

Canada, The Middle East, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict

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Résumé

L'auteur de ce document a fait une recherche qu'il présente dans ce Journal afin de clarifier l'attitude du Canada par rapport au Moyen-orient et au conflit israélo-arabe.

Nous nous permettons de donner quelques extraits significatifs et des plus révélateurs, relatifs à l'attitude adoptée par trois Premiers Ministres du Canada nommément: Mackenzie King, Lester B. Pearson et Pierre-Elliot Trudeau, afin d'illustrer la nature quelque peu complexe des rapports entretenus. Ce ne sont là que des extraits et pour bien saisir le tout il faudrait lire le document au complet pour pouvoir s'en faire une idée claire et précise.

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La politique du Canada au Moyen-Orient peut se diviser en trois phases distinctes, dominées par trois grands hommes politiques très différents, respectivement: les Très Hon. Pierre Elliot Trudeau, Lester Pearson et William Lyon Mackenzie King.

Avant 1948, pendant le règne de Mackenzie King, le Canada ne portait aucun intérêt au Moyen-orient, la seule politique dans ce domaine fut l'appui inconditionnel envers toutes les mesures prises par la Grande-Bretagne dans cette région du monde.

Pendant la règne de Lester B. Pearson, la politique du Canada au Moyen-orient fut guidée par l'engagement de Pearson auprès des Nations-unies et l'assurance à l'effet qu'une instance internationale mette sur pied une force capable d'assurer la promotion de la stabilité et de la paix dans le monde. Pour Pearson le conflit israélo-arabe était un test pour les Nations-unies, test dont le succès pourrait dépendre pour l'organisation. Pearson était cependant tout aussi préoccupé à l'effet que les dissensions du Moyen-orient ne permettent ni de miner l'alliance du Bloc occidental, ni de donner lieu à une confrontation de puissances surarmées.

Avant même que Trudeau n'accède aux rênes du pouvoir, le changement de

la seconde politique majeure du Canada au Moyen-orient avait déjà été amorcé.

Trudeau, après la guerre de 1967, pensa que la politique étrangère du Canada ne devait pas reposer sur les tendances altruistes nébuleuses mais bien plutôt sur l'intérêt personnel de la nation.

L'expansion des intérêts du Canada au Moyen-orient ainsi que certains changements des réalités politiques de la région, ont abouti à des modifications de la position du Canada envers le conflit israélo-arabe.

Depuis 1967, le gouvernement du Canada a graduellement perçu les Palestiniens comme "réfugiés" puis comme "Peuple" dont les "droits" et aspirations doivent être satisfaits.

Depuis 1948, chaque gouvernement du Canada a été ferme dans son appui envers le droit d'Israël d'exister en paix et en sécurité.

Le fait que le Canada ait toujours tenté d'être objectif et constructif dans son approche à l'égard du conflit israélo-arabe est reconnu et apprécié à travers tout le Moyen-orient.

Le Canada a toujours été perçu comme une force pour le réalisme, le compris et la conciliation.

In the cataloguing of countries that have been interested and involved in the Middle East, Canada is usually overlooked, or at best relegated to the status of a minor player. There has yet to be written a comprehensive historical analysis of Canada's role and relations in the Middle East.

Prior to the conclusion of World War II, Canada's interest in Palestine and the Middle East was minimal. Although Canada officially applauded the Balfour Declaration upon its publication in 1917, this did not connote any commitment to Zionism or to the creation of a Jewish State.¹ Endorsement of the Declaration was based on a traditional unwavering Canadian support for Great Britain's foreign policy. Throughout the Mandatory period, Canada continued to back British policies in Palestine. As Great Britain became more hostile to Zionism, so too did Canada's Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs William Lyon Mackenzie King — whose views on foreign policy went unchallenged in government. Yet, simply because Canada supported the British in their Palestine policy did not mean that as a member of the Commonwealth it accepted any responsibility for the mandate. In the words of a senior official in the Department of External Affairs:

"While I agree that Canada shares with numerous other countries a remote and serious re-

sponsibility for mandated territories including Palestine, I do not agree that Canada accepted any legal responsibility as a part of the British Empire. The Mandate was taken by the U.K. and was not assumed by Canada."²

With Mackenzie King's relinquishment of the External Affairs portfolio to Louis St. Laurent in 1947, and the subsequent accession of Lester Pearson to the position of Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, Canada quickly took on an active role in the fledgling United Nations and, as a consequence, in the deliberations over Palestine.³ In addition to leading the Canadian Delegation to the April 1947 U.N. General Assembly Special Session on Palestine, Pearson was elected chairman of the "Political and Security Committee" which was responsible for establishing the "United Nations Special Committee on Palestine;" (UNSCOP). Comprised of representatives from eleven nations, including Justice Ivan Rand of Canada, UNSCOP was commissioned to formulate a plan for the future of the strife-torn Holy Land.

Despite Rand's support for the partitioning of Palestine and internationalisation of Jerusalem as recommended by most UNSCOP members, the Canadian Government withheld its endorsement of the scheme until it became clear that the UNSCOP majority proposal alone could gain the necessary backing in the General Assembly.⁴ Underlying Canada's eventual support for the plan however, was a strong perception that only partition had a chance of success in solving the Palestine dilemma. Partition, stated St. Laurent, was:

"... the least unsatisfactory of alternatives which had at one time or another been considered as the least unjust and least impracticable solution to a problem where honorable members must realize justice and practicality are so difficult to reconcile or even discover."⁵

In keeping with St. Laurent's emphasis on "practicability," the Canadian delegation at the U.N. vigorously pressed for the inclusion of concrete provisions for the implementation of partition into the final draft of the UNSCOP proposal.

On May 20, 1948, the Provisional Government of Israel requested recognition by the government of Canada. Mackenzie King, who was less than sympathetic to either Zionism or Jewish concerns in general, did not respond. Great Britain had earlier requested that all Commonwealth members refrain from recognizing Israel, and Mackenzie King was not about to oppose his British friends over a matter that meant so little to him.⁶ However, when the retiring Mackenzie King was succeeded by St. Laurent in the autumn of 1948, the way was clear for granting Israel the recognition it sought. The new Prime Minister immediately appointed Pearson Minister of External Affairs, and he in turn quickly announced Canada's de facto recognition of the Jewish State. On December 24, 1948, speaking in the House of Commons Pearson read:

"The Canadian Government has today informed the Provisional Government of Israel that the Canadian Government recognizes de facto the State of Israel in Palestine and that it also recognizes de facto the authority of the Provisional Government of Israel. The State of Israel has, in the opinion of the Canadian Government given satisfactory proof that it complies with the essential condition of Statehood. These essential conditions are generally recognized to be external independence and effective internal government within a reasonably defined territory."

