadian delegation at the United Nations.

In discussing the aspect of “vehicles”, it is important to recognize the role which many of the pro-Zionist activists envisioned for themselves. On the one hand, they were surely there to make the case for partition of Palestine and for the recognition of the State of Israel as loudly and as vociferously as possible. We might therefore see them as ‘issue-oriented’ pressure groups as Paul Pross defines them.³³

On the other hand, it was of equal if not greater importance to these groups to legitimize themselves to the Canadian government and people, and in so doing, to legitimize the State of Israel. In this sense, we might see many of these groups as ‘institutional’ pressure groups in the making. It was, of course, important to these groups that the Canadian government support partition and recognize Israel, but it would seem that their representatives also had a longer-term series of goals in mind — those associated with legitimacy and relations with the Canadian government on a wide-range of Israel-related issues. In so doing, these groups appear to have lived by Paul Pross’ basic maxim of successful institutional group philosophy: that “it is better to return to bargain another day than to risk the ‘credibility’ of the organization in the eyes of those groups whose decisions may in the future make or break the group and its client.”³⁴

Hence, while surely intent on employing those vehicles which would effectively keep the Zionist view before the Canadian public, press and government — and on taking such actions required to ensure that the non-Zionist Mackenzie King government did not become pro-Arab in policy orientation — the major Canadian Jewish and Zionist pressure groups went to great pains to demonstrate to the Canadian government that, while they *did* seek a change in governmental policy direction, *they were not attempting to undermine the prevailing Canadian status quo*. By engaging in what might generally be viewed as ‘consensual’ and ‘accommodative’ relations with the Canadian government, the Zionist groups, while surely not convincing the Mackenzie King government to alter its basic policy position, were to a significant extent able to ‘legitimize’ their activities. This legitimizing effort was made even easier by the tendency on the part of the Canadian Arab pressure groups to take a more ‘conflictual’ and uncompromising stance in their representations before

Cabinet and Parliamentary committees. In this sense, then, we might see in the initial failure of the Zionist groups to influence Canadian policy in the 1946-1948 period the seed for future fruitful relations between the Canadian government and Israel-related interest groups.

FOOTNOTES

1. Roger Hilsman, "Policy-Making is Politics," in James Rosenau (ed.) *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (2nd ed.) (New York: The Free Press, 1969) p. 232.
2. R. Barry Farrell, *The Making of Canadian Foreign Policy* (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall of Canada, 1969), p. 75.
3. William Quandt, *Decade of Decisions, American Policy Toward The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).
Robert H. Trice (a), *Interest Groups and the Foreign Policy Process: U.S. Policy in the Middle East* (Berkeley: Sage Publications, 1976).
Robert H. Trice (b), "American Interest Groups After October 1973", in J. C. Hurewitz (ed.) *Oil, the Arab-Israel Dispute, and the Industrial World: Horizons of Crisis* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1976, pp. 79-95).
4. Janice Gross Stein (a), "Canada: Evenhanded Ambiguity", in J. C. Hurewitz (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 96-110.
(b), "Canadian Foreign Policy in the Middle East After the October War", *Social Praxis* 4 (3-4): 271-297.
5. Peter Dobell, *Canada's Search For New Roles: Foreign Policy in the Trudeau Era* (London: The Royal Institute for International Affairs, Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 17.
6. John Munro and Alex Inglis (eds.) *Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson — Volume 2* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), p. 212.
7. Stein (b), *op. cit.*, p. 272.
8. For a complete description of the difference in foreign policy orientation between the King-Robertson team and the St. Laurent-Pearson battery, see J. L. Granatstein's biography of Norman Robertson, entitled *A Man Of Influence*, pp. 205-206.
For a complete analysis of the men who made up Canada's external affairs department in this period, see Granatstein's recently published *Ottawa Men*.
9. Munro and Inglis (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 213-214.
10. Zachariah Kay, *Canada and Palestine: The Politics of NonCommitment* (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1978), pp. 141 and 168.
11. Munro and Inglis (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 217.
12. Kay, *op. cit.*
Zachariah Kay (b), "The Canadian Press and Palestine: A Survey, 1939-1948," *International Journal* 1962-1963 vol. xviii, no. 3, Summer, pp. 361-373.
13. Kay (a), *op. cit.*, p. 165.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 121-123.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 123.
16. Pickersgill and Forster (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 184.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 158.
18. Robert Presthus, "Interest Group Lobbying: Canada and the United States," *American Academy of Political and Social Science, Annals* (vo. 413, 1974, pp. 44-57), p. 52.
19. Tareq Ismael, "Canada and the Middle East," *Behind the Headlines* (December 1973, vol. xxxii), p. 5.
20. Peter Stursberg, *Lester Pearson and the American Dilemma* (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 1980).

21. Cited in Stursberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-72.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 72.
23. Munro and Inglis (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 217.
24. Michael Brecher, *Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 159.
25. Cited in Stursberg, *op. cit.*, p. 71.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 71.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 71. Emphasis added.
28. Ismael (a), *op. cit.*, p. 5.
29. Munro and Inglis (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 214.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 217.
31. Cited in Stursberg, *op. cit.*, p. 72.
32. William T. Stanbury, "Lobbying and Interest Groups in Representation in the Legislative Process," in William Neilson and James C. MacPherson (eds.), *The Legislative Process in Canada, The Need For Reforms* (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1978, pp. 167-207), p. 169.
33. A. Paul Pross, "Pressure Groups: Adaptive Instruments of Political Communication," in Pross (ed.), *Pressure Group Behaviour in Canadian Politics* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1975, pp. 1-26), p. 11.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 27.