Several months later, on May 11, 1949, Canada also extended de jure recognition to the new State when it voted for Israeli membership in the United Nations. At the same time, eager to support any U.N. initiatives, Canada volunteered the services of a group of military officers to participate on the "United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization" (UNTSO) in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt. Subsequently, in 1950 a Canadian, General Kennedy, was appointed director of the "United Nations Relief and Works Agency" (UNRWA), and in 1954 another Canadian, General Burns, was placed in charge of UNTSO.

At the U.N. Pearson also repeatedly urged direct negotiations between Israel and its neighbors, while calling for a solution to the conflict based on minor modifications to the 1949 armistice lines. The Palestine refugees, in his opinion, should be resettled in the surrounding Arab countries since it had become unfeasible for them to return to their old homes. The resettlement of the refugees could be achieved with the aid of massive international financial support which would include a substantial contribution from Israel. Pearson conceded that in such cases as family reunification, limited numbers of refugees should be permitted to return to Israel if they so desired.⁸

When the Jerusalem issue once again came before the U.N., Canada withdrew its support for the city's internationalization. Pearson argued that the concept of internationalization had become obsolete, not taking into account that the current situation was drastically different from that of November 1947 when the plan was first approved. With Jerusalem divided, and neither the Israelis nor the Arabs favoring its internationalization, any attempt to impose a U.N. regime on the city would be against the will of those most directly concerned and thus could only be accomplished by "heavy financial, administrative and military obligations" on the part of the United Nations.⁹ Pearson warned that by disregarding the:

"... real needs and genuine aspirations of the people who live in the Jerusalem area the result may be to endanger the very Holy Places whose position is our greatest concern."¹⁰

Instead suggested Pearson, considering that the original basis for recommending the internationalization of Jerusalem was largely to safeguard the

Holy Places, the U.N. should limit its demands to some form of jurisdiction over only these sites. This more circumscribed mandate, Pearson believed, would stand a stronger chance of gaining the acceptance of the Israelis and Arabs, while satisfying the U.N.'s prime objectives regarding Jerusalem. This "pragmatic" approach came to characterize Canadian efforts to resolve Middle Eastern problems. As has so often been the case however, reality had little bearing on U.N. voting, and Canada's proposal, supported by several other western nations, was turned down and the internationalization scheme upheld.¹¹

As interest in the Arab-Israeli conflict within the U.N. subsided, and relative stability settled on the Middle East, Canada's concern with the region waned. Lester Pearson, who controlled Canadian foreign policy for two decades starting in 1948, with the exception of the Diefenbaker interlude, generally only took an interest in the area during times of crisis. Development of bilateral relations with the emerging nations of the Middle East was simply not a priority in Canadian foreign policy. Up until the mid-1960's Canada established merely three embassies in the region. In fact, it was only through Canada's self-appointed role as mediator and conciliator that it first set up diplomatic relations with countries in the Middle East. Wanting to have direct contact with those on both sides of the Arab-Israeli conflict while endeavoring to appear impartial, Canada simultaneously established its first two Middle East embassies in Cairo and Tel Aviv during 1954.¹² The following year a third embassy was opened in Beirut. Canada's neglect of bilateral relations in the Middle East during the 1950's however, was not always quietly accepted by the Arab States. Towards the end of the decade Iraq, Morocco and Algeria all requested the exchange of ambassadors with Canada.

Despite Canada's support for partition and Israel's right to exist, Canadian diplomats have always been highly regarded throughout the Middle East.¹³ Canada, unlike many other western nations, was never a colonial power — a fact appreciated in the Arab world.¹⁴ The Arabs also welcomed what they viewed as Canada's impartiality. Commented former premier of Iraq Abdul-Karim Kassem:

"Canada has no interests in Iraq and we trust you as an independent neutral."¹⁵

Kassem's foreign minister, Hashim Jawad, urged Canada to accept the role of intermediary in discussions between Iraq and the West. The 1956 Suez Crisis especially impressed Arabs with Canada's ability as an effective and impartial mediator.¹⁶

In the spring of 1956, Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Abba Eban informed

American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that Israel was in desperate need of F86 jet fighters to defend itself against an increasingly powerful and threatening Egypt. Concerned by the shifting balance of power in the Middle East caused by the influx of Soviet Bloc arms in Egypt, but preferring not to needlessly jeopardize the U.S.'s position in the Arab world, Dulles secretly asked the Canadian government to provide Israel with a Squadron of F86's.¹⁷ Not surprisingly, Canadian officials were incensed at Dulles' self-centered policy. Canadian anger at the American Secretary of State's request is reflected in a statement by St. Laurent:

"We do not feel that when other western nations were not prepared to join in that responsibility [of ensuring a military balance] it should be left to the Government of Canada which has not the immediate interests in the areas which other western powers have."¹⁸

Nevertheless, the Canadian Government did recognize that action had to be taken to redress the arms imbalance. Thus in September of 1956 Canada reluctantly approved the sale of the aircraft, though the deal was made contingent upon an American announcement that it had the U.S.'s blessing. The outbreak of war in October 1956 however, prompted Canada to halt shipment of the F86's and subsequently cancel the sale.¹⁹

Even before the controversial F86 "sale", Canada had been a purveyor of limited amounts of small armaments to the Middle East. During 1954 and 1955 Canada supplied Israel with two million dollars worth of military equipment. Pearson justified the arms sales to Israel by cautioning that:

"... one of the most dangerous features of this situation [the rising tensions in the Middle East] is the feeling that Israel, the feeling on the part of Israel that nobody is prepared to help her, while the Communist states are prepared to help the Arab states. That feeling might become so intense in Israel that it might even provoke a preventative action and I think we should try to remove that feeling."²⁰

In January of 1956 Pearson rebutted Conservative party demands for an arms embargo to the Middle East, explaining that as a consequence of such a short sighted policy:

"... Israel would have been completely powerless to defend her very existence, unless she had agreed in desperation to throw herself into the arms of the communist suppliers. If it had suited their purpose, and for a price — and it would have been a high price — the Moscow government which controlled these suppliers would have been quite happy to arrange such a deal."²¹

During the spring of 1955, inquiries were made by Egypt into the possibility of purchasing several F86 jets and fifteen Harvard training airplanes from Canada. The request for the F86's was flatly turned down, and after some deliberation the Harvards were refused as well. While no one questioned the Gov-

ernment's decision to deny Egypt the fighter aircraft, the refusal to sell the Harvards did stir some opposition. It was argued that the Harvards were not offensive weapons and that by not furnishing them Canada would alienate Egypt, as well as undermine Arab confidence in Canada's impartiality. Heeding this criticism, the government reversed its decision and agreed to sell Egypt the Harvards.²²

Apart from a mild concern over the growing Middle East arms imbalance, Canada initially displayed little concern over the developments leading up to the 1956 war. When President Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in July of 1956, in contrast to the panic that swept certain other western capitals, there was little reaction in Ottawa. On August 3, 1956 Canada's Minister of Defense commented in the House of Commons that the problem was:

"... primarily a European matter . . . not a matter which particularly concerns Canada. We have no oil there. We don't use the Canal for shipping."²³

Canada expressed little disappointment in not being among the twenty-four countries invited to attend the August 1956 London Conference convened to discuss the Suez Canal issue.²⁴ Though the Canadian Government endorsed the conference's conclusions and proposals, it also urged Great Britain to take the matter to the U.N. rather than resort to the use of force. However, as sharp differences emerged between the U.S. and Great Britain, Canada became increasingly distraught. Finally, when the war broke out and threatened to undermine the Western alliance and develop into a superpower confrontation, Canada acted decisively.

At the outset of the 1956 war, Prime Minister St. Laurent gave Pearson a free hand to diffuse the crisis, while promising to "cover him" at home.²⁵ Unwilling to adopt a position in opposition to either its North American or European allies, Canada abstained on the U.S. resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire, a total embargo on arms to the region, and a unilateral withdrawal of all foreign troops from Egypt.²⁶ Pearson hoped to provide Canada's two closest friends with a less undignified retreat from the quagmire they had embroiled themselves in. That Great Britain and France should be publicly humiliated and internationally isolated was unacceptable to Pearson and many other Canadians who felt strong historical and emotional bonds with the two European nations. A second reason for Canada's abstention was that the resolution contained no provisions for a simultaneous effort to bring about a lasting peace. Explained Pearson:

"I regret use of military force in the circumstances which we have been discussing but I regret also that there was no more time, before a vote had to be taken, for consideration of the best way to bring about the end of cease fire which will have enduring and beneficial results."²⁷

On November 2, 1956 Pearson proposed the formation of a United Nations force which he hoped would bring a measure of stability along the borders between Israel and Egypt. At the same time Pearson warned that the force must not be seen as a substitute for peace. Unless the resultant atmosphere of tranquility was utilized to negotiate an overall settlement war would inevitably erupt again. The United States supported the concept of such an entity and was pleased to have Canada assume the central role in its formation so as not to raise Soviet objections that the U.S. was simply creating the peace-keeping force in order to establish its own forces in the Middle East under the flag of the U.N.²⁸ Pearson quickly succeeded in bringing about the creation of the "United Nations Emergency Force" (UNEF), with Canada supplying its largest contingent and first commander, General Burns. Unfortunately however, as Pearson had feared, there was no accompanying movements towards peace. Still Pearson's accomplishment in establishing the UNEF was far from trivial as the force did foster regional stability and a calm along the Egyptian-Israeli frontier that endured for more than a decade.

Israeli concern over naval freedom in the Straits of Tiran presented a problem that Pearson addressed with his characteristic ingenuity and energy. Israel refused to withdraw from Sharm el-Sheikh, which overlooks the entrance to the Gulf of Aquaba, without some assurance that its right to free passage through the Straits would be protected. According to a formula devised by Pearson, the U.S., Great Britain, France, together with as many maritime powers as could be mustered would pledge to uphold Israel's right, under Article 51 of the United Nation's Charter, to unmolested passage through the Straits of Tiran. Pearson had originally hoped to gain U.N. endorsement for his plan but failed due to opposition from the Soviet Block and many Third World nations. Nevertheless, after having received guarantees from the major western maritime powers, Israel accepted the Pearson plan and relinquished Sharm el-Sheikh to the UNEF.

How had Canada, a minor world power been able to become such a strong force in resolving the Suez Crisis? To a large extent, the situation dictated that Canada assume the role it did. Canada alone combined close and friendly ties with all three western powers involved, with a reputation for impartiality in both Israel and Egypt. Yet, this would have proved meaningless had Canada not been represented by a man with the vision, dedication, and abilities of Lester Pearson.²⁹

Apart from its opposition in 1956 to the British and French assault on Egypt, Canada under Pearson was generally consistent in its support of western posi-

tions on the Middle East. When the General Assembly voted to have the Algerian question brought before the U.N. in 1957, Canada sided with France in opposition to the decision. In the Canadian government's opinion as articulated by Pearson, strife in Algeria was an internal French matter:

"I can only say that we opposed, and regret this unfortunate decision to inscribe on the agenda a question which under the Charter falls so clearly within the domestic jurisdiction of France. Decisions of this kind in our view only harm the United Nations without advancing the cause of freedom and self-government in whose name they were made."³⁰

The next Middle Eastern upheaval to occupy the attention of Canadian diplomats was the troubled situation in Lebanon during 1958. On May 27 of that year the government of Lebanon levelled charges in the Security Council that the United Arab Republic was subversively interfering in Lebanese affairs. To investigate these accusations the Security Council set up the "United Nation's Observer Group in Lebanon" (UNOGIL) which included a group of Canadian officers. Following the revolt in Iraq, Lebanese President Chamoun, fearful of the uprising's repercussions in Lebanon, appealed to Eisenhower to send troops to Lebanon in hopes of stabilizing the situation. Soon thereafter, King Hussein of Jordan, harboring parallel concerns, issued a similar entreaty to Great Britain. Both Western powers responded quickly, with American marines landing on the shores of Lebanon on July 15, 1958, and British soldiers arriving in the Hashemite Kingdom two days later. Canada supported the U.S. and British actions on the basis that the troops were only deployed temporarily in order to restore regional stability and to allow the United Nations adequate time to ensure the preservation of Lebanese and Jordanian independence.³¹

As in 1956, Canada opposed a resolution, this time by the USSR, for a simple unilateral withdrawal of troops from Lebanon and Jordan. Together with Norway, Canada drafted an alternative resolution calling for the withdrawal of U.S. and British troops coupled with the establishment of a framework for the maintenance of peace in the region. While this resolution was being debated, several Arab states came up with a resolution of their own that was similar to the Canadian-Norwegian one, and probably inspired by it.³² Satisfied that the new resolution met its basic objectives, Canada withdrew its proposal and voted for the Arab one. In fact, the Canadians actually preferred the Arab resolution because it resulted from the efforts of the parties most directly concerned.³³

Canada's first expansion of diplomatic representation in the Middle East since the opening of the Beirut embassy came about rather circuitously. In the mid-1960's the Canadian government initiated an international assistance program that was designed as "an outward looking expression of the bilingual character of Canada."³⁴ The government was seeking to demonstrate its

heightened sensitivity to the French component of the Canadian national make-up by placing a priority on strengthening Canadian ties with French speaking societies abroad. In the Middle East the program involved the provision of development aid to the countries of French North Africa. It was in this manner that Canada forged its first substantive limits with the Magreb thereby laying the foundations for the full diplomatic relations that were subsequently established with Tunisia in 1966 and with Algeria and Morocco in the early 1970's. Assistance to North Africa was channelled through the "Canadian International Development Agency" (CIDA) and included support for the development of agriculture, fisheries, public health, education and communications.

The events surrounding the Six Day War of June 1967 were a major jolt to Canadian policy in the Middle East and Canadian foreign policy in general. On May 16, 1967 President Nasser demanded that the UNEF be withdrawn from Gaza, and Sinai including Sharm el-Sheikh. In a move that made the outburst of war virtually certain, U.N. Secretary General U. Thant acquiesced to Nasser's dictate. Egypt then promptly massed its forces along the frontiers with Israel and blockaded the Straits of Tiran. Pearson had vehemently opposed U Thant's decision to remove the UNEF without first bringing the matter before the United Nations. The Canadian Prime Minister argues that since the UNEF was set up by the entire General Assembly, it could not be disbanded by the demands of only one U.N. member. The General Assembly alone could make such a decision.

Despite Canadian attempts to ease tension in the weeks before the war, Pearson's enthusiasm and effectiveness as a mediator had declined. Nasser had become increasingly hostile towards Canada which he came to view as being pro-Israeli and a messenger-boy of the Western powers.³⁵ Yet, because Canada's allies were unified in an attempt to reverse the escalating crisis, there was no special incentive for Canada to intervene as was the case during the 1956 War. In spite of this, it was the joint initiative of Canada and Denmark that led to the convening of the Security Council on May 24, 1967, to discuss the deteriorating situation in the Middle East.

Otherwise, Canada was content to play a limited role by supporting the efforts of the Western Powers to prevent the outbreak of war. Following the lead of Great Britain, the Canadian government sent an assurance to Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol that Canada would support any U.N. measures to guarantee Israel's right of passage through the Straits of Tiran. Since it was obvious to all that the United Nations would not act, this was equivalent to a proclamation that Canada was unwilling to do anything.³⁶ It was also a flagrant reversal of Canada's 1957 pledge to act in concert with other maritime powers outside the

jurisdiction of the U.N. At one point, Canada indicated that it “may give a ship or two” toward Lyndon Johnson’s “Operation Regatta” — the proposed international flotilla that the U.S. hoped would reopen the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. Parrotting Great Britain once again, on May 28 Canada backed down, notifying the U.S. that Canada would not join “Operation Regatta.” Consequently, Johnson informed Israel that his administration would not act alone and that the U.S. had abandoned its efforts to open the Straits.³⁷ Pearson’s fragile 1956-1957 agreements had come unravelled when tested for the first time, and to no one’s surprise on June 4 war broke out.

Immediately after the war, on June 9, Pearson brought forward in the House of Commons a six-point plan which he felt could provide the basis for a lasting peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The Prime Minister called for “certain withdrawals” of Israeli forces, accompanied by negotiations to achieve an overall peace agreement.³⁸ International waterways must remain open to all countries, with any disputes over the waters referred to the International Court of Justice. In addition, passage of ships from any country through the Suez Canal should be enforced by the Security Council. To preserve and monitor the peace, suggested Pearson, a U.N. presence and a demilitarized zone should be established on either side of the border. Lastly, renewed efforts should be undertaken to solve the refugee problem.

Pearson’s principles for peace were largely incorporated into the Security Council’s Resolution 242 which Canada, as a member of the Security Council at the time, played a prominent role drafting.³⁹ Once endorsed by the U.N., resolution 242 became the touchstone of Canadian policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict and has continued as such, with certain modifications, up until today. Essentially, Resolution 242 called for a withdrawal from territories occupied during the June war, the right of every state in the region to peace and security, freedom of navigation in all international waters, and a solution to the refugee problem.⁴⁰ To demonstrate its convictions to the inadmissibility of acquiring territories by force as specified in Resolution 242, the Government of Canada has formulated strict guidelines for travel by Canadian officials in the occupied areas.

The development that finally caused a dramatic shift in Canada’s Middle East policy was the election in 1968 of Pierre Trudeau as Prime Minister. Against a backdrop of disillusionment with the U.N.’s role in the period before the Six Day War, immediately after taking office the Trudeau government undertook a major review of Canada’s foreign policy.⁴¹ Trudeau, who expressed reservations about Canada’s traditional role as an “honest broker” and peace-keeper in international disputes, believed that foreign policy must serve domes-

tic interests. Predictably, the conclusions of the the foreign policy review reflected the Trudeau viewpoint.⁴² The report recommended that Canada reduce its role in the United Nations while expanding its development assistance programs and bilateral relations with the countries of the Third World.

Another policy of Trudeau's that had indirectly begun to discourage commitment to U.N. peace-keeping in the Middle East was the Prime Minister's campaign to sharply reduce defense spending. By participating in U.N. peace-keeping, Canada's shrinking armed forces were being severely overextended. As a result, support for peace-keeping both in the army and the Department of Defense, traditionally bastions of support for the United Nations, also began to erode. Still, Canada has yet to withdraw from its peace-keeping duties and there is no indication that it is about to do so.

At first, Trudeau's foreign policy shift had little impact on Canada's relations with countries in the Middle East. Paradoxically, the October War of 1973, which propelled Canada back into a peace-keeping role, also finally triggered Canada's new diplomatic thrust in the Middle East.⁴³ Within days of the cease-fire, Canada received a request to serve on a renewed peace-keeping force. With Canada's western allies frantic over the Arab oil embargo, international economic stability threatened, and the prospect of superpower conflict ominously high, the Canadian government realized that it could not remain an impassive and unconcerned bystander.⁴⁴ Yet, with the memory of the events of May and June 1967 still fresh, the Canadian government demanded that certain conditions be met before it agreed to join the rejuvenated UNEF and the newly created "United Nations Disengagement Observer Force" (UNDOF) on the Golan Heights. To prevent the recurrence of the UNEF's 1967 demise, the peace-keeping forces and Canada's participation in them had to be acceptable to all the parties upon whose territories they would be deployed, but responsible only to the United Nations. Canada's commitment to the force would not be open ended, with continued participation contingent upon there being "reasonable expectations that the parties will negotiate a settlement."⁴⁵ Finally, it was demanded that more precise and equitable financial arrangements be made so that Canada, unlike in the past, would not have to bear an excessive load. When all these criteria appeared to be adequately met, Canada acquiesced to participation in UNEF II and UNDOF, in which it once again supplied the largest contingents. The reluctance and skepticism with which Canada accepted its renewed peace-keeping role is evident in an address by Minister of External Affairs Allen MacEachen to the UN General Assembly:

"I would be less than candid if I did not admit Canadians are today less inclined to accept in an unquestioning way the burdens of participation. Their concern springs mainly from

the fact that peacekeeping endeavors often seem to do no more than perpetuate an uneasy status quo. If United Nation's peacekeeping activity is to be finally effective, it must be accompanied by a parallel effort on the political level, especially by the parties most directly concerned, to convert the temporary peace that a peacekeeping force is asked to maintain into something more durable. If this is not done, and if those who contribute to peacekeeping roles are faced with indefinite prolongation of their hazardous tasks, I am afraid governments will be less inclined to respond to future requests for troops. ⁴⁶

The Canadian government was pleasantly surprised with the progress of the negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors. MacEachen welcomed the extension of the U.N. peacekeeping mandates and pledged that as long as the UNEF II and UNDOF:

"... can continue to provide a measure of stability between Israel and its neighbors and can help to establish and maintain a climate in which substantive negotiations can take place. Canada fully intends to maintain its contribution." ⁴⁷

Immediately following the October War the expansion of bilateral relations in the Arab World became a major priority of Trudeau's foreign policy. Although the government had decided to broaden its diplomatic representation in the Arab World before the October War, the war and its repercussions greatly accelerated the process. ⁴⁸ In December 1973 it was announced that full diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia would be established, and soon thereafter similar announcements were made with reference to Bahrein, Qatar, Oman, the United Arab Emirates and Iraq.

Underlying Canada's campaign to increase its diplomatic representation in the Arab World were certain strong economic considerations. During the early 1970's Canada was experiencing a trade deficit which prompted increased efforts to expand exports. The wealthy countries of the Middle East provided excellent markets for Canadian goods and services. ⁴⁹ Apart from the export of foodstuffs and manufactured items, Canada has been particularly successful in the export of skilled services including engineering, telecommunications, management consulting, oil drilling and banking. Trade with the Arab world rose tenfold between 1969 and 1974, and has been rising steadily since. Canadian sales to Israel quadrupled between 1970 and 1975 reaching a total of sixty million dollars in the latter year. ⁵⁰ Between 1971 and 1975 Canadian exports to Iran increased on the average of 75% a year. Trade with Iran however, levelled off after 1975 as discontent with the Shah's modernization program forced budget cutbacks. Since the fall of the Shah, Canadian contacts with Iran, both economic and diplomatic, have suffered as Canada, being "a stooge of the Great Satan to the South" has become somewhat unpopular in the new Islamic Republic. Though Canada has aggressively encouraged trade with the Middle East it has not sought Middle Eastern capital investment with Canada. With

both the government and the public in Canada growing increasingly nationalistic, foreign ownership has become frowned upon.⁵¹

In doing business with the Arab world the Canadian government was confronted with the problem of how to respond to the boycott imposed by numerous Arab countries after the 1973 war — a dilemma that had both economic and domestic political repercussions. The boycott blacklisted goods produced in Israel as well as companies dealing with the Jewish State. In addition, it prohibited firms doing business in the Arab world from dealing with blacklisted firms in their own country. On occasion, Arab purchasers also demanded assurances from their Canadian trading partners that they did not employ “Zionists” in senior positions.⁵² Over one hundred Canadian companies have been boycotted by the Arab States.⁵³

Many Canadians, outraged at what they saw as economic blackmail and tampering with their freedoms by foreign powers, demanded Government action to combat the boycott. The business community, on the other hand, did not want its burgeoning trade in the Middle East jeopardized by any government measures that might be viewed as hostile by the Arabs. Several Arab governments had in fact warned that any legislation designed to counteract the boycott would be regarded an “anti-Arab,” and would result in a serious deterioration of economic and diplomatic relations between Canada and the Arab world.⁵⁴

The government remained silent on the Arab boycott until May 8, 1975 when Trudeau attacked the boycott in the House of Commons declaring that:

“This type of practice is alien to everything the government stands for and, indeed, to what in general, Canadian ethics stand for.”⁵⁵

Despite the Prime Minister’s bold words, the government was slow to take any follow-up action. During a tour of the Middle East by MacEachen in 1976, the External Affairs Minister never once brought up the boycott question in his extensive discussions on economic matters with Arab leaders.⁵⁶ It was not until January 21, 1977 that the government acted by publishing a set of guidelines ostensibly intended to curb compliance with the boycott. According to the guidelines, government aid and services would be denied to firms guilty of abiding by those aspects of the boycott deemed unacceptable. In addition, the names of offending firms would be published. Trudeau defended the guidelines as adequate, arguing that in conducting business in the Arab world government assistance was often crucial. Instituting stricter anti-boycott legislation, as the Americans had done, would undermine Canada’s relations with the Arab world. When it was pointed out that the U.S. had not suffered appreciably as a result of its strong anti-boycott measures, the government countered that Canadian firms were much more vulnerable than their American counterparts.⁵⁷

On December 15, 1978 the government finally introduced a piece of anti-boycott legislation — Bill C-32. Basically, Bill C-32 was a restatement of the earlier guidelines plus an additional clause that would impose limited fines on companies complying with the boycott. Donald Jamison, who by that time had replaced MacEachen as Minister of External Affairs, upheld the proposed bill by contending that more stringent anti-boycott legislation would simply “multiply bureaucracy.”⁵⁸ Curiously, the bill never received a second reading and Parliament was dissolved before it could be voted upon. In the elections that followed, Pierre Trudeau’s Liberals were tossed out of office, with Bill C-32 meeting the same fate as the government that drafted it. Almost from the outset, Trudeau’s government had been widely accused of cowardice and hypocrisy, even from within its own ranks, for its handling of the Arab boycott issue.⁵⁹

Another result of the October War was that the question of the Palestinians emerged as arguably the most prominent issue in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Owing to both domestic political considerations and Canada’s expanding ties with the Arab world, this was an extremely sensitive matter, but one that could not be ignored. Prior to 1973, Canada acknowledged only the individual rights of the Palestinians. Since the drafting of Resolution 242 Canada held that the Palestinian question was inseparable from all the other aspects of the conflict, and should therefore only be addressed in the context of an overall settlement. To separate the Palestinian problem would be to undermine Resolution 242. Even after the October War Minister of External Affairs Mitchell Sharp stressed that:

“Canada has supported Resolution 242 since its adoption in 1967. Our adherence has been total but strictly limited to the terms of the resolution itself and we have always refused to add anything to it or subtract anything from it that were not immediately apparent from the wording.”⁶⁰

Several weeks later Sharp’s successor MacEachen added that his government would oppose:

“... any action that would tend to emphasize one aspect to the exclusion of other equally valid principles. This applies, of course, to the Palestinian issue, as to all others involved. While important, and indeed fundamental, to the Arab-Israeli dispute, this issue evidently cannot be resolved separately and without consideration for other elements of the problem. We should be opposed to any unilateral actions that could be prejudicial to the comprehensive negotiated settlement that is being sought.”⁶¹

Almost immediately thereafter this position began to shift. By 1974 Canada had come to support the collective rights of the Palestinians and Palestinian participation in any negotiations for an overall settlement to the Arab-Israeli con-

flict. The dilemma of who should represent the Palestinians, in MacEachen's opinion, was a matter to be determined by all the parties to the conflict, including Israel:

"Canada. . . [refuses] to prejudice both whether the P.L.O. should be one of, or the only representative of the Palestinians. In other words, we refused to judge whether it should be one of the representatives, whether it should be represented at all" ⁶²

However as MacEachen continued, he may have betrayed his leanings on this matter:

"It is true that at the Rebat summit conference the Arab countries, apparently with the concurrence of the King of Jordan, accepted the P.L.O. as, in their view, the appropriate representative of the Palestinian people. That of course, is a new factor in the situation." ⁶³

Speaking at the General Assembly, the head of Canada's delegation Dr. Saul F. Rae went further in stating that the P.L.O. was a legitimate representative of the Palestinians, though perhaps not the only one. ⁶⁴

In May 1974 Canada voted in favor of extending observer status to the P.L.O. in the World Health Organization. Several months later, Canada abstained on a vote to grant the P.L.O. the same status in the "United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization" (UNESCO). Once again on November 22 Canada abstained in the voting for Resolution 3236 which granted the P.L.O. observer status within all U.N. organs including the General Assembly. While in agreement that the Palestinians should be represented in any discussions affecting their interests, this could be achieved Dr. Rae stated "without departing from established procedures." ⁶⁵ Participation in the U.N. General Assembly, as laid down in the organization's Charter reminded Dr Rae, is restricted to delegations representing sovereign states or associations of a sovereign states. In explaining why he did not vote against the resolution Rae remarked that:

"Canada is fully in accord with the view that any enduring peaceful settlement must take account of the legitimate interests of the Palestinians . . . Canada will not oppose any legitimate step intended to ensure that full voice is allowed to the Palestinian people." ⁶⁶

Rae then went on to expand upon why his government refused to support the resolution:

"Canada cannot support a resolution which ignores the existence of Israel and its role as an essential party in any search for an eventual negotiated peace settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. In this context the resolution makes no reference to the principles enunciated in Resolution 242 which Canada continues to believe provides a valid and available framework for such a settlement. Further, there is no mention of the requirement for negotiations among the parties directly involved in this dispute as called for by Security Council Resolution 338, which Canada believes is the only way in which the Arab-Israeli conflict can even-

tually be resolved.”⁶⁷

Canada's abstention on Resolution 3236, and the reasoning behind it, became representative of Canada's voting in the U.N. on matters dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinians. Canada did however, strongly condemn the U.N. resolution of November 10, 1975 which referred to Israel as “the racist regime in occupied Palestine” and described Zionism as “a form of racialism and racial discrimination.”⁶⁸ MacEachen explained his delegations repeated abstentions by the principle of “partial acceptability.” “Partially acceptable” resolutions were one which contained clauses opposed by Canada along with at least one element that was in keeping with Canadian views.⁶⁹

The catalyst that jettisoned the Palestinian question to the forefront of Canadian domestic politics was the scheduled holding of two U.N. conferences in Canada; the U.N. Conference on Crime set for September 1975 in Toronto, and the U.N. Habitat Conference to be held in Vancouver during May and June of 1976. As official observers in the United Nations, the P.L.O. was automatically invited by the U.N. to participate in both conferences. Canada however, had agreed to host the conferences before the P.L.O. had attained its official status in the U.N. The government had thus gotten itself embroiled in an emotionally charged, unwanted and unwinnable domestic debate over whether to admit the P.L.O. delegations into the country to attend the conferences.

Soon after the U.N. decision to grant the P.L.O. observer status, a broad range of Canadian organizations mobilized substantial opposition to admitting P.L.O. representatives into Canada. That the first Conference was on the theme of crime made the thought of P.L.O. attendance especially repellent to many Canadians. It was argued that since according to Canadian legal definitions the P.L.O. was a terrorist organization, by law its members had to be barred entry into the country.⁷⁰ Within Parliament, a strong all-party consensus emerged embracing this view.

Hoping to salvage the conference with a minimum of political damage to the government, the Department of External Affairs suggested that only those members of the P.L.O. who were known terrorists be refused entry into Canada. Subsequently, on July 18, 1978 MacEachen requested that the U.N. postpone the Crime Conference for one year, apparently hoping that the delay would dampen protest and thereby permit the conference to proceed with a minimum of opposition. In explaining the request MacEachen stated:

“We were all aware of the public outcry for or against the admission to Canada for this congress, of observers from the Palestine Liberation Organization . . . We could not ignore the risk of public disorders . . . But in the final analysis, two factors dominated in our discussions. The first was the inevitable intrusion of unrelated political considerations into the

proceedings of the Congress. The second was the re-escalation of violence in the Middle East and subsequently into the Congress itself.’⁷¹

MacEachen’s reasoning was vague and convoluted to say the least. Even if one accepted his rationale, there was little reason to believe that a delay of one year would appreciably alter the situation.⁷²

In any case, irritated by the public opposition and government vacillation, the U.N. transferred the Crime Conference to Geneva. The Habitat Conference however, proceeded according to plan the following year with the P.L.O. represented. Ultimately, the government’s ambiguous position throughout this episode left persons on both sides of the issue dissatisfied and bitter. Ironically, as Canada was attempting to reduce its role in the Arab-Israeli dispute, matters related to the conflict such as the Arab boycott and the P.L.O. had come to play a prominent role in domestic politics.

As mentioned earlier, in January of 1976 MacEachen made a tour of several Middle Eastern countries. The mission was hoped to demonstrate Canada’s new more “even handed” approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict, strengthen bilateral contacts in the region, and to repair any possible damage done to existing relations caused by the recent controversy in Canada over the P.L.O.⁷³ Throughout his trip, which included stops in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq and Israel, MacEachen was pleased to find that his government’s Middle East policy was deemed acceptable by all those with whom he conferred.⁷⁴ During discussions with Arab officials, MacEachen also discovered that improved relations with the Arab world were not dependent upon Canada’s adopting a more pro-Arab position in the Middle East conflict. Arab leaders manifested little concern with Canada’s stand on the P.L.O., and did not pressure MacEachen to recognize the organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians.

The 1979 federal election provided perhaps the most dramatic case of the Middle East intruding upon Canadian politics. On April 25, 1974 Progressive Conservative leader Joe Clark unexpectedly issued a press release stating that if elected, his government would recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and hence move the Canadian Embassy from Tel Aviv to the Holy City. The timing of his announcement, Clark piously asserted, was determined not by election considerations but rather by the recently concluded peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. To have done so earlier:

“... might have complicated the Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations. Thankfully those difficult negotiations have now borne fruit.”⁷⁵

According to Clark:

“This historic peace event opens the way for Canada to take positive initiatives in the Middle East. One such initiative would be recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel with free access to its holy places provided to all faiths. As a symbol of this recognition, my government would be prepared to move the Canadian Embassy from Tel Aviv to the western part of Jerusalem, which has been part of Israel since the creation of the country in 1948.

“This is not to be construed as the taking of sides in the Arab-Israeli negotiations, respecting the West Bank, the Palestinians, or the broader terms of a comprehensive peace settlement between all countries in the Middle East. Rather this foreign policy initiative is only a recognition of the demographic and legal realities of Jerusalem in 1949 . . .”⁷⁶

Clark was immediately attacked by the other political parties for what they saw as a naked attempt to attract Jewish voters. Clark had in fact, been urged by his campaign manager and three Conservative Party candidates in heavily Jewish Toronto ridings to make the announcement. Yet, though political concerns certainly played a part in the decision, it would appear that Clark was genuinely convinced the embassy move was the morally correct thing to do.⁷⁷ With his limited knowledge of the Middle East, and foreign policy matters in general, the young Tory leader apparently did not appreciate the potential repercussions of his pledge. Had Clark been defeated, the announced embassy transfer would have become a mere election footnote. Instead however, Clark achieved a slim victory, with his campaign promise quickly coming to threaten the close Canadian relations with the Arab World that the Liberals had built up over the preceding decade. Paradoxically, Clark’s controversial promise made no discernible impact on Jewish voting patterns.⁷⁸

Anxious to demonstrate that he would make good on his election pledges, a few days after becoming Prime Minister, on June 5, 1979 Joe Clark forcefully reiterated his resolve to move Canada’s embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Almost instantaneously, the befuddled Prime Minister was bombarded from many corners by advice, entreaties, warnings, and threats to reverse his stand on the embassy. The U.S. government quickly conveyed its displeasure with Canada’s new policy in Jerusalem. Nine angry Arab ambassadors converged on the offices of both Clark and his Minister of External Affairs Flora McDonald, presaging dire consequences if Canada carried out its proposed embassy move. Several Arab countries actually threatened to break diplomatic relations and imposed economic sanctions. The P.L.O. called the Tory policy “an act of aggression.”⁷⁹ Forecasting enormous damage to Canada’s economy if the embassy switch went ahead, the Canadian business community exerted strong pressure on the government to back down. Both the Department of External Affairs and the Department of Trade and Commerce were unhappy with the proposed move, and even in his own party Clark lacked any wide support on this issue.⁸⁰ Clearly, within a week of having achieved office, the new

government was floundering over its leader's unfortunate election promise.

It soon became apparent to Clark and his government that the only way to extricate themselves from the embassy quagmire was a complete policy reversal.⁸¹ On June 23, 1979, the Prime Minister appointed Robert Stanfield to lead a Canadian mission to the Middle East:

"... to examine ways and means of implementing the Government's policy on Jerusalem in a manner that will be compatible with efforts to achieve such a [comprehensive] peace."⁸²

Stanfield was also instructed to conduct a review of Canada's bilateral ties in the Middle East, and to formulate recommendations on how these relations could best be enhanced.

By the very nature of Stanfield's assignment it was obvious that Clark had already decided to rescind his embassy pledge. The Stanfield mission was merely a subterfuge to facilitate a dignified retreat. Stanfield was not commissioned to simply advise the government on how best to implement its Jerusalem policy, but rather to come up with a formula for implementation that would contribute to the peace process. It took no great insight into the Middle East to know that such a duality was absurd. By siding with Israel on an issue so vital to the Arabs as Jerusalem, it would have become impossible for Canada to make any contribution toward the achievement of a peace settlement. The Stanfield mission was likewise unnecessary to ascertain that Canada's relations with the Arab world could only be hurt by the embassy move.

To no one's surprise, when Stanfield submitted his interim report on October 26, 1979 it contained a strong recommendation that Canada not transfer its Tel Aviv embassy to Jerusalem.⁸³ Stanfield explained that for several reasons, some obvious, others dubious, the embassy move would undermine the peace process. Though the final report was not due until the following year, on October 29 Clark curtly announced in the House of Commons that:

"The government accepts the recommendations that no action be taken on the change of the Canadian embassy until the status of Jerusalem is clarified within a comprehensive agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbors."⁸⁴

Clark's quick acceptance of the report, and his brief statement in announcing it, betrayed his impatience to place the entire costly affair behind him. Recalling the episode Clark confessed that:

"I underestimated the degree to which Canada is exposed when we take a position that is unpopular with certain powerful countries in the world."⁸⁵

Stanfield's final report was submitted on February 20, 1980. Although on

the question of Jerusalem the Stanfield mission was little more than a charade, it did have one constructive aspect. The Stanfield report provided the first comprehensive review of Canada's policy in the Middle East and offered numerous useful suggestions as to how Canada could improve its bilateral relations in the area. Like Trudeau's government before him, Stanfield lauded Resolution 242 as still the best basis for peace, while criticising it for not fully taking into account the rights of the Palestinians. Stanfield however, went further than the Liberals in recommending that Canada support the establishment of a Palestinian homeland and broaden its contacts with the P.L.O., which he described as having an "important leadership role amongst Palestinians."⁸⁶

Assessing the impact of the embassy controversy and the Stanfield mission is problematic, especially since the Clark government was replaced by the Trudeau Liberals before Stanfield's report was even produced. There is little doubt that the embassy issue was a political fiasco for Clark's government, undermining public confidence in its ability to rule, and contributing to the Tory's subsequent election loss. It seems unlikely that there was any long-term damage to Canada's standing in the Arab world beyond perhaps a slight residual leeriness on the part of certain Arab governments of future Canadian involvement in Middle Eastern affairs. Yet even this the Stanfield mission probably went a long way to offset. Stanfield's pronouncements on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinians were much closer to the Arab position than those of any previous Canadian government.

Though the governing Liberals have not adopted an official position on the Stanfield report, they do regard it as a "useful document."⁸⁷ Since returning to power the Trudeau government has not noticeably departed from its previous Middle East policy. One "new initiative" taken by the Liberals was their decision not to proceed with any anti-boycott legislation. The 1977 guidelines they claimed had proved sufficiently effective on their own. Considering that the name of a single offender has yet to be published, the government was either correct in this contention, or it has been lax in enforcing the guidelines. In view of the Liberals' hesitating efforts to combat the Arab boycott since it was first imposed, the truth is probably closer to the latter. It has been suggested by a senior official in the Middle East Division of Canada's Department of External Affairs that the Liberals may have been influenced in their decision not to reintroduce anti-boycott legislation by the section in Stanfield's report dealing with the Arab boycott.⁸⁸ While not openly opposing the passing of an anti-boycott bill, Stanfield cautioned that such legislation would undermine Canadian relations in the Arab world, and as a consequence, cause severe damage to Canada's economy.

Although Trudeau's achievements are often deprecated, there is no denying that he brought profound changes in Canada's policy towards the Middle East. Trudeau's term as Prime Minister constitutes a unique phase in Canada's policy in the region. In fact Canada's Middle East policy can be divided into three such distinct phases, dominated by three very different men — Pierre Trudeau, Lester Pearson, and William Lyon Mackenzie King. Though none of these men constantly wielded power over Canadian foreign policy during their respective eras, the influence and ideas of each was pervasive and continuous.

Prior to 1948, during the Mackenzie King years, Canada had no interest in the Middle East, its only policy towards the area being the unquestioning support of Great Britain in everything it did there. To Pearson, Mackenzie King's insular world view was an anathema. Throughout the Pearson years, Canada's policy on the Middle East was guided by Pearson's undying commitment to the U.N., and to ensuring that the international body develop into a force for promoting stability and peace throughout the world. Since the Middle East was a perpetual hub of conflict it became a central focus of Pearson's attention. It might be said that during the Pearson years, Canada had a policy on the Middle East rather than in the Middle East.⁸⁹ For Pearson, the Arab-Israeli conflict was a test case for the United Nations upon which the success of the organization could depend. Pearson was equally concerned however, that Middle Eastern strife neither be allowed to undermine the western alliance, nor develop into a superpower confrontation.

Even before Trudeau came to power in 1968, Canada's second major Middle East policy shift had already begun. The failure of the United Nations to act decisively to prevent war from breaking out in 1967 provoked serious questions in Canada about the efficacy of the U.N. and Canada's previously unequivocal support for it. Trudeau, who shared this skepticism, believed Canada's foreign policy should not be based on nebulous altruistic tendencies, but rather upon national self-interest. Realizing the enormous economic potential of the Middle East, Trudeau embarked upon an ambitious and eminently successful campaign to expand bilateral relations with the countries of the region. While still never shirking U.N. requests for Canadian participation in peacekeeping activities, Canada's consent is no longer unconditional and at times only grudgingly given.

Expanding Canadian interests in the Middle East, coupled with changing political realities in the region, have led to modifications in Canada's position on the Arab-Israeli conflict. While not reducing its support for the legitimacy and security of Israel, Canada has become more circumspect about adopting positions that might be upsetting to the Arabs. Since 1967 the Canadian govern-

ment has gradually gone from viewing the Palestinians as "refugees" to recognizing them as a "people" whose "rights" and aspirations must be satisfied. Resolution 242, which was supported exclusively and wholeheartedly in 1967, is now seen merely as a "useful" but incomplete framework for peace because of its inadequate reference to the Palestinian question.

Though Canada's policy in the Middle East differed fundamentally under Pearson and Trudeau, there is also an underlying current of continuity between the two periods. Since 1948 every Canadian government has been firm in its support of Israel's right to exist in peace and security. Yet despite this, Canada has generally been as highly regarded in the Arab World as in Israel. This is no small achievement considering the intensity of emotion on either side of the conflict, and how few other nations have been able to retain the good will of both Arabs and Israelis. That Canada has always tried to be objective and constructive in its approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict is recognized and appreciated throughout the Middle East.

Canadians have cause to be relatively proud of Canada's record in the Middle East. Their government has generously provided both humanitarian and development aid to the area. Canada has always been a force for realism, compromise, and conciliation, and its contribution to U.N. peacekeeping has been unsurpassed. Though somewhat belatedly, the government of Canada has forged strong and warm relations with most countries in the Middle East and successfully encouraged Canadians to take advantage of the ever expanding markets for goods and services in the region. Thus, while aiding in the development of the Middle East, Canada itself has been strengthened. With Canadian ties continuing to proliferate, it seems inevitable that this symbiosis based on shared interests, friendship, and mutual respect can only be further enhanced.

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